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1Abstract
The research approaches Turkish membership question to the European Union 
as an open-ended struggle among social forces. It aims to address whether 
there is a hegemonic pro-membership perspective and if any, which social 
forces are supporting it. Is there any alternative contesting and resisting 
membership and neo-liberal restructuring? Can disadvantaged groups from 
globalisation form a united struggle, and if not, how can we account for the 
lack of an alternative? At the theoretical level, it dismisses mainstream 
integration theories as debate is mainly stuck to the dichotomy between 
membership or not (form of integration), that in return is a non-debate. It 
introduces Gramscian historical materialist framework that paves the way to 
account for socio-economic content and power relations underpinning ongoing 
integration process. The argument proceeds by delving into a debate on 
theoretical coordinates regarding hegemony in Gramscian analyses and the 
theory of discourse introduced by Laclau and Mouffe in the Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy. Ultimately, it dismisses theory of discourse and conceives 
class struggle in relation to discipline of capital over society within social 
relations of production. The empirical data relies on semi-structured interviews 
conducted with capital and labour, political parties, state officials and women 
rights/feminist groups and human rights groups. Additionally, particular 
sectors, textile, automotive and agriculture are examined in parallel with 
Gramscian historical materialist coordinates on intra-class struggle.
2I shall argue that pro-membership perspective, whose socio-economic content 
is consolidation of neo-liberal restructuring, is hegemonic. It is pioneered by 
internationally oriented capital and conveyed as the means to stimulate 
competitiveness and economic growth and to consolidate democracy. It draws 
support from nationally oriented capital analogous with delocalization of 
production and integration to transnational production via outsourcing and 
contract manufacturing. Yet, it is possible to identify two rival class strategies 
that contest neo-liberal pro-membership project, neo-mercantilism that is 
supported by nationally oriented labour, nationalist political parties, centre-left 
political parties and Ha-vet (No-Yes) that is underpinned by internationally 
oriented labour, social democratic fraction among the Left, particular women 
rights groups and human rights groups. On the one hand, position of social 
forces underpinning neo-mercantilism is weakened in economy and ideas that 
echo import-substitution policy under Keynesian welfare state regime and 
developmentalist state in periphery are defeated analogous with globalisation 
and neo-liberal restructuring. The only criticism of neo-mercantilist project 
remains on national sensitivities. Put bluntly, the critique is anti-imperialist 
though not anti-capitalist. At the final analysis, membership is interpreted in 
relation to modernization and westernization with a populist discourse. On the 
other hand, although social forces within Ha-vet read European Union as a 
capitalist economic integration model, they conceive internationalisation of 
labour and European Social Model as the only viable mechanism to struggle 
against globalization and transnationalisation of production. Moreover, 
European integration is received positively as a democratization project. 
Ultimately, neither neo-mercantilism that supports ‘membership on equal terms 
3and conditions’, nor Ha-vet that adopts the motto of ‘another globalisation and 
Europe is possible’, stands as an overall alternative.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
The main purpose of this thesis is to consider Turkey’s bid to become a 
member country of the European Union (EU) within the structural dynamics of 
globalisation and neoliberal restructuring. I will consider this as an open-ended 
struggle between social forces, the outcome of which can only be determined 
by class struggle. Turkey stands at the periphery of Europe and its trajectory of 
liberalisation and neoliberal restructuring should not be read independently 
from the processes surrounding its integration to European structures. Turkey 
liberalized trade in relation to the completion of the EU Customs Union whilst 
in the last decade the EU has been defined as an anchor consolidating 
macroeconomic restructuring and financial liberalisation. However, existing 
literature does not read Turkey’s integration into European structures against 
the background of globalisation and neoliberal restructuring. I argue that 
treating globalisation and European integration as independent and autonomous 
processes is a standing that consolidates neoliberal restructuring, presenting the 
relationship between Turkey and the EU as operating only in one direction, 
whereby the EU provides protection from globalisation. This overlooks its role 
in consolidating neoliberal restructuring. To correct this, I follow one of the 
core premises of Gramscian historical materialism and work from an 
understanding that the political economy of Turkey should not be approached 
as independent from nor determined by the European integration process. The 
central question of this thesis draws on and contributes to debates in European 
integration and enlargement, hegemony, political subjectivity, and alternatives 
to globalisation. 
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The trajectory of Turkey’s membership question is puzzling, and differs 
previous cases of EU enlargement. Turkey formed an association partnership 
with the European Economic Community (EEC) through the Ankara Treaty 
that was signed on 12 September 1963. Following this, Turkey signed an 
association agreement but was not incorporated in the successive waves of 
enlargement that followed. Although it applied for membership on 14 April 
1987, it was not included in the list of candidate countries at the 1997 
Luxembourg European Council, when the EU committed itself to enlargement 
towards Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). It was, however, 
declared as a candidate country at the Helsinki summit on 12 December 1999. 
Meanwhile, Turkey completed the Customs Union on 31 December 1995 and 
remains the only country to have completed the Customs Union prior to 
membership. Accession negotiations began on 3 October 2005 and were 
suspended the following year. The process was defined as a ‘train crash’ by 
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn due to Turkey’s refusal to grant trade 
privileges to Cyprus. The EU interprets extension of trade concessions to all 
member states (thus including the Republic of Cyprus) as a natural condition of 
the Customs Union. Turkey, however, does not recognize the Republic of 
Cyprus as representative of the whole island due to its policy vis-a-vis Turkish 
Cypriots. The negotiations halted and the EU froze eight chapters over thirty-
five areas and decided not to close any chapter until a resolution is reached. To 
date, only the Science and Research chapter is completed. What is even more 
puzzling is the current stance of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
Government that endorses reforms outside the framework of membership 
status. Its commitment to reforms without necessarily the end state of attaining 
19
membership status is well-received in society. The future trajectory is uncertain 
as the EU left the outcome of negotiations open ended. France and Austria 
have declared that they will hold national referendums on Turkey`s entry. 
There are proposals for a special status of privileged partnership for Turkey –
these had the endorsement of former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The EU reserves permanent derogations 
on agricultural/structural funds and free movement of workers for Turkey’s 
enlargement. There are talks on absorption capacity of the EU with references 
to its enlargement fatigue. The current economic crisis even further 
complicates the picture.
In light of this context, this research does not structure the debate around the 
form of Turkey’s integration. Rather, it focuses on the content of Turkey’s 
integration to global production structure via the EU as a regional integration 
model. It aims to study the Turkish membership question as an ‘open-ended 
struggle’. Its main concern is to present an analysis of the current struggle over 
Turkey’s relationship with the EU among Turkish social forces. At the 
theoretical level, following Cox that ‘theory is always for someone and for 
some purpose’ (Cox, 1981: 128), it questions the social purpose underpinning 
current literature on Turkey-EU relations. In debating hegemony and political 
subjectivity behind alternatives to globalisation, this research delves into a 
debate between Gramscian historical materialism and the theory of discourse of 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Does Gramscian historical materialism necessarily 
constrain the debate on Turkish membership around economic classes, 
constituting a form of economic determinism and class reductionism that 
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excludes struggles around new social movements? Regarding the empirical 
research, it asks whether there is a dominant pro-EU hegemonic project that 
pioneers membership and the ongoing reform processes. And if so, which 
social forces support it? Is there an alternative historical bloc, opposing and 
resisting membership and neoliberal restructuring in Turkey? If any, which 
forces are behind this counter-hegemonic project and can they form a united 
front? And if not, how can we unravel the reasons behind the lack of an 
alternative to neoliberal restructuring? 
There is a large amount of literature on Turkey-EU relations. Some conclusions 
can easily be drawn from the current state of the relevant literature. First, the 
bulk of research focuses on the prospects of attaining membership (Avcı 2003; 
Balkır and Williams 1993; Buzan and Diez 1999; Çarkoğlu and Rubin 2003; 
LaGro and Jorgensen 2007; Park 2000; Rumford 2000; Uğur and Canefe 
2004), or the compatibility of Turkish politics with Europe from a variety of 
perspectives such as security and foreign policy (Müftüler Baç 2000; Buzan 
and Diez 1999; Cizre 2004, Tank 2001); the economy (Hiç, 1995; Hoekman 
and Togan 2005); and specific policies such as migration (Kirişçi 2003) or 
human rights (Dağı 2001; Hale 2003). Public opinion in Turkey`s bid for 
membership is also examined (Canefe and Bora 2003; Çarkoğlu 2004). A 
common problem with this literature is that it is mainly concerned with the 
form of integration. This, in my view, is a non-debate as Turkey`s integration 
with European structures is an ongoing process that cannot be explained 
through a focus on the end-state of negotiations (the question of whether 
Turkey will become a member or not). It fails to consider the socio-economic 
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content of the ongoing integration process, and critique the power relations 
underpinning it. Moreover, this research aspires to pinpoint areas of 
incompatibility, whose social purpose is endorsing membership perspective. 
Thus, this body of literature overlooks the struggle in society among social 
forces. The way opposition to membership is debated is even more 
problematic. Opposition is identified with conservative and nationalist groups -
often with `reluctant` Kemalist elites that struggle to come to terms with 
pluralism - who object to membership due to national concerns regarding the 
dismemberment of Turkey (e.g. Narbone and Tocci, 2007: 237; Canefe and 
Bora, 2003: 120; Rumford, 2003: 379). As a result, resistance to membership is 
seen as conservative and anti-democratic, and is defined as a `threat` that needs 
to be ‘carefully addressed’ (Çarkoğlu: 2004, 41-43). Implicit in this argument 
is that the membership perspective is read as a universally progressive process 
facilitating the adoption of international rules/norms, and democratic reforms. 
Thus, it hides the agency that lies behind the membership project and presents 
it on a universal terrain as if it is not open to class struggle. By the same token, 
dissent is understood solely as belonging to nationalist and conservative 
groups. This tendency stems from reading European integration as a process 
independent and autonomous from globalisation. As a result, there is no space 
to debate alternatives among disadvantaged groups as a result of the negative 
repercussions on welfare that have followed from the integration of Turkey 
with globalisation through the European project. It is a truism that one fraction 
of opposition is conducted on nationalism that is regressive. However, 
monopolising opposition to national/conservative groups has the social purpose 
of silencing opposition among disadvantaged groups from neoliberal 
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membership perspective. In my view, this reading is itself undemocratic, 
contradicting its stated aim of improving democratic standards. 
Few studies embark on a particular theoretical perspective in approaching 
Turkey-EU relations. Indeed, most of the literature is atheoretical (e.g. Avcı, 
2003; Çarkoğlu and Rubin 2003; Rumford, 2000; Tekeli and İlkin, 1993 and 
2000; Uğur and Canefe 2004). However, the assumptions of works that do 
have an explicit theoretical framework are problematic. A group of studies 
utilises mainstream European integration theory - neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism. For instance, Macmillan (2009) draws on 
neofunctionalism to explain why there has not been a rupture in relations 
between Turkey and the EU with spill-over behind an economic rationale. 
However, the trajectory that Turkey is gradually becoming closer to the EU 
behind an economic rationale can hardly be taken for granted. Indeed, there are 
various ups and downs in relations. Moreover, neofunctionalism is unable to 
elucidate timing of enlargement. Why does Turkey – an associate member that 
began to develop functional links in 1963 - lag behind CEECs? 
Neofunctionalism also overlooks why these functional economic links do not 
generate political integration (this criticism will be further developed in 
Chapter Two).
Özen (1999) draws on intergovernmentalism to posit that Turkey-EU relations 
started with concerns over foreign and security policy during the Cold War
23
rather than economic functional links contrary to neo-functionalist 
assumptions. Yet, intergovernmentalism – which conceives of enlargement as 
inter-state bargaining - cannot offer insights into why Turkey has agreed to 
open its market to European competition without getting anything in return 
from the EU. Moreover, it cannot explain the commitment of the current AKP 
Government to reform process without necessarily attaining the membership 
status behind a cost-benefit analysis of inter-state bargaining. More 
importantly, this debate between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism 
constrains Turkey`s membership question to the end-state of negotiations: the 
form of integration. They fail to situate Europe within the structural dynamics 
of globalisation. They frame membership in relation to political decisions made 
by governmental actors and overlook transnational actors. The role of labour 
and trade unions is completely omitted. The question of alternatives to 
membership is ignored or debated in relation to the `form` of integration such 
as privileged partnership. 
The Europeanisation perspective has dominated the theoretical literature on 
Turkey-EU relations in the last decade. These works suggest that after Turkey 
was declared as a candidate at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the EU`s 
credibility through political conditionality has increased to stimulate change at 
the domestic level. The Europeanisation of Turkish politics is studied in a 
number of diverse but related issues including civil-military relations, political 
parties, human rights, the rule of law and foreign policy (Aydın and Açıkmeşe 
2007; Aydın and Keyman 2004; Derviş et. al. 2004; Diez et. al. 2005; Heper 
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2005; Kubicek 2004 and 2005; Külahçı 2005; Müftüler-Baç 2005; Öniş 2003; 
Rumelili 2003 and 2004; Tocci 2005; Schimmelfennig et. al. 2006). 
In my view, the Europeanisation literature is also unsatisfactory for four 
reasons. First, it over-emphasizes the role of Europe in discussing transition, 
ignoring structural factors. European integration is conceived of as a structure, 
though Europe is equally an actor embedded within the global structure. 
Second, this body of literature presents Turkey’s ‘slow’ record of membership 
as an outcome of its reluctance to consolidate its democracy. Hence, its social 
purpose is to stimulate reform process. Third, it operates within neoliberal 
knowledge and thus presents the relationship between state and society on the 
one hand and economics and politics on the other as one of separate and 
autonomous spheres. This is related to its subscription to the ‘strong state’ 
literature in political science on Turkey (e.g. Buğra 1994; Heper 1985; Keyder 
1987), which presents the main struggle in society as one of state elites versus 
the public; or within the contours of centre-periphery cleavage (Mardin 1973). 
Hence, the withering away of the state is seen to be progressive, and to open up 
space for civil society. This standing, in my view, serves to consolidate 
neoliberal restructuring by veiling the class struggle against globalisation. 
Moreover, it presents civil society as progressive; overlooking the ‘fortresses 
and earthworks’ (Gramsci, 1971: 238) in consolidating hegemony of the ruling 
class. It is due to this assumption on the `strong state` that the Europeanisation 
literature paradoxically ends up conceiving of a ‘state’ elite – the Kemalist 
bureaucracy and military - as both the dominant power bloc and a force in 
opposition resisting Europeanisation. This is an outcome of the tradition of 
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'strong state', which, to quote Gramsci, believes in '[e]verything within the 
State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State' (1971: 261), denies 
class struggle and contributes to neoliberal restructuring. Fourth, there is an 
embedded Orientalism in Europeanisation literature, which presupposes 
Europe to be a progressive and superior model to which candidate countries 
have to catch up.
A final category in theoretical literature draws on constructivism. Here, the 
focus is on rule adoption in the Turkish case and the membership movement is 
explained in relation to constructivist ideational factors (Schimmelfennig et. 
al., 2006). Constructivist approaches equally consider identity issues, such as 
the ‘Europeanness’ of Turkey and; stands for probable contributions of Turkish 
membership in creating a multicultural European identity (Grigoriadis, 2009; 
Rumelili, 2008). In my view, the constructivist research agenda constrains the 
debate by focusing on whether enlargement can be explained using ideational 
factors (the logic of appropriateness) or rational calculations (the logic of 
consequences); and arguing in favour of the former. This (supposed) binary 
ignores the material conditions. Turkey's status as a country short of full 
membership is explained as the outcome of Turkey's inability to comply with 
certain European norms and standards (Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006). 
Moreover, the social purpose behind social constructivist research is 
presentation of the EU as a `civilian power` hiding its imperialist and 
expansionist policies. This advances an understanding of imperialism 
autonomous and independent from economics; and plays into a reductionism 
that equates imperialism with military intervention. Finally, there is an 
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embedded Eurocentric bias, through which Europe is presented as an ideal case 
in terms of its record on human rights and democracy. 
To combat these problems, this research adopts Gramscian historical 
materialism to study the Turkish membership question. Gramscian historical 
materialism conceives of integration as a market-oriented, neo-liberal 
hegemonic project (Bieler and Morton 2001; Bieling 2003; Cafruny and Ryner 
2003a; Gill 1998 and 2001; Overbeek 2004; van Apeldoorn 2000 and 2002; 
van Apeldoorn et. al. 2009; van der Pijl 1998 and 2006); and of enlargement as 
the expansion of neo-liberal restructuring (Bieler 2000; Bohle 2006; Holman 
1996 and 1998; Shields 2003 and 2004). There are four merits to adopting this 
framework. First, as integration is embedded within globalisation and 
neoliberal restructuring, it enables the questioning of the socio-economic 
content and the power relations that underlie the current state of integration of 
Turkey to European structures without being stuck to the ‘form’ of integration. 
Framing the research question around the prospects of Turkey becoming a 
member is a non-debate as the process is open-ended and ongoing. For 
instance, Turkey continues to adopt acquis - even for those chapters that are 
blocked - and the AKP Government is committed to the reform process outside 
the membership status. 
Second, it conceives of membership process as an open-ended struggle among 
social forces, the outcome of which can be determined through class struggle. 
Rather than positing automaticity of integration as lying behind the economic 
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rationale, this approach unravels agency behind the ongoing integration and 
reform process, and ultimately opens floor to consider alternatives. The role of 
labour in the struggle is integrated in the analysis, something that is completely 
absent in the mainstream literature (an exception is Yıldırım et. al. 2008). 
Moreover, analogous with Bieler, `due to the diversity of the way production is 
organised, there are rarely two homogenous classes opposing each other in 
capitalism` (2006: 32). Accordingly, there is an emphasis on intra-class 
struggle based on functional – productive capital and money capital - (van der 
Pijl, 1998) and/or geographical fractionation – a struggle between national, 
international and transnational forces of capital and labour (Bieler 2000, 
Robinson 2004, van Apeldoorn 2002). Moreover, the enlargement outcome 
that is established by the class struggle varies from country to country: such as 
a pro-membership hegemonic project in the case of Austria and a pro-EU 
alliance in the case of Sweden (Bieler, 2002: 586-587); and an alliance 
between state elites and transnational capital – that is read as a passive 
revolution - in the case of Central and Eastern Europe (Bohle, 2006: 75). 
Third, it situates the membership process within the structural dynamics of 
globalisation; and the transnationalisation of production and finance. The 
transnationalisation process is differentiated from internationalisation as it goes 
beyond geographical expansion to encompass the organisation of production 
on a global scale through processes of ‘fragmentation and decentralization of 
complex production chains’ and centralisation of command in the economy 
into the hands of transnational capitalist class (Robinson, 2004: 9, 10, 14 and 
15). Accordingly, it can grasp transnational class formation in which the 
28
transnational sphere can be scrutinised in its specificity (van Apeldoorn, 2002 
and Bieler 2000). This in turn paves the way to debate ways and means of 
integrating Turkey’s production structure to the transnational production 
structure and transition in the positions of labour and capital in this process. 
Finally, this approach does not treat state and society relations as one of 
exteriority. Analogous with Gramsci’s conception of the integral state and the 
ethical state (Gramsci, 1971: 263) and Cox’s analyses of ‘forms of state’ (Cox 
1987), it conceives of state-society relations as a social relation (Morton, 
2007a: 120). This in turn avoids state centrism and fetishing the state as a black 
box beyond human agency and an equally problematic treatment of civil 
society as monolithically progressive; a conception that is autonomous and 
independent from the economy and political society. Such a standing not only 
captures the role of the capitalist state per se in the struggle over hegemony, 
but unravels mechanisms of hegemony of the ruling class within civil society.
Following Cox’s argument that ‘production creates the material basis for all 
forms of social existence...including the polity’ (1987: 1), this analysis takes 
social relations of production as a starting point. From this, analyses are 
embedded in three spheres in the debate of the struggle over hegemony: the 
social relations of production, forms of state and the world order - none of 
which has a one-way determinant relationship (Cox 1981, 1987). Different 
configurations of state/society complexes engender different forms of state, 
which are understood in the plural sense (Cox, 1981: 127; 1987: 147-148). The 
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ruling class projects its hegemony internationally, in turn shaping the world 
order and rendering particular social forces structurally privileged in their 
struggle over hegemony at the national level. 
The analysis starts with establishing the main pattern of Turkey’s integration 
into the global production structures by comparing Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) and foreign trade. I argue that Turkey’s economy is integrated via trade 
as FDI is still negligible. Thus, drawing on Bieler (2006: 65), I argue that it 
constitutes a case of internationalism rather than transnationalism. 
Accordingly, intra-class struggle is examined in relation to internationally and 
nationally oriented capital and labour. The following hypothesis is tested in the 
Turkish membership question: the transnationalization of production and 
finance has generated a new division between international social forces of 
capital and labour; and national oriented capital and labour. The former can be 
expected to be in favour of liberalisation and support regional integration to 
stimulate exports (in the case of capital) and to struggle at the international 
level to regain its power that is lost at the national level in tandem with 
transnationalisation of production (in the case of labour). On the contrary, 
national social forces of capital and labour will be more critical about European 
integration and open economy as they will increasingly be exposed to pressures 
of competitiveness in the global market and they would expect protection from 
state (these claims further draw on the work of Bieler, 2000: 48; Bieler, 2005a: 
465; Bieler, 2006: 38). 
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Yet, a word of caution is necessary here: this hypothesis does not presuppose a 
positivist epistemology. It is not the purpose of this thesis to verify or falsify 
these assertions. Rather, its function in the empirical design is to help 
analytically laying out the position of social forces in the open-ended struggle. 
Thus, it is the empirical research that ultimately determines the position of 
social forces in the class struggle. I am, however, careful to note occasions 
where empirical data does not correspond to the hypothesis. 
Methodologically, particular sectors are selected to enable me to consider intra-
class struggle. The textile and automotive industries are analysed as 
internationally oriented as they are the pioneering sectors in Turkey’s export-
promotion strategy, and so have a privileged position in foreign trade. To 
analyse nationally oriented industry, I look at Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprises (SMEs) and the agricultural sector that produce for the domestic 
market. The agricultural sector is still protected and has not been subjected to 
the Customs Union. Public employees are also interviewed as they also 
constitute a category disadvantaged by the welfare and social cuts that form 
part of neoliberal restructuring. Political parties constitute the second category; 
I consider these through the Gramscian concept of the ‘modern Prince’ - ‘an 
organism, a complex element of society... the first cell in which there come 
together germs of a collective will tending to become universal and total...’ 
(Gramsci, 1971: 129). Third, state institutions are integrated into the research 
design following Cox’s argument on internationalisation of state – that 
internationalisation of production engenders a process through which the state 
is internationalised via an intra-state compromise that adjusts national policies 
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on the basis of the needs and requirements of international production, and a 
transition in state structures that empowers ministries related to the economy in 
transmitting the global consensus to the national level (Cox, 1981: 146; 1987: 
253-254). Finally, class struggle is interpreted as resistance against the 
discipline of capital in social reproduction (van der Pijl, 1998). Accordingly, 
struggles around patriarchy, environment and human rights (identity politics, in 
short) are included in debating alternatives to neoliberal membership project as 
an instance of class struggle. 
The thesis employs qualitative techniques, utilising case studies and semi-
structured interviews. In total, eighty interviews were conducted in İstanbul 
and Ankara across two research trips of two months each. In order to fill the 
gaps in the empirical data primary sources were gathered from libraries and 
documentation centres of these institutions. A variety of primary resources 
were also collected directly from the interviewees. The validity of information 
was cross-checked through the information from other interviews as well as the 
consultation of further primary and secondary printed sources. It is possible to 
come across with a variety of primary resources published by representatives 
of capital that reflects their position in relation to economic issues but also 
social policy, democratisation and foreign policy reflecting their endeavour to 
transcend their vested economic interests by presenting membership 
perspective on a wider terrain. For the political parties, interviews are cross-
checked and supported by election manifestos. Additionally, academic articles, 
research papers and/or books of particular organic intellectuals that are either 
employed in institutions or effective in shaping their policies are assessed. The 
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working reports from the general assembly’s or conference proceedings of 
trade unions are also utilised in examining the position of labour.  
However, the bulk of data is generated by interviews. Interviews provide the 
opportunity to obtain information that is not recorded elsewhere (Richards, 
1996. 200). Moreover, in general interviews have the advantage of providing 
an insight into the internal decision-making process of an organisation in 
contrast to policy documents, which only state the outcome of a debate. The 
first empirical step was to map a list of research participants into one of six 
categories: representatives of capital, trade unions, particular industrial sectors, 
political parties, state institutions and alternative subjectivities. It is often stated 
that getting access and arranging the interview is not an easy process with an 
elite group (Burnham et. al., 2004: 208). Most of the interviewees were 
contacted via email although a few of them responded. However, this provided 
me leverage - in my second attempt on the phone - to convince them to conduct 
the interview. The research questions were sent in advance upon request. Most 
of the interviews were digitally recorded though in some cases the interviewee 
preferred not to be recorded and I took notes during the interview. Interviews 
lasted between forty-five to ninety minutes. All interviewees were guaranteed 
anonymity in advance and that no direct quotes would be attributed to them. 
They were guaranteed to receive the transcript of the interview upon request if 
they would prefer to check and/or amend. Harvard style references to the 
interviews are included in the text to indicate where particular points are drawn 
from which specific interview. There is an issue regarding the subjective nature 
of the information gathered through interviewing (Richards, 1996: 201). 
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Though this research does not adapt a positivist stance searching for the truth, 
it was important to gather information on the position of institutions rather than 
individual opinions. In some cases, interviewees clearly stated whether a 
particular opinion was reflecting their personal view or position of the 
institution; where there was doubt I asked for clarification. I have avoided 
incorporating personal views in the presentation of my empirical analysis. 
The interviews were conducted with members of each of the six categories 
noted above. As the interviews were semi-structured, the format of the 
interview was guided by a list of themes and questions posed to each category 
of actors. It is notable that particular themes were more salient for particular 
categories of actors during the interview process. Indeed, the flexibility 
provided by semi-structured interviews (Bryman, 2008: 437) enabled me to 
adjust the emphasis depending on the category of actor being interviewed. As 
an example, questions on the effects of globalisation and transnationalisation of 
production were more salient for industrial sectors and trade unions, whilst 
political issues were more pre-eminent for groups involved in struggles against 
the discipline of capital. However, in principle all questions were posed to all 
interviewees. For instance, feminist activists were questioned about the effects 
of globalisation and flexible labour on women rights and the struggle over 
patriarchy; whilst questions regarding the way in which democracy should be 
defined were put to trade unionists.      
The interviews commenced by questioning of the social base of institutions, 
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though the question used for this purpose varied according to the category of 
actor being interviewed. For industrial sectors, an emphasis was placed on 
understanding whether they operate in national and/or international markets; 
and whether they primarily operate in the private or public sector. For political 
parties and/or alternative subjectivities, I asked who the group they aspired to 
represent/articulate the views of is. This was conducted to map the position of 
respective social forces in the social relations of production and intra-class 
struggle. Considering that the primary critique of Gramscian historical 
materialism is that mainstream literature fails to embed European integration 
and enlargement processes within structural dynamics of globalisation and 
neoliberal restructuring (that is further examined in the following chapter), 
interviews proceeded by interrogating the effects of globalisation and 
neoliberal restructuring on: the particular industrial sector in which they 
operate, the production process, trade unionist strategy and/or struggle against 
patriarchy. This method paved the way to debate membership within the 
context of globalisation. 
Following this, emphasis was placed on uncovering the rationale behind their 
particular stance in tandem with the major focus of research into the socio-
economic content rather than the form of integration. Particular themes were 
selected according to their standing vis-a-vis EU membership, including: the 
probable economic implications of participating in the Internal Market and 
Euro-zone; any additional economic implications of membership beyond the 
Customs Union; social policy, mechanisms of unionist struggle vis-a-vis
globalisation (a focus in particular for trade unions); whether the European 
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Social Model based on social partnership constitutes a viable model for 
industrial relations; repercussions of the membership process on Turkish 
foreign policy and nationally sensitive issues such as the Cyprus problem; the 
relation between membership and democracy; and the impact of ongoing 
reform process to human rights, women rights, minority rights and rule of law. 
At the end of each interview, emphasis was placed on understanding the 
organic links with other social forces in society by questioning whether the 
interviewee’s institution endorsed common projects and acted jointly with 
other social forces at the national and international levels in shaping the 
membership debate. This question is related to the theoretical coordinates of 
forming relations of force in the struggle over hegemony. An additional set of 
questions was posed for representatives of alternative subjectivities, who were 
asked about conceptions of emancipation and relations of force with other 
actors on the left of the political spectrum.
One limitation that arose from the selection of interviewees was the tendency 
for them to direct me to people who are employed in European divisions and/or 
departments inside the institution. This occurred particularly frequently in state 
institutions considering that a European fraction inside bureaucracy is 
endorsed. This limited my ability to obtain a holistic picture of the position of 
particular institutions on globalisation and membership – a concern related to 
‘generalisability’ of data. However, in these cases the data is supplemented and 
cross-checked with primary resources. The issue of sampling is not raised as a 
major concern for elite interviews (Richards, 1996: 200). Yet, rather than a 
concern on representative sampling, bringing the interview process to an end –
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putting boundaries - was an issue considering that Gramsci was a theorist of 
capillary power (Morton, 2007a: 88). In the literature, it is often stated that 
saturation point is an answer to the problem of when to stop (Burnham et. al., 
2004: 207-208). Indeed, during the interview process there was a point when 
interviews started to repeat themselves that is taken as a sign for data 
saturation. 
This research seeks to contribute to the literature in three main areas. First, it 
seeks to re-think the concept of hegemony by engaging in a debate between 
Gramscian historical materialism and the theory of discourse. The attempt to 
address the questions posed by Laclau and Mouffe to Gramsci regarding 
revolutionary subjectivity, class reductionism and economic determinism has 
previously not been engaged in greater scrutiny (an exception is Bieler and 
Morton 2008). This debate has political significance as it can articulate ways 
and means of forming a united struggle between labour and struggles around 
women’s liberation, the environment and human rights in civil society. 
Second, there is a growing body of literature that endeavours to develop a 
critical political economy reading of integration and enlargement. The Turkish 
membership question has not been analysed using the tools provided by a 
Gramscian historical materialist perspective (an exception is Ataç and 
Grünewald, 2008, though  they mention the probable merits of debating 
Turkish enlargement using Gramscian historical materialism, but they fail to do 
so). In this sense, it aims to contribute to this growing body of literature. It does 
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this by debating the merits of embedding the membership question within 
globalisation and discussing the relation between regionalism and 
globalisation; analysing the mechanisms of integration of a peripheral country 
into the transnational production structures; and the way social forces are 
integrated with the process of transnational class formation; and by discussing 
alternatives and the potential for a counter-hegemonic historical bloc in Turkey 
– a country that stands at the periphery of Europe and whose trajectory of 
integration provides space to develop an alternative, given that the current state 
of integration is to the benefit of capital and the process is uncertain 
(particularly given the declining attraction of the EU within the context of 
current economic crisis and cuts in social benefits).        
Finally, the literature has – until now - largely remained limited to analyzing 
political decisions. It thus lacks empirical research into the positions of social 
forces in Turkey regarding the membership question, such that the position of 
labour is almost completely ignored. Alternatives to membership are even 
debated in relation to alternative forms of integration, rather than in reference 
to its socio-economic content. The position of disadvantaged groups in society 
from globalisation is overlooked. There is a gap in the literature for questioning 
alternatives to membership in society due to the failure of other approaches to 
read the process as an instance of class struggle.  
The structure of this thesis will be as follows. I open the thesis by engaging 
critically with European integration theory and reflecting on its social purpose 
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in cultivating a particular knowledge regarding Turkey’s membership process. 
Three categories of literature are reviewed: classical integration theories, 
comparative political approaches, and social constructivism. Each sub-section 
briefly introduces and critically assesses these categories and then examines the 
way enlargement is explained. This is followed by a discussion on their 
reflections and shortcomings in the case of Turkey’s enlargement. The next 
stage of the chapter proposes a Gramscian historical materialist framework to 
fill the gap in the literature and outline its merits followed with operationalising 
theoretical framework. 
The third chapter focuses on an engagement between Laclau and Mouffe and 
Gramscian scholars on hegemony. In the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 
Laclau and Mouffe criticize Gramsci for economic determinism and class 
reductionism (1985: 69). Can it be said with Laclau and Mouffe that Gramsci is 
a class reductionist and/or an economic determinist? To what extent Gramscian 
historical materialism overlooks social movements confining agency for a 
counter-hegemonic strategy to trade unions and political parties? The debate 
over hegemony is particularly important in Turkey’s membership question. It is 
a peripheral country within uneven development of capitalism, and a country 
where populist politics are salient in the struggle over hegemony. Additionally, 
following the completion of the Customs Union, political issues began to 
prevail and the struggle for membership was also shaped by identity politics 
around democracy, human rights and/or the Kurdish problem. It is also of 
relevance in relation to debating alternatives to membership and in developing 
an analysis of contemporary fractions of the Turkish Left.
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There are two main tasks behind this engagement. First, it re-thinks hegemony 
(and the idea of the counter-hegemonic historical bloc) by drawing on the work 
of Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe. I analyse the disagreements before moving 
on to develop my own position in the debate. I disagree with Laclau and 
Mouffe and raise five key objections relating to their understanding of 
materialism, state/society relations, the role of the international sphere, 
historicism and agency-structure. In so doing, I will state why I adopt 
Gramscian historical materialism to analyse social movements. However, I 
modify this in addressing the critique of Laclau and Mouffe on integrating 
social movements into the research design, by utilising the work of van der 
Pijl. He conceives of resistance as operating against the ‘discipline of capital’ 
and the ‘exploitation of the social and natural substratum’ (van der Pijl, 1998: 
36 and 47). This stance opens floor to conceive of struggles around patriarchy, 
human rights and environment as an instance of class struggle in debating an 
alternative historical bloc vis-a-vis neoliberal membership project in the 
seventh chapter. Hence, the second task behind this additional theoretical 
engagement is to clarify the conceptual framework regarding political 
subjectivity behind a counter-hegemonic strategy. 
Chapter four provides the historical background by presenting a reading of the 
political economy of Turkey. It does so with the help of Gramscian concepts 
and Cox’s analysis based on three levels: the social relations of production, the 
forms of state, and the world order (Cox 1987). This chapter is structured into 
two distinct historical periods: the import-substitution industrialization policy 
in the Fordist period of the 1960s and 1970s; and the neoliberal turn in the 
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1980s. At the end of each sub-section, Turkey-EU relations are analysed in 
accordance with the pre-eminent social relations of production and world 
order. It is expected that internationally oriented capital will pioneer 
membership perspective to stimulate exports and consolidate market economy 
model whilst nationally oriented capital will oppose membership as it will be 
exposed to pressures of competitiveness by particating to the Internal Market.
The next three chapters present my empirical data. My main concern in chapter 
five is to examine the position of capital, with an emphasis on intra-class 
struggle. It considers whether there is a pro-European hegemonic project and, 
if so, can the ruling class transcend its vested interests to present arguments in 
favour of membership so that they can operate on a ‘universal terrain’ within 
civil society? To address these issues, chapter five lays out the configuration of 
social forces in relation to capital and examines how different fractions of 
capital debate membership within the context of their position in globalisation 
and transnationalisation of production. I will examine the textile and 
automotive sectors as internationally oriented capital as they have a privileged 
position within export-promotion strategy since 1980s. The SMEs and 
agricultural sector will be observed as nationally oriented capital. Agriculture 
sector is still a sheltered sector producing for the domestic market. Moreover, 
agriculture is not included in the Customs Union except processed agricultural 
products that in turn will be affected by participation in the Internal Market.
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Chapter six examines the position of labour vis-a-vis the EU membership 
question, which is debated within the context of the transnationalisation of 
production and viable mechanisms of struggle against globalisation. I will test 
the hypothesis that - in the Turkish case - trade unions that organise workers in 
international/transnational production sectors (sectors that have already been 
economically integrated with the Internal Market via the Customs Union) 
support membership, as they will conceive of regional integration as a 
mechanism providing protection from globalisation (incentive for positive 
integration); whilst trade unions organising workers employed in nationally 
oriented sectors (which rely on national protection) will adopt a more critical 
stance due to concerns over de-industrialisation and de-unionisation; and 
concerns that they will be increasingly exposed to the pressures of 
competitiveness and losses in welfare (these claims further draw on the work of 
Bieler, 2000: 48; Bieler, 2005a: 461; 2006: 42). Internationally oriented labour 
is examined in relation to textile and automotive industries, and Confederation 
of Progressive Trade Unions (Disk) and Confederation of Turkish Real Trade 
Unions (Hak-İş). Nationally oriented labour is analysed in relation to the 
agriculture sector, public employees, and Confederation of Turkish Trade 
Unions (Türk-İş) - that is primarily organizing public economic enterprises 
producing for national market. The chapter ends by summarizing the reasons 
for the failure of labour to form a united front in opposition to neoliberal 
restructuring through the process of EU membership. 
Chapter seven extends the debate among social forces to political and civil 
society. Throughout the research, I criticise the conception of civil society and 
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the state as two separate and autonomous entities. Therefore, the chapter begins 
by establishing the contours of approaching state institutions, political parties 
and identity struggles, conceiving of them as operating in an extended sphere 
of social reproduction. I then analyse the position of state institutions within 
the neoliberal form of state. I draw on Cox’s analysis of the 
‘internationalisation of [the] state’ (Cox, 1981: 146 and 1987: 253-254), and 
expect institutions linked to the economy to develop a supportive stance 
regarding the membership process, whilst state institutions that develop 
policies for the segments of society disadvantaged by globalization to be 
sidelined in the struggle. I then observe the position of political parties. The 
governing AKP is analysed as the right-wing political party carrying the 
neoliberal project and pro-membership perspective whilst I consider whether 
opposition parties espouse alternative views. Finally, the last section of chapter 
seven integrates struggles against the discipline of capital in society (the 
struggles of women's rights/feminist groups, environmental groups and human 
right groups) and analyses the reasons for their apparent failure to form a 
united front with labour against globalisation. Finally, I present alternatives to 
the pro-membership project around two rival class strategies: neo-mercantilism 
and Ha-vet (Yes, No). Ultimately, I argue that they do not constitute an 
alternative per se, a conclusion I develop further in the conclusion.  
The next chapter looks at European integration theory. It considers how 
Turkey-EU relations are studied in the literature in more detail. It summarises 
the relevant literature in three categories – classical integration theory, 
comparative politics and constructivism - and critically assesses the reflections 
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of each on Turkey-EU relations literature. It problematizes the knowledge that 
is produced following the mainstream and questions its social purpose. It then 
introduces Gramscian historical materialism as an alternative to fill the gap in 
the literature and concludes by operationalising it in relations to the main 
pattern of Turkey’s production structure to globalisation. 
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Chapter 2 - A Critical Assessment of European Integration Theories: 
Merits of Gramscian Historical Materialism
2.1) Introduction
This chapter critically assesses European integration theories and their 
approaches to enlargement, with a specific focus on contemporary research 
considering Turkish membership of the EU and its social purpose. I argue that 
that there is a gap in the literature to embed membership question to the 
structural dynamics of globalisation and neoliberal restructuring, meaning that 
Turkish membership is treated as an issue autonomous from wider forces of 
globalisation. Moreover, much contemporary research remains wedded to the 
results of negotiations: the form that Turkey's integration into the EU will take 
is considered.
In order to rectify this, I introduce a Gramscian historical materialist 
framework that paves the way to question the underlying power relations and 
the socio-economic content of Turkey's integration into European structures, 
without being wedded to debates on the form of enlargement. Moreover, the 
membership question is treated as an open-ended process, the outcome of 
which is not explained behind an economic rationale, but rather determined by 
class struggle. 
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The main premises of integration theories are summarised and critically
assessed in separate sub-sections. I then turn to discuss these theories in 
relation to Turkey-EU relations, followed by a critical assessment of their 
shortcomings. I consider classical integration theories: neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism; comparative politics; and social constructivism.
Following this, I introduce Gramscian historical materialism - with an 
emphasis on its analyses of integration and enlargement - and explain the 
rationale of employing a Gramscian framework to study the question of 
Turkish membership of the EU. This is followed by an introduction of the 
Turkish production structure and formulation of the main hypothesis that will 
lay out contours of intra-class struggle.
2.2) Classical Integration Theories 
2.2.1) Neo-Functionalism and Intergovernmentalism: A Reflection of 
Neoliberal/Neo-Realist debate in European integration
Early theoretical approaches to European integration were influenced by 
debates between idealism and realism within the discipline of international 
relations. Federalism and functionalism both debated the best methods of 
preventing another war in Europe, believing it was important to transcend the 
nation state. Federalism emphasises supranational mechanisms and posits the 
creation of a 'union of states and citizens' through a sudden transformation with 
46
constitutional change (Burgess, 2000: 15). Functionalism, meanwhile, seeks to 
transcend the nation state through the stimulation of functional links by 
decentralisation, technocratic cooperation and international administration 
(Mitrany, 1943). 
Haas drew on functionalism to develop a Europe-specific theory, which 
became known as neo-functionalism (Haas 1958). This assumed that 
integration that starts in key 'functional sectors' of the economy generates 
further integration in order to fully obtain the advantages of integration. This, 
he believed, would ultimately cultivate a political community (Haas, 1958: 11-
19). Neo-functionalism was seen both as an approach to – and a guide for – the 
stimulation of further integration, following the notion of 'spill-over' (also 
known as the 'Monnet method'). Tranholm-Mikkelsen distinguishes three forms 
of spill-over: functional, political and cultivated. At the core of functional spill-
over lies the assumption that integration that starts in a technical sphere will 
automatically spill-over to other sectors due to their interdependence to each 
other. This will spill-over to the political sphere as integration entails a learning 
process for national elites that in turn will create a political impetus for further 
integration. Integration will be accompanied with institutionalisation in the 
form of cultivated spill-over through creation of supranational institutions such 
as the European Commission (Tranholm-Mikkelsen: 1991: 4-6).     
By the mid 1970s, the crisis of Fordist accumulation was well developed. The 
European economy faced crisis and integration stagnated following the Empty 
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Chair Crisisi. This prompted an intergovernmentalist backlash focussed on 
'spill-over' in the integration process (Hoffmann, 1966; Milward, 1992). 
Intergovernmentalists accused neo-functionalists of normative bias for 
adopting a 'moral mandate' in seeking to prevent another war in Europe. 
Against this, they sought to study the 'realities' of integration. They claimed 
that integration is the outcome of negotiations among national actors operating 
at the lowest common denominator, and note that the state has either endured 
or survived (Hoffmann, 1966: 889); or been rescued (Milward, 1992). For 
instance, Hoffmann disagrees with the functional logic of spill-over. He 
contends that as the logic of diversity progresses, nation states are not 
superseded but still remain the basic units of analysis and action (Hoffmann, 
1966: 863). In a similar vein, Milward criticises the existing approaches for 
conceiving of supranationalism as the antithesis of the nation-state. 
Accordingly, he reads integration as 'an act of national will' and a strategy in 
the post-war reconstruction of nation state. Building on this, he asserts that the 
European Community was a means for nation states to regain the loyalty of 
their citizens and to provide social welfare provisions. The European 
Community was the means for the rescue of the nation state in Europe 
(Milward, 1992: 12, 18 and 44).
The neoliberal turn of 1980s galvanized European integration that is captured 
by works revisiting functional logic and intergovernmentalism (Mutimer, 1989; 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991). Schmitter aspires to revise the legacy of neo-
functionalism in a 'neo-neo' version, though he criticises the self-reflexive logic 
of neo-functionalism and states that 'any comprehensive theory of integration 
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should potentially be a theory of disintegration' (Schmitter, 2005: 47). On the 
contrary, Moravcsik argues that nation states remain 'in charge' of the 
integration process. In his theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, he develops 
a multi-causal/trilateral model, combining rationalist institutionalism, 
economic interests and inter-state bargaining. For him, integration is the 
outcome of 'rational choices made by national leaders', determined by 
commercial interests, macro-economic preferences and conditions of 
asymmetrical interdependence in the anarchical international system 
(Moravcsik, 1998: 5-18).
The debate between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism can be 
situated within the neoliberal/neo-realist debate in the discipline of 
international relations. Hence, although neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism posit differing approaches to integration, they are 
situated within the same paradigm. They share similar weaknesses and can be 
criticised on similar grounds. I will now turn to consider six of these criticisms. 
First, both neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism are preoccupied with 
the transfer of sovereignty from the national to the supranational level. Hence, 
debates relate solely to the institutional 'form' of integration, with the social 
content and social purposes underpinning European integration ignored 
(Apeldoorn, 2000: 158). Second, both theories operate in the positivist tradition 
and share an individualistic and utilitarian ontology. They believe that 
decisions regarding integration are taken by rational, utility maximising actors 
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operating in their economic self-interest (van Apeldoorn et. al, 2003: 18; Bieler 
and Morton, 2001: 13). As they assume ‘explicitly or implicitly that market 
forces are expressions of an inner rationality of universal human nature that is 
held to be the essence of the realm of freedom in political affairs’, they fail to 
problematize structuration of power relations in the social sphere (van 
Apeldoorn et. al, 2003: 18). Third, neo-functionalism is ahistorical. It fails to 
question the reasons why integration emerges during specific historical periods 
but not during others, and overlooks the background transformations of 
capitalism and the responses of the capitalist class (Cocks, 1980: 1-2 and 4). 
This means that the wider structures of globalisation and neoliberal
restructuring – within which European integration is embedded – are not 
considered. Hence, both theories fail to consider structural change, as they fail 
to question existing social and power structures (Bieler, 2005b: 76; Bieler and 
Morton, 2001: 14; van Apeldoorn et. al. 2003). The fourth criticism of neo-
functionalism and intergovernmentalism comes from the fact that they 
overlook state-society dynamics (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 57). The 
intergovernmentalist approach treats states as monolithic and fails to account 
for different state forms, meaning that 'the state' is seen as a 'black box' beyond 
human agency. Moreover, it over emphasises state's security and military 
capabilities whilst underestimating economic issues (Bieler, 2000: 6). Fifth, 
intergovernmentalism is interested solely in inter-state relations and denies the 
transnational sphere; whilst neo-functionalism fails to assign an autonomous 
role to transnational actors (van Apeldoorn, 2000: 158) – seeing transnational 
forces only in the context of national state-society configurations (van 
Apeldoorn et. al., 2003: 24-26; Bieler and Morton, 2001: 16). Sixth, although 
50
liberal intergovernmentalism takes state-society relations into consideration 
with its focus on national preferences and interest groups, it draws on an 
individualist conception of state-society relations based on rational choice, 
overlooks structural inequalities and role of the transnational sphere and 
transnational actors that transcend national boundaries (van Apeldoorn et. al, 
2003: 24-26). Finally, both approaches fail to account for the role of ideas and 
ideology in forming the European order (van Apeldoorn, 2000: 158).
2.2.2) Classical Integration Theory, Enlargement and Turkish Membership 
Question
  
Enlargement remains under theorised in the classical approaches to integration. 
Indeed, neo-functionalism does not have a theory of enlargement at all, 
although Schmitter contends that functional logic assumes that countries with 
functional links to the EU would join earlier than those without. However, he 
admits that such an approach cannot explain why Switzerland has not joined 
the EU (Schmitter, 2005: 70). Burgess explains enlargement from a federalist 
perspective. Here, the main concern is the probable effects of enlargement on 
the EU's institutional structure (Burgess, 2005: 39). Moravcsik and Vachudova, 
meanwhile, apply liberal intergovernmentalism to enlargement in Eastern 
Europe and argue that enlargement is the outcome of inter-state bargaining 
based on rational calculations. They argue that the core states prevail through 
enlargement, whilst candidate countries occupy a weaker position in accession 
negotiations due to their poorer economic conditions (2003: 45-46). Thus, 
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candidate countries make short-term sacrifices from agricultural and structural 
funds, and bear the cost of rapid adjustment to liberal trade policies in return 
for the imagined long-term benefits of membership (Moravcsik and 
Vachudova, 2003: 46-48).
There are a number of studies seeking to explain Turkey-EU relations using 
functional or intergovernmental logic. Macmillan claims that 
intergovernmentalism cannot explain why relations between Turkey and the 
EU have proceeded despite opposition from various member states and turns to 
neo-functionalism to understand how 'spill-over' can help explain the move 
towards Turkish membership within the EU (2009: 789). Contrarily, Özen 
argues that neo-functionalism is incapable of explaining Turkey-EU relations, 
as relations began with security considerations during the Cold War and 
progressed into the economic sphere, an operation contrary to neo-functional 
logic (Özen, 1999). Müftüler-Baç and McLaren and Öniş apply liberal 
intergovernmentalism to explain the EU's shifting position, from the 1997 
Luxembourg Council when Turkey was not given candidacy status, to the 1999 
Helsinki European Council when the EU declared Turkey as a candidate 
country (Müftüler-Baç and McLaren, 2003; Öniş, 2000b and 2003). A common 
theme of these studies is that they seek to explain the shift on the part of the 
EU through changes in the policies of Greece and Germany. Thus, they take a 
state-centric approach to enlargement. A further group of studies do not 
directly apply intergovernmentalism, but are similarly informed by realist 
assumptions. They approach Turkey-EU relations either from the perspective 
of security, or by emphasising international relations – with a particular 
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emphasis on the Cyprus issue and Turkey's relationship with Greece (Buzan 
and Diez, 1999; Cizre, 2004; Oğuz, 2004; Öniş, 2000a; Park, 2000; Tank, 
2001).
I argue that classical approaches fail to adequately explain the operation of 
Turkish integration thus far. Functional approaches are incapable of explaining 
Turkish enlargement, as Turkey has already been closely integrated into the 
European economy through the Customs Union, and this has not led to political 
integration. Furthermore, it cannot explain the timing of enlargement, giving 
no explanation for the fact that a bid for accession which began in the 1960s 
and has proceeded via a process of economic integration has not been resolved, 
to such an extent that Turkey's accession has taken far longer than the Eastern 
European countries that started to form 'functional links' in the 1990s. They do 
not consider the approach of the current Turkish government (which, as I argue 
in Chapter Four, constitutes a hegemonic formation controlled by the AKP), 
which seeks to maintain the reform process without necessarily pushing for full 
membership status. These failings result from the fact that neo-functionalism 
ignores state-society dynamics and fails to situate enlargement within the 
structural dynamics of neoliberal restructuring. 
Intergovernmentalist approaches, meanwhile, construe of Turkey's relations 
with Europe as foreign affairs issues rather than through the lens of integration 
per se, and frequently frame the debate in relation to security concerns. Thus, 
an intergovernmentalist analysis based on inter-state bargaining has limited 
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explanatory power with regards to Turkey's decision to open its market to 
European competition without gaining any concessions from the EU (such as 
membership status or the receipt of benefits from structural funds). 
Crucially, the two classical perspectives confine the debate to the 'end-state' of 
negotiations: they focus on the 'form' of integration at the expense of analysing 
its socio-economic aspects and power relations. In the case of Turkey, this 
results in a non-debate, as the integration of Turkey into European structures is 
an ongoing process. They frame membership in relation to political decisions 
made by governmental actors and overlook transnational actors. The role of 
trade unions is completely omitted, and 'privileged partnership' is the only 
alternative to membership considered. The perspective of those disadvantaged 
by the integration process is thus ignored, meaning that critique is absent from 
studies using classical approaches.
2.3) Comparative Politics and Integration Theory
2.3.1) European Union as an Internal Political Arena 
The 1990s witnessed the rising influence of various comparative approaches to 
European integration, with a variety of studies focusing on multi-level 
governance, network governance and Europeanisation. Hix claims that the EU 
has been transformed from a platform of inter-state bargaining into an 'internal 
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political arena', and argues that international relations scholars consider 
integration as an instance of supranationalism or intergovernmental 
cooperation. Against this, he claims that comparative politics offers a more 
convincing account of European Community 'politics' (Hix, 1994: 22-23). The 
'institutionalist turn' in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s further 
stimulated political scientists' engagement with the EU (Jupille and Caporaso, 
1999: 430).
Three variants of institutionalism can be identified: rational-choice, historical 
and sociological, each of which has different assumptions (Pollack, 2005b: 
137-138). Despite their differences, all three aspire to study how and why 
institutions matter by examining the role of institutions in social and political 
behaviours and outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 936-37). The rational-choice 
model posits a strategic and rational actor with fixed interests and preferences. 
Institutions are explained in relation to their capacity to perform functional 
needs and are defined 'thinly', as constraining the behaviour of agents (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: 942-45). In the context of European integration studies, the 
model examines the role of the Commission (understood as the executive), the 
European Court of Justice (the judiciary) and the European Parliament (the 
legislature) (Pollack, 2005b: 141-48). Sociological institutionalism proceeds 
from a 'thick' definition of institutions, in which institutions do not simply
constrain actors but also 'constitute' them (and their interests). According to 
Hall and Taylor, sociological institutionalism has three specificities: its broader 
definition of institutions, which blurs the distinction between institutions and 
culture; valuing the constitutive effects of institutions over agents' preferences 
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and identities; and a reference to the logic of 'appropriateness' in explicating 
how institutions develop (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 946-49). Checkel typifies this 
approach, arguing that the dynamics of learning and socialisation impel agents 
to act not on rational calculations but through the 'logic of appropriateness'. He 
defines social learning as a process of interaction within an institutional 
context, through which actors acquire new interests and preferences (Checkel, 
2001: 51 and 53). Finally, historical institutionalism rejects the ahistorical and 
functional explanations of other forms of institutionalism, and emphasises the 
effects of institutions on politics over 'time', by asking how and under what 
conditions historical events affect politics (Pollack, 2005b: 139-141).
In the debate between approaches from international relations and those 
informed by comparative politics (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999; Hix, 1994 and 
1998), it is argued that 'governance approaches' can explicate the complex 
multilevel institutional configuration neither as an international organization 
nor a domestic political system, but as an emerging 'governance without 
government' (Pollack, 2005a: 380; Scharpf, 2001: 3-4). This new governance 
model conceives of the EU as a unique system of regulatory governance 
relying on 'unique set of multi-level, non-hierarchical and regulatory 
institutions, and a hybrid mix of state and non-state actors' (Hix, 1998: 38-39; 
Marks and Hooghe, 2003). In other words, governance approaches ask 'what 
kind of a political order' is emerging through European integration by studying 
issues such as democratic legitimacy; the governance capacity of the EU; and 
the distribution of authority between nation-states and supranational or sub-
national actors (Pollack, 2005a: 368). In addressing these questions, the 
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approach emphasises three factors: the existence of actors at different levels 
such as the supranational, the national and the subnational; declining state 
authority resulting from decentralisation and the regionalisation processes; and 
the interconnectedness of the political in the national, supranational and 
transnational spheres (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 1-4).
These studies have also been criticised, however. Hix is critical about the 
tendency of new governance approaches to conceive of the EU as sui generis. 
He questions to what extent it is plausible to have a specific theory for 
European integration (Hix, 1998: 46), and believes that attempting to develop 
one hinders integration theories in order to benefit from existing 
understandings of institutions, behaviour and democracy (Hix, 1998: 54-55). 
For Jachtenfuchs, meanwhile, the governance literature reveals a tendency 
towards problem-solving and ignores questions around political power and 
rule. Moreover, the studies are based on case studies and lack a coherent 
theoretical framework (Jachtenfuchs, 2001: 258-59).
  
2.3.2) Comparative Politics and Enlargement
Studies on enlargement which draw upon comparative approaches 
problematise the effects of enlargement on EU institutions and governance in 
applicant countries (Friis and Murphy, 1999; Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 
2005: 112-113). Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch focus on effects of 
enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe on aspects of EU governance 
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including the heterogeneity of the economic development level, the EU's 
administrative structures and capacities, political ideas, party systems, and 
constitutionalism. They argue that enlargement decreases the likelihood of 
political unanimity within the EU and results in more flexible governance 
(2005: 112). In a similar vein, the rational choice institutionalist model 
addresses the probable effects of enlargement on the formal structure of 
institutions, decision-making and voting patterns (Pollack, 2005b: 153).
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier develop a research agenda focussing on the 
impact of Europeanisation and conditionality on the domestic policies of
CEECs (2005b). This body of literature is designed to analyse how, which and 
to what extent rules of the EU are transferred to the candidate countries. They 
measure rule adoption and the institutionalisation of EU rules at the domestic 
level (2005b: 7), developing three models: the 'rational choice external 
incentive' model, the 'constructivist social learning' model, and the 'lesson-
drawing' model. The 'external incentive model' follows the logic of 
consequences and measures rule adoption on the basis of external rewards and 
sanctions at the EU level, and by undertaking cost/benefit calculations for 
adopting states. It posits that a government adopts EU rules if the benefits of 
doing so exceed the domestic costs of adoption (2004: 663; 2005b: 10-17). The 
social learning model rests on the constructivist logic of appropriateness and 
Checkel's analyses of international socialisation. It explains adoption in 
relation to the desire of CEECs to identify with the values and norms of the EU 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir, 2004: 667-68 and 2005a: 18-20). The lesson-
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drawing model argues that adoption provides remedies to the domestic needs 
and challenges of candidate countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir 2005b: 
8-10). 
In the last decade, Europeanisation perspective dominates the literature on 
Turkey-EU relations. This operates under the assumption that the credibility of 
the EU stimulates change at the domestic level, and that this increased after 
Turkey was declared as a candidate at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. In a 
nutshell, it is argued that ‘the more that Turkey-EU relations have gained 
“certainty” over time, the more Turkish politics have come to terms with the fact 
that democracy is the only game in town’ (Derviş et. al, 2004: 14). Literature on 
the Europeanisation of Turkey covers a number of diverse but related issues, 
including civil-military relations, political parties, human rights, the rule of law 
and foreign policy (with a particular focus on Turkey's policies on the Cyprus 
problem and its relationship with Greece) (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007; Derviş 
et. al. 2004; Diez et. al., 2005; Heper, 2005; Kubicek, 2004 and 2005; Külahçı, 
2005; Müftüler-Baç, 2005; Öniş, 2003; Rumelili, 2003 and 2004; Tocci, 2005; 
Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006). These studies argue that the Copenhagen political 
criteria contribute to a consolidation of democracy in Turkey, and leave it 
increasingly plural and multicultural (Aydın and Keyman, 2004). The main 
focus is on the nature of EU conditionality and its impact in consolidating 
democracy (Usul, 2011). Implicit to these approaches is that full EU 
membership will follow if Turkey complies with political conditionality. It is 
argued that main obstacle to membership can be found in the remnants of the 
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Kemalist and statist tradition, which is not open to political liberalism 
(Grigoriadis, 2009: 4).
The Europeanisation perspective provides an unsatisfactory analysis of Turkey-
EU relations, however. This results from four main failings. First, it over 
emphasises the role of Europe and fails to clarify whether the causal 
mechanisms behind change are stimulated by global-structural factors or 
regional-European factors (e.g. Aydın and Keyman, 2004; Derviş et. al, 2004; 
Müftüler-Baç, 2005). European integration is conceived of as a structure, 
though Europe is equally an actor embedded within the global structure. 
Second, the analyses are ahistorical. In the case of Turkey, Europeanisation 
analyses do not consider the period before Turkey was declared as a candidate 
for EU membership. In other words, they overlook five decades of relations, 
and present the reform processes of the last decade as a major 'achievement'
owing to the 'more credible carrot' of candidacy status. Third, the 
Europeanisation approach fails to consider state/society relations and conceives 
of the economy/market as autonomous from the political sphere and the 
operation of states, meaning that they reproduce neoliberal understandings (e.g. 
Derviş et. al. 2004; Diez et. al., 2005; Heper, 2005). For instance, 
Europeanisation would assume a negative correlation between undemocratic 
state structures and increasing EU integration, and so would be unable to 
explain why Turkey applied for membership in 1987, just four years following 
the end of its military regime. Here, Europeanisation fails to recognise that it 
was the coercive mechanisms of the capitalist state that were instrumental in 
the completion of the Customs Union and the neoliberal restructuring during 
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the 1980s through the containment of labour that is followed with further 
integration via completion of the Customs Union (this is further elaborated in 
Chapter 4). Paradoxically, the Europeanisation literature also conceives of the 
state and its 'bureaucratic elite' as 'dominant' (they believe it constrains the 
ability of the reform process to generate change), and in opposition to the 
consolidation of democracy. This is an outcome of the tradition of 'strong 
state', which, to quote Gramsci, believes in '[e]verything within the State, 
nothing outside the State, nothing against the State' (1971: 261). This denies 
class struggle and contributes to neoliberal restructuring. Europeanisation 
studies are therefore determinist in arguing for change at domestic level as they 
disregard the role of domestic actors and their strategies/policies (e.g. Rumelili 
2003 and 2004; Tocci 2005; Schimmelfennig et. al. 2006). Finally, 
Europeanisation presents Europe as providing a progressive model for 
candidate countries to aspire to. This is a reflection of an embedded and hidden 
Orientalism that posits the European identity as superior to non-European 




2.4) Social Constructivism 
2.4.1) The Constructivist Turn in International Relations and European 
Integration
A constructivist approach to European integration developed alongside the 
'constructivist turn' in international relations. This problematises the idea of 
stable political identities (including, for example, the idea of a 'European 
identity'; and national identities), leading to an emphasis on rules and norms. 
For instance, the EU is defined as a 'different type of international actor' with 
'normative power' that relies on civilian rather than military mechanisms (Diez, 
2005: 613-614). The ideational impact of the EU's identity and role in the 
international sphere is emphasised (Manners, 2002: 238). For Manners, 
European integration is constituted on a normative base. Embarking on an 
analysis of the EU's move to abolish the death penalty, he contends that the EU 
'act [s] in a normative way in world politics', and its impact does not stem from 
'what it does or what it says, but what it is' (Manners, 2002: 252). 
Constructivist research also problematises the relation between knowledge and 
politics and asks to what extent 'Europe exists without the huge literature on it?'
(Christiansen et. al., 2001: 13-16). The constructivist turn has been well 
received for furthering understanding of the impact of ideational in
constructing Europe (Smith, 1999: 682). It is argued that constructivism 
explicates the effects of the European integration process on the European state 
system, explaining the change in actors' identity, interests and behaviour 
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(Christiansen et. al., 1999: 528-44). According to Checkel, the constructivist 
approaches enrich our understanding of socialisation and the identity-shaping 
effects of the European project on national agents (Checkel, 2001: 50). 
Yet constructivist accounts have also been subject to criticism. Moravcsik 
accuses them of operating solely at the 'meta-theoretical level' and failing to 
contribute to empirical and theoretical understandings of European integration. 
Accordingly, he argues that constructivism fails to formulate a clear empirical 
research programme to test its claims (1999: 669-70). Smith does not share 
these claims, however – he argues that constructivism's weakness lies in its 
diversity. He argues that as there are a number of social constructivism(s) there 
is more agreement 'on what is being rejected than what is being proposed'
(1999: 690). Van Apeldoorn et. al., meanwhile, differentiate between 'liberal 
constructivism' and 'critical constructivism', and accuse the former of analysing 
identity in isolation from material interests. They also claim that constructivism 
lacks 'a sociology of interest formation that is mediated by identity' (van 
Apeldoorn et. al., 2003: 30-32).
2.4.2) Constructivism and Enlargement
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier seek to explain enlargement by drawing on 
the constructivist turn. They argue that as the costs to member states of 
enlargement outweigh the benefits they can expect to receive, rationalist 
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accounts cannot explain why they are in favour of EU enlargement to include 
states from Central and Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 47; 
Sedelmeier, 2005: 120-26). Thus, they adopt a sociological perspective and 
member states' support for enlargement as norm-based, making references to 
collective European identity and regulative norms (Schimmelfennig, 2005: 90-
92). They just work to further a process of 'international socialisation'
determined by the 'logic of appropriateness' and the internationalization of 
norms, values and rules (Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006: 2). Their main focus is 
on measuring the impact of the EU on the democratic transformation of 
candidate countries. 
It can be argued that constructivist approaches focus largely on two aspects of 
EU enlargement. First, they consider rule adoption and the impact of 
conditionality in stimulating domestic changes in candidate countries. In the 
case of Turkey, emphasis is placed upon topics such as the recognition of the 
Kurdish population as a minority, human rights and civilian control over the 
military, with constructivism adopting a stance in perceived opposition to the 
'statist' doctrine of Kemalism and Turkey's unitary state structure. In this sense, 
the Kemalist national identity is seen as a barrier to rule adoption 
(Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006: 97). It is argued that the period between 1987 
and 1999 was not conducive to rule adoption as international conditions were 
not supportive, and Turkey was ruled by 'strongly Kemalist governments'. 
During the last decade, rule adoption has increased in Turkey, however, and it 
is posited that this is the result of a combination of domestic and international 
factors. The EU recognised Turkey as a candidate at the 1999 Helsinki 
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European Council, increasing the credibility of the EU within Turkey, and the 
AKP devoted itself to policies seeking to reform the prevailing Kemalist 
approach (Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006: 103).
Second, constructivist studies generally debate the Turkish membership 
question in relation to identity issues. They are critical of essentialist and fixed 
definitions of identity, a stance that denies any membership perspective for 
Turkey due to religious differences and the continued perception of the 
Ottoman Empire as the 'other' to European identity. Following their claim that 
identities are open-ended; socially negotiated; and constantly being constructed 
and contested, they argue that Turkish and European identities will be 
constituted in relation to each other throughout the process (Rumelili, 2008: 
97-99 and 108). Rather, it can contribute to the creation of a European identity 
that is 'inclusive, multicultural, tolerant and universalistic' and can act as a 
bridge among civilisations (Grigoriadis, 2009: 4; Rumelili, 2008).
However, constructivism has six major flaws. First, the debate surrounding 
Turkey's compliance to EU norms is constrained around the supposed dyadic 
opposition of rationalism (the logic of consequences) and idealism (the logic of 
appropriateness) (e.g. Schimmelfennig, 2005; Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006). 
Second, constructivism operates with a Eurocentric bias through which Europe 
is presented as an ideal case in terms of its record on human rights and 
democracy. Third, the social purpose of constructivism is to present EU as a 
'civilian power' in the international system. This overlooks the imperialist and 
65
expansionist policies of the EU. As imperialism is interpreted as autonomous 
from economics, it becomes abstracted from capital accumulation and reduced 
to military interventions. This prevents debates on uneven capitalist 
development from being considered. Fourth, Turkey's status as a country short 
of full membership is explained as the outcome of Turkey's inability to comply 
with certain European norms and standards. In this sense, the explanation is 
ideational, and neglects material forces (Rumelili, 2008). Can every country 
that fulfils the political conditions of membership become a member? It is 
important to remember that 'ideas do not float about in an endless universe of 
meaning, but are produced by human agency in the context of social power 
relations' (van Apeldoorn, 1998: 15). Moreover, this reading of Turkey is based 
on a liberal reading of civil society, which conceives of them as operating 
autonomously from the state. This consolidates neoliberal restructuring and 
presents liberalisation as a progressive process opening up space for civil 
society (e.g. Schimmelfennig et. al., 2006). Fifth, the structural factors that 
determine the EU are ignored. For example, constructivist approaches fail to 
consider the effects of the economic crisis on the Turkish membership 
question. Finally, constructivist approaches develop a reading of the AKP 
Government as progressive, believing it wishes to comply with international 
rules and is seeking the consolidation of democracy (Schimmelfennig et. al., 
2006). In this sense, intellectuals subscribing to constructivism should be seen 
as traditional intellectuals, whose knowledge serves to reproduce 'common 
sense' and consolidate neoliberal restructuring in the struggle over hegemony. 
If Turkey is more 'democratic' due to rule adoption (as assumed by 
constructivist approaches), how can we explain the rising authoritarianism in 
66
Turkey especially during the AKP's third term in office; the high numbers of 
dissenting journalists and students in prison; and the AKP's recourse to force in 
attempting to deal with the Kurdish problem.
2.5) A Critical Approach: Gramscian Historical Materialism
It cannot be argued that there is a single 'neo-Gramscian school': there are a 
number of nuances and internal tensions between scholars of Gramscian 
historical materialism (Morton, 2001: 25-26). This is manifested through the 
number of different labels used to define such scholarship, with terms such as 
'neo-Gramscianism' and 'transnational historical materialism' used - Gramscian 
historical materialism is adopted in this research - (Cafruny and Ryner, 2003b: 
1; Overbeek, 2000: 170-172). There are points of commonality, however, and 
these revolve around the development of a historical materialist reading of 
European integration (Overbeek, 2004: 133). For these approaches, European 
integration is situated against a background of structural changes resulting from 
globalisation and neoliberal restructuring, and integration is seen as a market-
oriented, neoliberal hegemonic project (van Apeldoorn, 2000 and 2002; van 
Apeldoorn et. al., 2009; Bieler and Morton, 2001; Bieling, 2003; Cafruny and 
Ryner, 2003a; Gill, 1998 and 2001; van der Pijl, 1998 and 2006), whilst 
enlargement is seen as the expansion of neoliberal restructuring (Bieler, 2000; 
Holman, 1996 and 1998; Shields, 2003 and 2004).
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Gramscian historical materialism builds on critiques of mainstream theories of 
integration and enlargement, which revolve around the 'revival of Europe'. 
They argue that such approaches cannot account for structural changes and 
globalisation, as they take existing power structures for granted (Bieler, 2002: 
577; Bieler and Morton, 2001: 5; van Apeldoorn, 1998: 13). More importantly, 
they fail to explain the nature and distribution of power constitutive of the 
capitalist market structures in European integration as power is defined in a 
narrow sense which relates it solely to the political authority of a state or 
supranational institution. The way mainstream theories conceive of power as 
confined to interstate affairs and market as ‘the realm of freedom’ in opposition 
to state is criticised (Cafruny and Ryner, 2003b: 5). Rather, Gramscian 
historical materialism aspires to problematise social power 'in both its material 
and its normative dimension' (van Apeldoorn, 1998: 14, emphasis in original). 
Thus, they understand it as a force engendered by social forces, upon which 
state power is formed. Moreover, such approaches focus on the ‘form’ of 
integration and enlargement and overlook their socio-economic content and 
their 'social purpose' (Bieler, 2002: 577; van Apeldoorn, 1998: 14).
Gramscian historical materialism also questions the relationship between 
knowledge and politics. For Cox, there is 'no such thing as theory in itself', as 
'theory is always for someone and for some purpose' (Cox, 1981: 128). 
Accordingly, it seeks to formulate a critical theory of European integration that 
not only makes structural changes accountable, but also aspires to deconstruct 
the 'political' within mainstream theory. Bieler and Morton argue that the social 
purpose of neo-functionalism is to foster further integration, whilst 
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intergovernmentalism aspires to preserve national sovereignty (2001: 23). 
Based upon these insights, Gramscian historical materialism reads the revival 
of Europe against the background of globalisation and the transnationalisation 
of production and finance which superseded the historical bloc founded upon 
the 'embedded liberalism' of Fordist accumulation, demand-side economic 
management and the Keynesian welfare state, which was dissolved in the 
1970s (van Apeldoorn et. al., 2003: 37; Bieler, 2002: 576-77). Its research 
agenda is to study 'transnational struggle over Europe's socioeconomic order'
(van Apeldoorn, 1998: 16).
Gramscian historical materialism advances an alternative reading of 
enlargement by situating it within the structural dynamics of globalisation and 
neoliberal restructuring (Bieler, 2002: 576). For instance, Holman compares 
the transitions in Spain and Central and Eastern Europe by focussing on 
enlargement, and historically situates these two enlargements within the 
structural dynamics of globalization. He argues that the industrial backgrounds 
of Spain and CEECs constitute differing points of departure (whilst Spain had a 
mixed economy, CEECs had command economies), and so their 'mode of 
insertion' into the world economy differ. CEECs are incorporated into the 
European transnational production heartland in a 'dependent way', in which 
there is no national bourgeoisie seeking liberalisation (as there was in Spain) 
(Holman, 1998: 19-21). He also notes that the international context within 
which Europe is embedded had altered: during Spain's accession, the European 
Community was embedded within a programme of international/Atlantic 
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Fordism, whilst at the time of Central and Eastern European accession, the EU
was embedded within neoliberal restructuring (Holman, 1998: 12-14).
Analyses adopting Gramscian historical materialism begin by considering the 
social relations of production and offering readings of globalisation as a force 
engendering a process of transnationalisation of both production and finance. 
Bieler defines globalisation in relation to the transnationalisation of finance 
(the deregulation and liberalisation of financial markets); the 
transnationalisation of production (the rise of transnational corporations 
(TNCs) and/or FDI); and argues that it is neoliberalism that drives 
globalisation (Bieler, 2000: 36). Transnationalisation is different from 
internationalisation as it transcends geographical expansion but encompasses 
the organisation of worldwide production by processes of 'fragmentation and 
[the] decentralization of complex production chains' (Robinson, 2004: 14-15). 
Yet, although production is decentralised, the 'command and control of the 
economy' is centralised with the rise of a transnational capitalist class 
(Robinson, 2004: 9-10 and 15). Thus, the internationalisation of production has 
engendered a global class structure (Bieler, 2002; Cox, 1981: 147; van 
Apeldoorn, 1998: 15) and a transnational managerial class (van der Pijl, 1998: 
98), that is both a class in itself and for itself (Cox, 1981: 147; Robinson, 2004: 
48).
Indeed, following Cox, enlargement is approached on three levels: the social 
relations of production, the form of the state and the form of the world order, 
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none of which is determinant in a one-way relationship (Cox, 1981: 138). My 
fourth chapter presents a reading of Turkish political economy that provides a 
more detailed analysis of this framework. Here, it is sufficient to say that the 
social relations of production are not limited to the production of goods but are 
determined by three categories: material capabilities, ideas and institutions 
(Cox, 1981: 136). A particular configuration of social forces engendered by 
production underpins a particular form of state and so there are different forms 
of state based on the configuration of social forces (Cox, 1987: 147-148). The 
world order not only is shaped by the social relations of production and the 
forms of state, but renders particular social forces structurally privileged in the 
hegemonic struggle.
Holman's work on Spain's post-Franco socialist Government adopts such an 
approach. He reads their 'European option' as the outcome of a transnational 
historical bloc that was pioneered by structurally powerful transnational 
capital, and believed that it entailed two processes: the incorporation of Spain 
into spheres of transnational production, and the internationalisation of the 
Spanish state (Holman, 1996: 30, 65 and 99). Meanwhile, in debating Polish 
transition, Shields unravels the institutional and political mechanisms through 
which capital has been structured, a process that also engenders a transition to 
the neoliberal state form (Shields, 2003 and 2004). In explicating ideas 
determining transition, he contends that neoliberal restructuring is advocated as 
'the natural and rational course of transition'. For instance, 'Shock Therapy' is 
articulated as possessing an 'expert, objective and non-ideological character', as 
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if it were proposed by technical economists independent of any organisation. 
Rather, membership was determined by the transnationalisation process and the 
limits of the structural power of the transnational capitalist class (Shields, 
2003: 229-232).
The outcome of enlargement is thus understood as an instance of class struggle 
(Bieler, 2002: 577). Bieler argues that enlargement should not be read as an 
automatic process resulting from a self-interested, economic rationale. 
However, situating enlargement within the structural dynamics of globalisation 
does not automatically lead to a structurally deterministic account, which 
simply states that enlargement is caused by globalisation (Bieler, 2002: 581). 
Rather, the argument is that enlargement is an outcome of an open-ended 
struggle among different nationally, internationally and transnationally oriented 
social forces whose interests are determined by the structural factors of 
globalisation, the transnationalisation of production and finance (Bieler, 2000: 
1-4). In this sense, class struggle is not confined to national capital and labour 
but it is examined in relation to various fractions of capital and labour ('intra-
class struggle'), that in turn unravels agency and renders it intelligible (Bieler 
and Morton, 2001: 17). Accordingly, Gramscian historical materialism 
abandons state-centrism in explaining the role of transnational actors/class 
formations (Bieler, 2005b: 79).
Indeed, enlargement is an open-ended struggle, whose outcome varies 
depending on class struggle and specificities in each country. Bieler compares 
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the integration of Austria and Sweden into the EU (Bieler, 2000 and 2002). He 
notes that in Austria, accession was an outcome of a historical bloc pioneered 
by internationally oriented capital, which conceived of membership as the 
means of safeguarding participation in the Internal Market. It was supported by 
internationally oriented labour, which conceived of integration as a mechanism 
to struggle against globalisation at the international level. Sweden's accession 
was the result of a pro-EU alliance. Production there was dominated by 
transnationally oriented capital, which did not need to develop strong political 
alliances as it had the structural power to transfer investment and production to 
other units in the EU. Thus, transnational labour formed its own pro-
membership campaign (Bieler, 2002: 586-587). In Central and Eastern Europe, 
however, pro-membership perspectives were based on an alliance between 
elites in state institutions, who sought to guarantee restructuring; and the 
transnational capitalist class, which is seeking to expand capitalist 
accumulation (Bieler, 2002: 588). Bohle, meanwhile reads Central and Eastern 
European enlargement as the outcome of passive revolution – 'bourgeois 
revolutions without a bourgeoisie' (Bohle, 2006: 75). States were integrated 
within a transnational historical bloc not through the actions of a national 
historical bloc or a pro-European alliance pioneered by a domestic bourgeoisie, 
but by intellectuals and elites in the state (Bohle, 2006: 75-76). In Western 
Europe, compromise on the issue of enlargement is reached through 'embedded 
neoliberalism'; in Central and Eastern Europe, it is expanded into a 'market-
radical variant of neoliberalism' – the redistributive aspects of the EU are not 
imported, and the free movement of labour is blocked ' (Bohle, 2006: 78). On 
the basis of these analyses, I adopt a Gramscian historical materialist 
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framework to debate the question of Turkey's membership of the EU. This is 
for a number of reasons.
First, it is important to read Turkey's membership question against the 
background of globalisation and the transnationalisation of production and 
finance. Turkey is an interesting case: its integration began as early as the 
1950s, and it is the only country to have completed the Customs Union prior to 
membership. Moreover, the transition from import-substitution to 
neoliberalism materialised through a military coup in 1980, at a time when the 
relations between Turkey and EEC were frozen. Yet, this does not mean that 
Turkish economy liberalised independently of the European integration 
process. Rather, it gradually liberalised trade in the run up to the completion of 
the Customs Union in the 1990s, and the EU operated as an anchor in the 
consolidation of macroeconomic restructuring in the last decade. This resonates 
well with Gramscian historical materialism's rejection of the 'reductionism 
implied in structuralist as well as in actor-oriented approaches', and its 
insistence upon examining social phenomena to understand 'the dialectic 
totality of structure and agency' (Overbeek, 2000: 169). In my view, the merit 
of such an approach is that it approaches the political and economic 
development of Turkey neither as independent from nor determined by the 
European integration process.
Second, Gramscian historical materialism paves the way for a discussion of the 
socio-economic content and the social purposes of European integration and 
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enlargement. This is crucial in the case of Turkish enlargement as it allows 
debates surrounding the social purpose of integration to be considered, without 
necessarily being wedded to the 'end state' of negotiations. Indeed, the form of 
Turkish integration is a non-debate as the outcome of negotiations remains 
unknown, and the AKP Government has opted to comply with the reform 
process without necessarily attaining full membership status. In this sense, the 
contribution of Gramscian historical materialism is decisive as it allows for 
debates regarding the pre-eminent power relations that underpin Turkish 
integration.
Third, Gramscian historical materialist perspectives do not treat state as a 'thing 
in itself': an object above human agency. Embedded in its concept of the 
'integral state' or the 'ethical state' is a conception of the state in relation to 
society. Cox criticises the treatment of state in mainstream international 
relations theory as 'a singular concept: a state was a state was a state' (1981: 
127) when, in fact, there are a number of state forms, all of which are defined 
in relation to different configurations of state/society complexes (.ibid). This 
means that the state is not fetishised but is explained with reference to its 
historicity. Hence, as Morton highlights, rather than taking the state as a 'thing 
in itself', it is conceived as a form of social relation upon which the hegemonic 
struggle is expressed (Morton, 2007a: 120). In mainstream Turkish political 
science, the treatment of the Turkish state as a 'strong state' that keeps society 
underdeveloped can be seen as a 'common sense argument' (e.g. Buğra, 1994; 
Heper, 1985; Keyder, 1987; Mardin, 1973). Yet, in my view, this perspective 
contributes to neoliberal restructuring by presenting the 'withering away' of the 
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state as the means for the opening of space in civil society, an argument that 
has enabled the ruling class to posit its vested interests as 'universal', allowing 
it to develop its hegemony by taking the consent of subordinate classes (I
discuss the relationship between the state and society further in the following 
chapter). Taking a Gramscian approach permits me to analyse the capitalist 
state per se, consider its role in the struggle over hegemony and unravel the 
mechanisms of hegemony operated by the ruling class in civil society.
Finally, Gramscian historical materialism conceives of enlargement as an open-
ended struggle between social forces. This allows me to consider labour as an 
agent in processes of enlargement and integration. It also allows consideration 
of actors debating alternatives to globalisation and neoliberal restructuring. In 
particular, the analytical tool of 'hegemony' is of use in debating open-ended 
struggles. Contrary to the state-centric definition in mainstream international 
relations approaches, the Gramscian concept of hegemony is not limited to 
state domination, but encompasses material resources, institutions and ideas. 
For Gramsci, hegemony is a moment in which the ruling class takes 'moral and 
intellectual leadership' by transcending 'the corporate limits of the purely 
economic class, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate 
groups too…' (Gramsci, 1971: 181). Thus, hegemony, is a form of class rule 
secured both by consent and the coercive mechanisms of the state (Overbeek, 
2000: 173). It constitutes the 'concepts of control' that create 'normalcy and 
[the] general interest' at a particular stage in history. It is determined by 
processes of capitalist accumulation at the structural level, and concrete social 
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forces engendered by relations of production (Overbeek and van der Pijl, 1993: 
5-6). As hegemony is constantly contested and consolidated, it opens the door 
to an analysis of alternatives to neoliberal restructuring among groups 
disadvantaged by globalisation and enabling the constitution of a politics of 
resistance.
2.6) Turkish Production Structure in the Global Period and Coordinates 
of Intra-class Struggle
This research debates the struggle over hegemony by taking the social relations 
of production as its base. In this, it follows Cox, who notes that '[p]roduction 
creates the material basis for all forms of social existence, and the way in 
which human efforts are combined in productive processes affect all other 
aspects of life, including the polity' (1987: 1). Thus, production is not limited 
to the 'supply of the physical requisites of life', but rather entails the creation of 
historical structures, institutions and relationships that determine modes of life 
and the accumulation of resources, which collectively constitute the 'material 
reproduction of society' (Cox, 1987: 396). The social relations of production 
entail three inter-related elements: the social context of production that 
determines the nature of production (what is produced on the basis of needs of 
society and/or how it is produced for example); the structure of authority 
determined by the division of labour in the production process; and the 
distribution of rewards of production (Cox, 1987: 11-12). In other words, 
'relations of production' are central to Gramscian historical materialism, rather 
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than 'forces of production', pinpointing the material's dependence on social 
structures (van Apeldoorn, 2002: 17).
Yet, 'due to the diversity of the way production is organised, there are rarely 
two homogenous classes opposing each other in capitalism' (Bieler, 2006: 32). 
Hence, in the open-ended struggle, intra-class struggle can be studied by 
emphasising functional or geographical fractionalisation. On the basis of the 
accumulation process and the subordination of labour to capital, van der Pijl 
debates intra-class struggle in relation to money capital and productive capital 
(van der Pijl, 1998: 13-14). Yet, as the main concern here is integration of a 
peripheral country to a regional bloc, using geographical fractionalisation as an 
analytical pointer seems more plausible. Accordingly, following Bieler, 
functional fractionalisation is treated as secondary, given that globalisation and 
the transnationalisation of production render it apposite to conceive of intra-
class struggle within the national, international and transnational fractions of 
capital and labour (Bieler, 2006: 34; Bieler, 2000: 10).
In a similar vein, Robinson remarks that accumulation in global capitalism 
entails not simply the geographical expansion of capital across national 
boundaries (internationalisation) but 'the fragmentation and decentralisation of 
complex production chains and the worldwide dispersal and functional 
integration of the different segments in these chains' (transnationalisation) 
(Robinson, 2004: 14-15). Therefore, the main struggle in the period of global 
capitalism is between national and transnational fractions of classes, along the 
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contradictory logics of national and global accumulation (Robinson, 2004: 37 
and 49-53). Likewise, van Apeldoorn reads the current state of globalisation as 
a new phase in capitalism, determined by the transnationalisation of 
production, creating spatial fractionalisation and related rival class strategies 
increasingly important in analysing the social relations of production (van 
Apeldoorn, 2002: 27 and 32).
It is necessary to establish the main mechanism of integration of a particular 
country to the global capitalist structure. Internationalisation occurs when trade 
is the main mechanism used, whilst transnationalisation occurs when the flow 
and outflow of FDI is determinant of the integration pattern (Bieler, 2006: 65). 
The principal mechanism of integration of Turkish economy with globalisation 
is trade. As Table One (below) reveals, Turkey conducts approximately 50% of 
its imports and exports with the EU. 
Table 1: Ratio of Foreign Trade to Gross Domestic Product (GDP)   
Imports of Goods 
and Services (% 
of GDP)
Exports of Goods 
and Services (% of 
GDP)
Total Foreign 
Trade (% of GDP)
1981-1990 17,2 13,7 30,9
1991-1995 19 16 36
1996-2000 24 21 45
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2001 23 27 50
2002 24 25 49
2003 24 23 47
2004 26 24 50
2005 25 22 47
2006 28 23 51
2007 27 22 49
2008 28 24 52
2009 24 23 47
2010 26 23 49




The data on inward and outward FDI can be accepted as an indicator of the 
level of transnationalisation of production (Bieler, 2006: 47-67). Table Two 
(below) indicates that FDI is still negligible in terms of capital accumulation. 
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522 37 1,7 -
1998 940 367 - -
1999 783 645 1,9 1,6
2000 982 870 2,2 2,0
2001 3,266 497 12,4 1,9
2002 1,063 175 3,5 0,6
2003 1,753 499 4,7 1,3
2004 2,733 859 5,1 1,6
2005 10,031 1,064 - -
2006 20,223 926 - -
2007 22,023 2,104 15,9 1,5
2008 18,148 2,532 12,5 1,7
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2009 7,611 1,551 7,3 1,5
Source: UNCTAD (2003), World Investment Report, Country Fact Sheet 
Turkey. UNCTAD (2010), World Investment Report, Country Fact Sheet 
Turkey.
Indeed, although the Customs Union was expected to attract FDI, it is argued 
that inward FDI is still negligible, especially in comparison with Eastern 
European countries (Dutz et.al., 2005: 261). As Table 3 illuminates FDI 
inflows lags behind especially the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland until 
2005. Though the FDI flows doubled in 2005 that stayed constant until the 
Euro-zone crisis, as the Table 4 reveals the percentage of FDI within GDP in 
Turkey is considerably low when compared with EU-27 and major 
industrialised countries. Moreover, it is also negligible when compared with 
particular CEECs whose FDI within GDP has increased rapidly with 
membership. Thus, Turkey’s integration path can be analysed as an instance of 
internationalism. 







2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Turkey 707 827 1980 10031 20185 22047 19504 8411 9071
Czech 
Republic
- 3067 5237 11653 5463 10444 6451 2927 6781
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Hungary 1417 3843 3219 7709 6818 3951 7384 2045 2377
Poland 787 5346 7346 10293 19603 23501 14839 13698 9681
Slovakia - 864 2569 2429 4693 3581 4687 -50 526
Slovenia - 196 651 588 644 1514 1947 -582 834
Estonia - 299 621 2869 1797 2725 1731 1838 1539
Latvia - 357 347 707 1663 2322 1261 94 349
Lithunia - 398 500 1028 1817 2015 2045 172 629
Source: UNCTAD (2010) Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
Flows, Annual (1970-2010). 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=88
Table 4: FDI stocks as of GDP
Turkey EU-
27




1999 - - 48.4 19.9 24.3 0.6 - 1.2
2000 - - 60.2 25.4 33.2 0.6 - 1.3
2001 - - 60.0 30.0 38.6 0.6 3.0 1.9
2002 2.2 - 55.4 28.1 36.2 0.7 2.9 1.6
2003 1.8 - 57.3 27.2 38.0 0.9 3.4 2.1
2004 1.6 19.1 51.7 26.6 39.7 1.2 5.4 3.0
2005 1.8 21.9 55.4 30.3 45.3 2.2 7.5 2.9
2006 1.6 23.5 56.6 32.4 47.1 4.0 10.5 3.2
2007 1.7 25.8 60.8 34.9 50.8 4.6 11.9 4.4
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2008 2.6 26.6 62.6 34.6 51.0 4.7 11.7 5.8
2009 3.5 31.2 70.6 37.6 56.2 6.6 14.5 7.3




Accordingly, the following hypothesis will be tested in relation to the Turkish 
membership question: the transnationalisation of production and finance has 
generated a new division between internationally oriented social forces of 
capital and labour on the one hand, and national social forces on the other. The 
former are more likely to be in favour of an open economy and support 
regional integration, as they benefit from a borderless world; whilst the latter 
can be expected to adopt a more critical stance on integration as they are 
dependent on national protectionism and expect subsidies and protection from 
state (Bieler, 2000: 48; Bieler, 2005a: 465; Bieler, 2006: 38). Yet, this 
hypothesis is established not as in a positivist method but as a coordinate 
providing an analytical framework in debating intra-class struggle within the 
context of Turkish membership. The position of social forces can only be 
established as an outcome of empirical study.  
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2.7) Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that mainstream approaches are incapable of 
situating Turkish membership of the EU within structural dynamics of 
globalisation and questioning power relations and socio-economic content of 
ongoing integration of Turkey to the European structures. Rather, I have 
suggested Gramscian historical materialism as an alternative and explained my 
reasons for adopting it as an approach in this thesis.
I began by considering neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist approaches. 
I noted that they fail to consider the structural dynamics within which 
European integration is embedded, remaining preoccupied with the form of 
integration and failing to interrogate the power relations underpinning the 
integration of Turkey into the capitalist structure through the European 
integration process. Moreover, I noted that functional logic posits that 
integration occurs automatically as a result of self-interested economic actors, 
but that this is incorrect in the Turkish case, and cannot explain the AKP 
government's approach, which is committed to EU reform process without 
necessarily attaining the membership status; nor why Turkey's integration has 
lagged behind CEECs. Intergovernmentalism, meanwhile, cannot explain why 
Turkey completed the Customs Union without receiving benefits in return 
(such as membership status or benefits from EU structural funds). Furthermore, 
trade unions are completely omitted from analyses and domestic actors 
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considering alternatives to EU membership remain invisible. The only 
alternative considered is 'privileged partnership', and this provides further 
evidence of their preoccupation with the form of enlargement.
I then turned to consider the comparative political approaches which were 
developed during the 1990s, and sought to contribute to integration debates 
based on the assumption that the EU is no longer just an international 
organisation, but has become a polity in itself, and so cannot be analysed using 
the methods of conventional international relations approaches. I noted that 
they are preoccupied with the repercussions of enlargement on EU politics and 
only examine the effects of Europeanisation and political conditionality on the 
domestic politics of candidate countries. 
Following this, I considered the Europeanisation literature, which has 
dominated the debate surrounding Turkish membership since Turkey was 
declared as a candidate country. I also found this approach to be unsatisfactory. 
I noted that it overemphasises the role of Europe in creating domestic changes, 
and that this results from a neglect of wider global structure. It is ahistorical 
and fails to analyse state/society relations. It subscribes to the 'strong state 
tradition' pre-eminent in Turkish political science, which views 'state, military 
and civilian bureaucracies' as simultaneously in power and forming the 
opposition. This recalls Gramsci's criticism of the claim that '[e]verything 
[must be] within the State, [with] nothing outside the State, nothing against the 
State' (1971: 261). Thus, Europeanisation literature has the social purpose of 
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consolidating neoliberalism by denying class struggle and presenting 
liberalisation as a progressive process constraining the power of the 'strong 
state'. Finally, I argued that implicit in the Europeanisation literature is the 
assumption that Europe is a progressive model that candidate countries aspire 
to 'catch up' with, an assumption which lays bare the Orientalism at the heart of 
Europeanisation.
Next, I considered the constructivist turn in international relations. I argued 
that constructivist research views enlargement as a normative goal, and focuses 
on measuring the impact of the EU on the domestic politics of candidate 
countries. I argued that constructivism proves equally unsatisfactory for 
approaching the Turkish membership question. Its social purpose is to present 
the EU as a 'civilian power' in the international system: a reading based on a 
conception of politics as autonomous from economics. Thus, it ignores the 
EU's imperialist and expansionist policies. It reduces imperialism to military 
intervention, failing to see that capital accumulation is a form of imperialism, 
meaning that there is no room for resistance to uneven development. Moreover, 
Europe is interpreted as a progressive model – an 'ideal type' that candidate 
countries have to comply to by rule adoption. Again, this is a Euro-centric 
reading. I noted that constructivism views Turkey's prolonged candidacy as the 
result of its failure to comply with EU rules and norms, a reading that 
overlooks material structures. Moreover, I noted that constructivism cannot 
explain the effects of the economic crisis on the Turkish membership question 
as it fails to situate Europe within wider processes of globalisation, and 
subscribes to a liberal reading of civil society as independent and autonomous 
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from the state. In this, I argued that constructivist scholars should be seen as 
'traditional intellectuals', whose knowledge serves to consolidate neoliberalism 
by hiding capitalism's contradictions behind a 'system of fortresses and 
earthworks...' (Gramsci, 1971: 235 and 238) or a 'thick ideological veil' (Femia, 
2002b: 122). 
On the basis of this critique, I argued that a Gramscian historical materialist 
approach is needed to analyse the Turkish membership question. I showed how 
this fills the gap left by other approaches by situating the membership question 
within the structural dynamics of globalisation and processes of neoliberal 
restructuring. As Turkey is a unique case (in that the EU has already ruled that 
the outcome of its accession negotiations is open-ended, and that it is the only 
county to have completed the Customs Union outside of membership), 
Gramscian historical materialist analyses are especially needed to consider the 
socio-economic content and the power relations underpinning ongoing 
integration of Turkey with globalisation via European perspective. I noted that 
Gramscian historical materialism conceives of the process of European 
integration as an open-ended struggle. This not only unravels the agency 
behind neoliberal restructuring, but also creates space for the consideration of 
labour. I noted how this enables Turkey to be situated within the transnational 
production structure, and creates space to debate the role of the transnational 
sphere in the process. I then observed that as Gramscian historical materialism 
conceives of the state and society as constituting a social relationship, it is 
capable of developing a critique of the 'strong state tradition' preeminent 
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among Turkish political science, which assumes that the state deliberately 
leaves civil society (conceived of as a progressive entity monolithically) 
underdeveloped – leading to widespread belief that state power should be 
curtailed. The social purpose of this tradition is consolidation of neoliberal 
restructuring. In this view, Gramscian perspectives can critique a treatment of 
state as autonomous and independent from civil society and an equally 
problematic stance that conceives civil society as a monolithic and progressive 
sphere. 
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Chapter 3 - Two Perspectives in Debating Hegemony: Gramsci and 
Discourse Theory
‘The idea that complete and perfect political equality 
cannot exist without economic equality... nevertheless 
remains correct’ (Gramsci, 1971: 258).
‘...it often happens that people combat historical 
economism in the belief that they are attacking historical 
materialism...’ (Gramsci, 1971: 163).  
3.1) Introduction
Having criticised mainstream theories and introduced Gramscian historical 
materialism, this chapter engages with Laclau and Mouffe's critique of 
Gramsci, which they lay out in the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. They 
pose difficult questions regarding the base/superstructure model and political 
subjectivity and offer an alternative definition of hegemony. This chapter will 
consider the underlining disagreements between Gramsci and Laclau and 
Mouffe with regards to political subjectivity, the base-superstructure model, 
hegemony, materialism and political praxis at the theoretical level. Can it be 
said [with Laclau and Mouffe] that Gramsci is a class reductionist and/or an 
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economic determinist? Do Gramscian studies overlook social movements and 
plural forms of social antagonisms in society, confining agency to a counter-
hegemonic strategy built around trade unions and political parties? I will argue, 
however, that the debate between Gramscian historical materialism and Laclau 
and Mouffe should not be confined to defending a particular theoretical camp. 
Rather, it is important to question to what extent a united front can be formed 
among disadvantaged groups in society against globalisation and neoliberal 
restructuring. 
This chapter engages with an additional theoretical debate. It aims to re-think 
hegemony and considers different conceptions of counter-hegemonic strategy, 
drawing on the works of Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe. There are five 
reasons behind such an endeavour. First, Laclau and Mouffe’s criticism to 
Gramscian historical materialism constitutes an important critique that has not 
been adequately addressed in the literature (an exception is Bieler and Morton, 
2008). 
Second, it aims to provide a conceptual framework regarding political 
subjectivity and agency for the empirical research which follows in subsequent 
chapters. Is the hegemonic struggle in Turkey over the membership question 
essentially a struggle of 'capital and labour' and a struggle among class 
fractions, or is there also a need to include struggles over political recognition 
amongst alternative subjectivities, which primarily operate within the sphere of 
identity politics? This latter claim resonates with one of the central postulates 
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of Laclau and Mouffe, who argue that 'the Left need[s] to tackle issues of both 
“redistribution” and “recognition”' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: xviii). I will 
argue in the following that rather than embarking on theory of discourse, it is 
possible to approach new social movements as resistance to commodification 
in the sphere of social reproduction following van der Pijl (1998). 
Third, this theoretical stance would then enable me to integrate women rights 
groups, human rights groups and environment groups into the research design 
as an instance of class struggle. Indeed, these groups are expected to develop a 
critical stance vis-a-vis EU membership in the seventh chapter. This is 
important considering that political issues have begun to prevail and the 
struggle for membership is shaped by issues around democracy, human rights 
and/or the Kurdish problem following the completion of the Customs Union.
Fourth, this theoretical engagement also sheds light why there is not one but 
two class strategies contesting pro-membership project in the struggle over 
hegemony (that will be analysed in the sixth and seventh chapters). Although 
intra-class struggle is prioritised in explicating the absence of a united front 
around a counter-hegemonic strategy, theoretical coordinates of the way 
different fractions conceives of state-society relations and political economy of 
European integration sheds light in understanding their respective positions vis-
a-vis membership. Indeed, this debate contributes to scrutinise contemporary 
fractions of the Turkish Left and the disagreements.
92
Last, this engagement between different analytical frameworks strengthens 
analysis on hegemony that is vital to uncover pre-eminent power relations and 
ultimately contest them. Particular organic leftist intellectuals not only read the 
EU as a 'democratization project' but also subscribe to the myth of the 'strong 
state', two arguments decisive in consolidating neo-liberalism's pro-
membership project. On the one hand, they gave consent to AKP’s neoliberal 
hegemony (that will be further elucidated in the subsequent chapter) believing 
that its rule would challenge the ‘hegemonic’ republican order underpinned by 
statist-secular elites to use their jargon (İnsel, 2003: 301). They read AKP rule 
as in government but without power and interpret 2002 victory of the AKP as 
opening a new path for democratisation (Öniş and Keyman, 2003). Implicit in 
this reading is the strong state tradition and separateness of economics and 
politics. A similar critique can be conducted for particular social forces that 
read EU membership perspective in relation to democratisation. In this reading, 
as the social base is left underdeveloped in Turkey – due to strong state, elites 
and military – membership is articulated as an anchor to consolidate 
democracy.  
I shall argue that Laclau and Mouffe depict Gramsci as taking classes and/or 
production as a structure, whilst it is the social relations of production that lie 
at the core of struggle over hegemony in Gramscian historical materialism 
(Bieler, 2000; Cox, 1987; Morton, 2007a; van der Pijl, 1998; Rupert, 1995; 
Robinson, 2004). It is material capabilities, ideas and institutions, in a non-
determinant and reciprocal way, that are taken as the basis for an analysis of 
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social relations (Cox, 1981: 136). From such a vantage, Gramscian historical 
materialism does not exclude contradictions around patriarchy, human rights 
and/or the environment. I then introduce van der Pijl’s analysis in integrating 
these struggles in the research design. According to van der Pijl, it is the 
‘discipline of capital over the entire reproductive system’ and its ‘exploitation 
of the social and natural substratum’ that has to be resisted (van der Pijl, 1998: 
36 and 47). It is the struggles around social reproduction and the deepening and 
expansion of the capitalist discipline that 'subjects new spheres to the logic of 
exploitation and profit', including 'the destruction of the biosphere, and all the 
terrains on which the corrupting influences of money and profit are souring the 
joys and quality of life-from sports and leisure to art, education and health –
even a funeral' (van der Pijl, 1998: 48).
In the first section, Gramsci's understanding of hegemony and his theorisation 
of counter-hegemonic strategy is explained. This is followed by a summary of 
Laclau and Mouffe's critique of Gramsci and an outline of their project of 
'radical and plural democracy', through which they aspire to 'radicalise 
hegemony'. The final sub-section summarises my own position vis-a-vis five 
separate (though related) aspects of the debate: the status of materialism, 
state/society relations, the role of the international sphere, historicism and 
agency-structure; and explains the underlining rationale behind adopting a 
Gramscian conception of hegemony in this research in each of these five areas. 
This chapter engages with the early writings of Laclau and Mouffe, in 
particular their post-structural reading of hegemony in Hegemony and Socialist 
94
Strategy. In that sense, recent writings which are influenced by the 'Lacanian 
turn' (Howarth, 2004: 262) fall outside the scope of the chapter.
3.2) Gramsci, Hegemony and Theoretical Directions of Counter-
hegemonic Strategy
Gramsci belonged to the 'proletarian moment' (Hall, 1987: 16) and queried why 
socialist revolution occurred in Russia rather than in a capitalist social setting, 
as had been anticipated by the stagist and economist interpretations of 
historical materialism pre-dominant in the Second International. On the basis 
of this question, he laid the foundation of his analysis on a differentiation 
between state-society relations in the East and the West and concluded that the 
way revolution is conditioned in the West is more complicated as a result of 
'political super-structures, created by the greater development of capitalism' 
(Gramsci, 1978: 199). This is to say that he posits that the contradictions of 
capitalism would not automatically prepare the ground for a socialist revolution 
in the West, as 'the superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems 
of modern warfare'; they provide a 'system of fortresses and earthworks...' 
(Gramsci, 1971: 235 and 238). In other words, Gramsci emphasises the 
mechanisms of civil society that hide capitalism's contradictions behind a 'thick 
ideological veil' (Femia, 2002b: 122).
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Embarking on this analysis on state-society relations, Gramsci advances two 
strategies: the 'war of manoeuvre' (a mode of 'frontal attack') and the 'war of 
position' (Gramsci, 1971: 238-39). He contends that in the West, 'the question 
of so-called permanent revolution...would subsequently be absorbed and 
superseded by the concept of "civil hegemony"' (Gramsci, 2007: 267). Indeed, 
he interpreted the ‘united front’ and strategies of Lenin and Comintern as being 
in line with a ‘war of position’ (Gramsci, 2007: 168-169, Q 7, §16). 
Henceforth, Gramsci elaborates, there is a need to study '"in depth" which 
elements of civil society correspond to the defensive systems in a war of 
position' (Gramsci, 1971: 235). This struggle entails ideological preparation 
through conquering 'one after another all the instruments of ideological 
diffusions' (Femia, 2002a: 483-484). Hence, the struggle over hegemony is 
expanded to civil society and is directed to challenge various institutions of 
capitalist rule such as 'publishing houses, newspapers, journals, literature, 
libraries, museums, theatres, art galleries, schools, architecture, [and] street 
names' (Morton, 2007a: 92-93). It is in relation to this conception of hegemony 
and struggle that Morton reads Gramsci as a 'theorist of capillary power' 
(2007a: 88). 
In the war of position, the concept of hegemony entails a central position in 
explicating and challenging the capitalist rule. To quote Gramsci, 'in politics, 
the war of position is the concept of hegemony...' (Gramsci, 2007: 267). The 
concept of hegemony can be traced back to gegemonia in Russian Social-
Democratic Movement as a political strategy in the struggle of working class 
against Tsarism (Anderson, 1976: 14-17). The Gramscian understanding, 
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however, advances the classical conception from one concerned with class 
alliance and/or dictatorship of the working class, to one that 'describes 
structures of bourgeois power in the West' (Anderson, 1976: 20). Thus, as 
Gibbon notes, Gramsci enhances 'both the scope of the concept of hegemony 
(to include ideological leadership in the socialist revolution and bourgeois 
ideological domination in capitalist society) and its content – to focus directly 
on its material mechanism and vehicles: organizations, apparatuses and 
intellectuals' (2002: 516-517).
Hegemony, according to Gramsci, is a condition in which the ruling class takes 
a role of 'moral and intellectual leadership' by transcending 'the corporate limits 
of the purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of other 
subordinate groups too…' (Gramsci, 1971: 181). Implicit in this definition are 
two stages in the struggle over hegemony. Whilst in the economic-corporate 
level, the 'tradesman feels obliged to stand by another tradesman, a 
manufacturer by another manufacturer, etc...', the hegemonic moment is 
reached when 'the corporate limits of the purely economic class' is transcended 
by forming relations of force (Gramsci, 1971: 181-82). The hegemonic level is 
political - it 'marks the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of 
complex superstructures' (Gramsci, 1971: 181-182). This occurs when a 
particular social group prevails and gains an upper hand in the conflict by 
'bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also 
intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle 
rages not on a corporate but on a "universal" plane' (Gramsci, 1971: 181-82). 
Bates neatly sums up the Gramscian concept of hegemony by stating that it 
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refers to a form of rule led by a particular class which has convinced 'others of 
the validity of its world view' (Bates, 1975: 352 and 355). In other words, 
hegemony emphasises that 'man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas...' 
(Bates, 1975: 351). It stands as a form of intellectual and moral unity on a 
'universal' plane (Gramsci, 1971: 181-82).
There are two particular merits of this definition. First, Gramsci observes that 
'even bourgeois hegemony is not automatic but achieved through conscious 
political action and organisation' (Hobsbawn, 1977: 209). Second, he extends 
struggle over hegemony to working class and subaltern groups. Indeed, his 
reference to the 'need for the Left to break out of an "economic-corporate" 
outlook and construct a hegemonic politics of its own' was a decisive 
theoretical opening (Forgacs, 1989: 72). In ‘Some Theoretical and Practical 
Aspects of “Economism”’, Gramsci cogently observes that theoretical 
syndicalism prevents ‘a subaltern group...from ever becoming dominant, or 
from developing beyond the economic-corporate stage and rising to the phase 
of ethical-political hegemony in civil society, and of domination in the State’ 
(Gramsci, 1971: 160). Henceforth, he is received as a figure within historical 
materialism who emphasises 'the active, voluntarist side of Marxist theory, as 
opposed to the fatalistic reliance upon objective economic forces and scientific 
laws' (Femia, 2002b: 117). His critique of spontaneity sits alongside his 
reference to the need for political contingency (Gramsci, 1971: 196). Following 
Thomas, it can be said that 'Gramsci's carceral research can be succinctly 
characterised as the search for an adequate theory of proletarian hegemony in 
98
the epoch of the "organic crisis" or the "passive revolution" of the bourgeois 
"integral State"' (2009: 136).
Gramsci's clearest explication of what a counter-hegemonic struggle will look 
like comes in his analysis in the Political Writings of the Turin factory councils 
movement of 1919-1920. Here (drawing on Machiavelli), he develops his 
concept of the political party as a 'Modern Prince', working alongside trade 
unions to present a united front among subaltern classes. Gramsci notes how –
in the Turin struggle – the movement built its own leadership among the 
working class and avoided industrial collaboration, remaining fiercely 
independent (1977: 159). This, he argued, can generate consciousness based on 
production, unify the working class and form the basis of proletarian power 
and the socialist state (Gramsci, 1977: 100 and 111-112). In view of this, 
Gramsci elucidates, the capacity to overthrow capitalism cannot be expected to 
arise naturally from the trade unions. Gramsci reads syndicalism as 'an utter 
failure' (Gramsci, 1977: 74 and 109) and posits that 'objectively, the trade 
union is nothing other than a commercial company, of a purely capitalistic 
type, which aims to secure, in the interests of the proletariat, the maximum 
price for the commodity labour...' (Gramsci, 1978: 76). In their evolution, 
Gramsci observes, trade unions could not immediately accomplish the 
emancipation of the working class by eliminating 'capitalist private property 
ownership' so instead their aims lay in 'improving the proletariat's living 
conditions...higher wages, shorter hours of work and a body of social 
legislation' (Gramsci, 1977: 104). Thus, Gramsci criticises reformist trade 
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unionism and 'pseudo-revolutionary syndicalism' due to their narrow approach 
based on bureaucratic and technical expertise regarding general industrial 
matters (problems which are specific to capitalist society); and their failure to 
debate the problems of production (Gramsci, 1977: 159; Gramsci, 1978: 76). 
However, Gramsci argues that 'our criticism of the errors and mistakes of the 
trade-union movement should not lead us to condemn the unions, but to 
strengthen them' (1977: 241 and 242).
In this counter-hegemonic strategy in the war of position, Gramsci places a 
particular emphasis on the concept of the 'united front', through which the 
working class can transcend its interests and form class alliances by gaining the 
consent of peasants and certain semi-proletarian urban categories (Gramsci,
1978: 443 and 448). The proletarian united front is a strategy which entails 
organising 'all the popular forces in revolt against the capitalist regime' among 
the oppressed and exploited classes, 'toiling classes', by the leadership of the 
working class (Gramsci, 1977: 376; Gramsci, 1978: 11 and 34). This meant 
forming an alliance between industrial workers and peasants (Gramsci, 1977: 
376) and a conception of proletarian revolution achieved through factory 
control and land seizure (Gramsci, 1977: 140-141).
Gramsci’s political writings, however, contain a number of points of debate 
with the social democrats. Particular areas of disagreement were the debate on 
participation to parliamentary electionsii (Gramsci, 1978: 32-33, 39-40); the 
adequate response to the rise of fascismiii (Gramsci, 1978: 61); and the position 
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of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) for advocating ‘trade-union officialdom’ 
(Gramsci, 1978: 13 and 17). Although he started his political life within the 
PSI, Gramsci was in favour of communist fractions splitting from the party and 
maintained this position until the Livorno Congress of 1921, when the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) was formed. Gramsci saw the PSI as 'merely a 
parliamentary party, one which could set itself the target of "correcting" or 
sabotaging the bourgeois state, but could not set itself the target of founding a 
new state' (1977: 370). For him, the socialists failed to break with the historical 
reality produced by capitalism and shared liberal economists' 'mistaken 
mentality' regarding the 'perpetuity and fundamental perfection of the 
institutions of the democratic State' (1977: 76). Against this, Gramsci argued 
that 'industrial autocracy' endures as long as capitalist private property 
ownership is not challenged, and this can hardly be reformed by democracy 
(1978: 10). Moreover, Gramsci argued that the state cannot be founded upon 
the institutions of the capitalist state (including parliamentary democracy), and 
must, fundamentally, be a new creation (Gramsci, 1977: 76). Drawing on 
'Lyons Thesis', presented to the PCI's third congress in 1926, Gramsci argues 
that social democracy should be interpreted 'not as a right wing of the working 
class movement but as a left wing of the bourgeoisie' (Gramsci, 1978: 259).
Many recent analyses of Gramsci question whether the theoretical coordinates 
provided by Gramsci are still applicable given that he was working within a 
particular temporal and spatial reality (see, for instance, Bellamy, 1990 and 
1994; Germain and Kenny, 1998). Gibbon interprets relevance of Gramsci's 
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solutions to contemporary social problems as 'accidental' (2002: 529). The 
issue of historicising Gramsci's conceptual tools to engage with current 
struggle over hegemony is also debated by Hall and Morton. The former argues 
that an 'easy transfer of generalisations from one conjuncture, nation or epoch 
to another' is inconsistent with 'thinking in a Gramscian way'. Rather, he reads 
Gramsci as a thinker who provides the tools to 'ask the right kinds of questions' 
rather than someone to follow like 'an Old Testament prophet' who '"has the 
answers" or "holds the key" to our present troubles' (Hall, 1987: 16). 
Concomitantly, Morton takes Gramsci's own method of 'absolute historicism' 
as a pointer in treating the history of ideas (2007a: 17). Thus, he criticises both 
an ahistorical, or mechanical application of Gramsci's theory, and aspires to 
develop a method of 'thinking in a Gramscian way'. This involves internalising 
Gramsci's method of immanent thinking and 'focusing on the rhythm of 
thought in his work', in order to conceive of 'ideas in and beyond their context 
and engage critically with Gramsci's work without seeing him 'as some sort of 
prophet' (Morton, 2007a: 35-38). An example of Gramsci's historicism can be 
found in his treatment of Machiavelli. Gramsci embedded the writings of 
Machiavelli to his time, but argued that the idea of Modern Prince resonated 
with the political context in Italy. Yet, he re-defined the 'Modern Prince' as the 
political party, the vanguard of the working class (Gramsci, 1971: 129, 140 and 
147).
On the basis of this theoretical stance, Gramscian scholars focus on alternatives 
to globalization. Notably, there is a developing literature seeking to introduce 
an alternative Gramscian framework. Cox identifies the key challenge here as 
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building a ‘coherent coalition of opposition’ (1992: 40-41). A number of 
Gramscian historical materialist analyses focus on the role of labour as an 
international actor and debate the prospects for labour internationalism; 
transnational solidarity; and co-operation between labour and social 
movements in challenging neo-liberal restructuring (Bieler, 2005a, 2006; 
Bieler et. al 2008; Bieler and Morton, 2004; Bieler and Lindberg, 2011). A 
further group of literature approaches counter-hegemony in relation to sub-
altern, social movements and localised oppositional forces from below, and 
underlines the need to resist the rule of global transnational ruling class at the 
global level in addition to national level (Robinson, 2004: 145-79). Yet, it is 
also posited that primary focus of Gramscian historical materialist scholars is 
on the hegemony of the ruling class and the structural power of transnational 
capital in the world economy. They are criticized for giving only secondary 
status to the debates surrounding resistance and counter-hegemonic strategy 
(Drainville, 1994: 121; Eley, 2002: 43). 
3.3) Radical and Plural Democracy in Debating Alternatives / Intervention 
of Laclau and Mouffe in Debating Hegemony 
In the early stages of their academic work, both Laclau and Mouffe drew on 
Gramsci and criticized economism by emphasising the superstructural and 
cultural aspects of his research on political contingency, hegemony, collective 
will and the integral state (Laclau, 1979; Mouffe, 1979a and 1979b). Later on 
in the development of their discourse theory, they came to conceive of 
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economy as a discursive formation (Torfing, 1999: 39). In Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, they criticise the Gramscian conception of hegemony for 
prioritising class over non-class identities, failing to acknowledge the 
autonomy of the political and for conceiving of a single hegemonic nodal point 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 137-138). They argue that Gramsci subscribed to 
two forms of essentialism embedded in Marxism: class as the sole unifying 
element of hegemonic formations; and the economic base as the determinant of 
antagonisms and the political sphere (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 69). Hence, 
Laclau and Mouffe aspire to go beyond Gramsci by 'radicalising hegemony'. 
They seek to radicalise democratic struggles in which political identities are 
not subsumed under class but rather in the plural form as 'multiple hegemonic 
articulations' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 137). They argue for a plurality and 
diversity of social antagonisms in society, a position echoed by Howarth 
(2000), Howarth et al. (2000) and Torfing (1999) that criticize assigning a 
privileged position in the hegemonic struggle to social class due to their 
position in the relations of production. 
In explicating the underlining rational in this endeavour, Laclau and Mouffe 
refer to 'structural' changes within capitalism (the decline of the classical 
working class in post-industrial countries; atypical forms of political struggle –
especially in the periphery – and the penetration of capitalist forms into social 
life) on one hand, and the proliferation of new forms of political struggle and 
new social movements such as feminist, ethnic and ecological protest 
movements on the other (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 1). Moreover, in an 
interview conducted in 1982, Laclau and Mouffe criticise the 'classical 
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conception of "the seizure of power"', identifying it as a 'vanguardist 
conception'. Rather, they argue that 'power is not something one can seize, 
because power is constitutive of the ensemble of social relations' (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2002: 146-147). Accordingly, they articulate a strategical praxis of 
'radical democracy' through which they believe the Left must come to terms 
with democracy and pluralism (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987). This project of 
'radical and plural democracy' integrates the struggles for 'redistribution' and 
'recognition' within the Left (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: xv and xviii). It is not a 
case of 'back to class struggle' but rather the advocacy of 'a chain of 
equivalence' through which workers' struggles can operate alongside new 
social movements of identity and ecologically based struggles (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985: xviii). Stated bluntly, 'the strategy of war of position involves a 
plurality of democratic struggles' (Laclau and Mouffe 2002: 147).
Laclau and Mouffe, in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, break with 
base/superstructure model and argue that centrality of working class as the 
revolutionary subjectivity and production structure as determinant of 
antagonisms in society constitute ‘limits to hegemony’ (Laclau and Mouffe: 
1985: 48-57). They define hegemony on a post-structural terrain through 
deconstructing two 'narratives' conditioning hegemony within historical 
materialism: the primary structure determining the antagonism between the 
working class and bourgeoisie; and Trotsky's 'permanent revolution' (Laclau 
and Mouffe: 1985: 48-55). These are interpreted not only as constituting 'limits 
to hegemony', but also producing a form of 'political authoritarianism' (Laclau 
and Mouffe: 1985: 54 and 56-57). Laclau and Mouffe criticise the positioning 
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of the working class as the privileged subjectivity whose unity (assumed by 
historical materialism) is constituted by their position in the relations of 
production (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 118). Accordingly, they posit that the 
centrality attributed to the working class as the 'universal class', 'is not a 
practical but an ontological centrality, which is, at the same time, the seat of an 
epistemological privilege' (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 56-57).
It is on the basis of this critique that Laclau and Mouffe aspire to 'radicalise' the 
Gramscian notion of hegemony. They argue that it is structural undecidability 
which conditions hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: xii). In parallel with 
poststructuralism, they conceive of society as an 'impossible object of analysis'. 
The terrain of the social can never be closed and there can be no absolute or 
determinant fixing of the identities of social subjects in articulatory practices or 
political subjectivity (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 112-13). Thus, Laclau and 
Mouffe define the hegemonic relation as one through which 'a certain 
particularity assumes the representation of a universality entirely 
incommensurable with it' by linking different identities and political forces 
around a common project (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: x-xiii). Dismissing the 
base/superstructure model, they indicate that the relation between the 
hegemonised task and class is contingent rather than necessary, a relation 
whose ‘identity is given to it solely by its articulation within a hegemonic 
formation’ (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 86). Breaking with the constitution of 
agency and interests in the relations of production, they argue that 'a relation of 
contradiction can exist between two objects of discourse' (Laclau and Mouffe: 
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1985: 110). Hegemony is no longer conceived of as the unification of political 
forces around externally constituted interests, but rather 'the concept of 
hegemony supposes a theoretical field dominated by the category of 
articulation' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 93). Hegemonic projects aspire to 
stabilise meanings or hegemonic formations by articulating 'nodal points' or 
'master-signifiers' which serve to partially fix the identities of particular 
signifiers (Howarth, 2000: 110).
3.4) Two Perspectives in Debating Hegemony
Embarking on a criticism of Gramsci for economic essentialism, class 
reductionism and an insistence on orienting hegemony around a single nodal 
point, Laclau and Mouffe aspire to radicalise hegemony. In their view, this 
endeavour is conducted to apply the concept of hegemony to social movements 
operating within the sphere of plural and radical democracy.
Indeed, both Laclau and Mouffe and Gramscian historical materialist scholars 
pose a number of difficult questions. To help clarify the key issues of the 
debate in re-thinking the concept of hegemony I will establish categories to 
cover key areas of disagreement. I argue that Laclau and Mouffe's conception 
of hegemony separates politics and economics; fails to adequately deal with the 
relationship between state and civil society; fails to theorise the social totality; 
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and overlooks the international dimension in the hegemonic struggle. In so 
doing I make clear why I adopt a Gramscian framework for this research.
At the heart of the debate between Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe is the status 
of materialism. Both theoretical approaches aspire to transcend the duality 
between idealism and materialism. Whilst the former emphasises dialectics 
(Gramsci, 1971: 435) and conceives of ideas as material forces (Gramsci, 
1971: 165), the latter highlights the 'material character of every discursive 
structure' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 108-109). Laclau and Mouffe criticise 
Gramsci for subscribing to economic essentialism and class reductionism in 
conceiving of hegemony. They argue that the separation of economics and 
politics is 'established a priori in an essentialist conception' (Laclau and 
Mouffe: 1985: 120). In view of this, they aspire to transcend the 'classical 
dichotomy between an objective field constituted outside of any discursive 
intervention, and a discourse consisting of the pure expression of thought' 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 108). They reject claims that discourse theory is 
itself idealist (Geras, 1987). Instead, it is posited that discourse theory is 
materialist (Torfing, 1999: 45 and 94). From this, they claim that the material 
character of discourse cannot be unified around a founding subject such as the 
Gramscian notion of 'class' or Althusser's 'logic of reproduction' (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985: 104-105). Gramscian scholars, however, criticise poststructural 
analyses such as Laclau and Mouffe's for separating and prioritizing the 
ideational over the material, an error which prevents poststructuralism from 
unravelling the social actors behind power mechanisms and questioning the 
underlying power structure behind a particular discourse (Bieler and Morton, 
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2008: 112-113). Morton posits that this conception of struggle over hegemony 
ends up 'abstracting forms of collective agency from the prevailing social order 
and isolating and separating issues from social conditions and material 
interests' (Morton, 2006: 48-49). From such a perspective, the social function 
of Laclau and Mouffe is the promotion of liberal values (Morton, 2006: 56). 
Against this, Gramscian historical materialism conceives of ideas as 'material 
social processes' within which material capabilities and ideas are interrelated 
and reciprocal (Bieler and Morton, 2008: 105). Moreover, Gramscian studies 
conceive of production not solely in terms of physical goods, but in a broader 
sense which includes material capabilities, ideas and institutions (Cox, 1981: 
131-138).
Laclau and Mouffe are wrong in their interpretation of Gramsci as an 
essentialist. Gramsci criticises the 'fatalism of philosophy of praxis' and/or 
'vulgar materialism', reading it as a consequence of the failure to develop an 
'immanent thought to [the] philosophy of praxis' (1977: 34). Indeed, he 
explicates a differentiation between 'historical economism' and 'philosophy of 
praxis' (1971: 158-68), and posits that it is the former which overlooks 
relations of class formations and 'is content to assume motives of mean and 
usurious self-interest' (1971: 163). Furthermore, in ‘Revolution Against 
Capital’ he reads the Bolshevik Revolution as ‘the revolution against Karl 
Marx’s Capital’ and argues that Bolsheviks developed an immanent philosophy 
of praxis in the sense of taking men rather than raw economic facts into 
consideration (1977: 34-35). Concomitantly, in ‘Some Theoretical and 
Practical Aspects of “Economism”’, Gramsci interprets economism as a ‘direct 
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descendant of liberalism, having very little connection with the philosophy of 
praxis’ (1971: 159). He reads 'laissez faire liberalism' and 'theoretical 
syndicalism' as two forms of economism (1971: 159). Thus, it is not historical 
materialism but theoretical syndicalism, Gramsci claims, that sacrifices the 
independence and autonomy of subaltern groups to ruling class hegemony and 
stands as 'an aspect of laissez-faire liberalism – justified with a few mutilated 
(and therefore banalised) theses from the philosophy of praxis...' (1971: 160). 
In this sense, Gramsci ultimately argues that economism has to be combated 
both in the theory of historiography and the theory and practice of politics 
(1971: 165). Given this, Gramsci cannot be labelled an economic essentialist –
his analyses are based on a 'broader conception of social politics encompassing 
the state, the economy, and cultural spheres of a social formation' (Rupert, 
1995: 31). The way Gramsci depicts the effects of Americanism upon Italian 
social relations is illustrative in this regard:
...it might seem that in this way the sexual function has been 
mechanised, but in reality we are dealing with the growth of a new form 
of sexual union shorn of the bright and dazzling colour of the romantic 
tinsel typical of the petit bourgeois and the Bohemian layabout. It 
seems clear that the new industrialism wants monogamy: it wants the 
man as worker not to squander his nervous energies in the disorderly 
and stimulating pursuit of occasional sexual satisfaction. The employee 
who goes to work after a night of "excess" is no good for his work' 
(1971: 304-305).
Laclau and Mouffe aspire to transcend the dualism between idealism and 
materialism. However, the status of materialism in discourse theory left 
deconstructed. Indeed, Laclau and Mouffe aspire to develop ‘a non-
economistic understanding of economy’ (2002: 136). Those drawing on the 
work of Laclau and Mouffe argue that class is not a category to be denied 
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scrutiny, but rather that it is a subject that can only be constituted by discourse 
(Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2004: 204). There is a notable tendency, however, to 
neglect economy. This is manifest when Laclau and Mouffe conceptually 
stretch 'democratic struggles' in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, and interpret 
anti-capitalist struggles of the nineteenth century not as proletarian struggles, 
but as 'resistance to the destruction of artisanal identities' (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 156). Here, class struggle is rejected and understood instead as the 
defence of a certain worker identity which has been acquired in relation to 
'skills or...organizational functions in production' in a reductionist manner 
(Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 158). It is no surprise, then, that works employing 
Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse predominantly focus on social 
phenomena in relation to identity politics and overlook struggles of material 
inequality and relations of distribution in empirical studies (see, for example, 
Howarth et. al., 2000).
Hence, in my view, Laclau and Mouffe operate within capitalism's structured 
separation of economics and politics – a condition that 'de-socialises the 
materialiv'. As convincingly argued by Wood, the separation of economics and 
politics has always been immanent to capitalism, and constitutes its 'most 
effective defence mechanism' (Wood, 1981: 67). Similarly, Aronowitz 
criticises Laclau and Mouffe for leaving little room for political economy 
(Aronowitz, 1986-1987: 11-12), whilst Žižek posits that the absence of class 
analyses in postmodernist critical thought (such as Laclau and Mouffe's) 
signifies a 'theoretical retreat from the problem of domination within 
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capitalism' (2000: 97). In this sense, whilst post-modernism politicizes 
language and gender, drawing attention to issues that were previously viewed 
as apolitical or private, it fails to re-politicize capitalism. Its reading of the 
political is predicated on a 'depoliticization of the economy' (Žižek, 2000: 98). 
For Žižek, it is the form of contemporary capitalism that renders political 
subjectivities dispersed, shifted and contingent; and postmodern analyses will 
never be sufficiently political so long as they continue to neglect the economic 
sphere (2000: 108). Similarly, Wood argues that one of the functions of post-
Marxism is 'to conceptualize away from capitalism' (Wood, 1990: 60). For her, 
what is alarming is not that post-Marxism 'violate[s] some doctrinaire Marxist 
prejudice concerning the privileged status of class', but rather that it fails to 
critically engage with capitalism, seeking 'to sweep the whole question under 
the rug' (Wood, 1990: 79). Concurrently, Gill’s criticism regarding 
Foucauldian analyses can be read in relation to post-structuralism. For him, 
‘despite its preoccupation with localised, capillary forms of power/knowledge, 
the Foucaldian view often lacks a convincing way of linking these forms of 
power to macro-structures’. Thus, ‘this epistemological revolution’ overlooks 
‘any sustained analysis of the rise of capital as a social relation’ (Gill, 1995: 
403). 
This theoretical retreat from the problem of economic domination and 
distribution of income can be observed in the position of particular women 
rights/feminist groups (this argument is further developed in the seventh 
chapter). For instance, interviewee from Ka-mer - a feminist organisation that 
struggles for violence against women especially in the Eastern Anatolia –
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highlighted that there has never been a debate on the Customs Union and/or 
economic implications of globalisation though they operate in poor and 
economically underdeveloped regions (Interview No. 79). Similarly, particular 
women rights/feminist groups have never discussed liberalisation of trade via 
the Customs Union and its implications to Turkish economy in debating 
membership (Interview No. 69 and 79). The interviewees also stressed that 
economic aspects of membership are interpreted as ‘technical’ related to 
particular industrial sectors (Interview No. 29 and 79). In other words, 
neoliberal 'common sense' which reads the economy as operating in an 
apolitical field and its strategy of de-politicising the economy are internalised.
A further area of disagreement between Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe 
concerns the state. For Gramsci, the state is embedded within political and civil 
society that is manifested in coordinates of integral state and/or ethical state 
(1971: 263). Such a standing enables us to designate mechanisms of capitalist 
state and contest them. Laclau and Mouffe, on the state debate, criticise 
Marxist accounts to ask the wrong kind of questions around the problem of 
‘relative autonomy of state’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 139). As social can 
hardly be sutured around two antagonistic camps state can hardly be 
approached as a sphere of class struggle. Thus, Laclau and Mouffe deconstruct 
Marxist conception of state as an instrument of ruling class in capitalist 
accumulation. However, following they do not give hints in approaching the 
role of state in hegemonic struggle. On the one hand, this is consistent with 
their critical stance to classical conception of power. In line with post-
structuralism, they argue that 'power is not something one can seize, because 
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power is constitutive of the ensemble of social relations' (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2002: 146-147). On the other hand, according to Laclau and Mouffe, 
hegemony is ‘a type of political relation and not a topographical concept’ 
(1985: 141). They posit that ‘a situation in which a system of differences had 
been so welded together would imply the end of the hegemonic form of 
politics’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 138). Accordingly, the field of articulatory 
practices within the ‘open, non-sutured character of the social’ is defined as the 
core of hegemonic relations. It is the existence of a variety of hegemonic nodal 
points – that are antagonistic – which renders relations as hegemonic (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985: 138-139). To put bluntly, according to Laclau and Mouffe, 
‘hegemony is, quite simply, a political type of relation, a form, if one so 
wishes, of politics, but not a determinable location within a topography of the 
social’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 139). In this conception of hegemony, the 
struggle over hegemony is no longer related to seizure of state power. That is 
why they remain silent on the role/status of state within the struggle over 
hegemony in the Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. In my view, this position 
has the political consequence of overlooking the role of the state in the struggle 
over hegemony and failing to contest instruments of capitalist state. 
   
This emphasis on pluralism within radical democracy rather than seizure of 
power can be observed in the interviews I conducted with women 
rights/feminist groups. Indeed, in the 1970s, the women rights movement was 
structured within leftist politics. For instance, the Progressive Women 
Association (İKD) was founded by the initiative of Turkish Communist Party 
(TKP) and it was banned by the military in 1979. The second wave of feminist 
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movement in Turkey however arose in 1980s – around the motto that private 
sphere is political - within a de-politicized social setting of neoliberal 
restructuring. A feminist activist highlighted that women rights/feminist groups 
resisted neoliberal restructuring as it entailed a process in which women labour 
has been increasingly subjected to flexible forms of employment. However 
neoliberal restructuring also opened floor for pluralism (Interview No. 77). 
They criticised confining struggle against patriarchy around exploitation of 
working class proletarian women and/or delimiting problems of women within 
class struggle and public sphere (Interview No. 18).
Moreover, as the emphasis within the radical and plural democracy is openness 
of the social and plurality of antagonisms, it overlooks neoliberal civil society 
that actually contributes to ruling class to articulate its vested interests on a 
universal terrain. Given that state is under-theorised and neoliberal civil society 
is not contested – and coupled with their separation of politics and economics –
their discourse theory operates within the neoliberal order's separation of the 
state and civil society. This separation has been widely criticised. Buttigieg 
contends that it risks misconstruing 'power relations within, among and across 
states', strategically disabling leftist struggle (2005: 35-37). A similar concern 
is raised by Wood, who states that the conceptual opposition of the state and 
civil society means that '"civil society" [is] in danger of becoming an alibi for 
capitalism' (1990: 60). Though this definition of civil society opens new 
avenues for emancipatory projects of the left, it retreats from the problematic 
of capitalism (Wood, 1990: 63). In this sense, Wood cogently observes, such a 
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stance overlooks the 'oppressions of civil society' (1990: 63). More 
importantly, such a definition of civil society generates 'new forms of freedoms 
and equality', but equally 'constitute[s] a new form of social power, in which 
many coercive functions that once belonged to the state [are] relocated in the 
"private" sphere, in private property, class exploitation, and market 
imperatives' (Wood, 1990: 73). Indeed, Wood claims that the 'irony' of these 
'new pluralisms' is that they end up 'making invisible the power relations which 
constitute capitalism', despite aspiring to articulate 'an antagonism to all power 
relations in all their diverse forms' (Wood, 1990: 78). Similarly, Bieler and 
Morton criticise a direct treatment of global civil society as a platform 
generating resistance, given that such a reading conceives of the state's 
relationship with the market as one of exteriority and fails to recognise that 
civil society frequently operates as an agent of globalisation (2004: 307-308). 
For instance, Çelik employs discourse theory to analyse Turkey, arguing that 
increased democratization will open up more space in the political sphere to 
articulate identity politics (around Kurdish or Islamic identities, for example), 
which she sees as progressive (Çelik, 2000). Indeed, it is possible to unfold the 
debate with reference to the Turkish Left, where the repercussions of 
conceiving of the relationship between state and society as one of externality 
are clear. In parallel with the conception of the state as a 'strong state' as 
subject to transhistorical statolatry, a fraction inside the Left consents to the 
neoliberal hegemony of the AKP, seeing it as a progressive force challenging 
the mechanisms of the 'strong state' (the military, in particular). Moreover, 
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AKP was also supported to open up space for debates around political Islam 
and Kurdish identity in tandem with pluralism. AKP hegemony is thus depicted 
as a force under the discourse of political Islam – outside of and external to the 
mechanisms of the 'strong state' – and hence a force with the potential to 
constrain it. This is the view articulated by a number of leftist Turkish organic 
intellectuals who read AKP as in government but without power (İnsel, 2003: 
301; Öniş and Keyman, 2003): a claim that overlooks how AKP hegemony 
reproduces the neoliberal project by strengthening executive power, and the 
coercive mechanisms of the state. Rather, it is my contention that the AKP 
hegemony is an instance of 'trasformismo', as its social content is in the 
consolidation of neoliberal restructuring through the containment of social 
unrest (I develop this argument more fully in Chapter Four, below). The AKP 
achieves this by presenting its rule as a rupture with previous orders which, 
they claim, pitted the elites versus the people in appearance. Thus, discourse 
theory is interpreted and used against the state, but not the capitalist state per 
se. 
On the basis of this critique, I argue that Gramscian framework enables us to 
critique the 'common sense' approach to the 'Turkish strong state tradition'. 
Yalman reads the 'strong state' literature (Heper, 1985; Keyder, 1987; Buğra, 
1994) as a paradigm, salient for both institutional and Marxist accountsv (2009: 
118). This reading depicts the Turkish state as sui generis, having a rationality 
and 'substantive ends' of its own; and posits that the main social cleavage is 
between the bourgeoisie and office-holders (Yalman, 2009: 160 and 200). Yet, 
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Yalman indicates, the strong state tradition is an indispensable part of 
bourgeois hegemony (2009: 313). 
Thus, Gramsci's conception of the relationship between state and society is 
more plausible in understanding the struggle over hegemony than Laclau and 
Mouffe's. Gramsci – through the concepts of the 'integral state', the 'ethical 
state' and the 'state as an educator' that provide the tools to grasp the role of 
capitalist state in the struggle over hegemony. The notion of the 'integral state' 
is often seen as one of Gramsci's key contributions to Marxist theory (Thomas, 
2009: 137). It refers to the condition arising when a particular group of social 
forces leads society whilst being in possession of 'all the intellectual and moral 
forces...needed to organise a complete and perfect society...' (1971: 271). He 
conceives of the state as the 'economic-political organization of the bourgeois 
class' that settles class disputes and 'unifies different groupings and gives the 
class a solid and united external appearance' (Gramsci, 1977: 39-40). He then 
develops a critique of the liberal conception of the state which sees 
'"[e]verything within the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the 
State" by proposing 'Where there is "freedom", there is no State' (Gramsci, 
1971: 261). In this sense, Gramsci reads the idea of the 'State without a state', 
as an 'image', a 'pure utopia, since [it is] based on the premise that all men are 
really equal and hence equally rational and moral, i.e. capable of accepting the 
law spontaneously, freely, and not through coercion, as imposed by another 
class, as something external to consciousness' (1971: 263). 
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For Gramsci, the reading of the State as a 'politico-juridical organisation', or 
'policeman', 'whose functions are limited to safeguarding of public order and of 
respect for the laws' is too narrow: for him, the state and civil society are 
embedded, 'in the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil 
society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion' 
(Gramsci, 1971: 263). Additionally, Gramsci interprets the capitalist state as an 
'educator' through which 'the bourgeois class poses itself as an organism in 
continuous movement, capable of absorbing the entire society, assimilating it 
to its own cultural and economic level' (Gramsci, 1971: 260). The state in a 
capitalist society is ethical as well, 'as much as one of its most important 
functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and 
moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive 
forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes...' 
(Gramsci, 1971: 258). 
This reading of the state/society relation does not, however, reduce the state to 
society. In ‘Notes on Italian History’, Gramsci suggests that statolatry is a state 
form, explaining it in relation to conditions of passive revolution and 
underlining that ‘the Italian bourgeoisie was incapable of uniting the people 
around itself’ (1971: 53), so the state took a role of ‘manufacturing the 
manufacturer...’ (1971: 67). Indeed, according to Gramsci, 'for some social 
groups, which before their ascent to autonomous State life have not had a long 
independent period of cultural and moral development on their own..., a period 
of statolatry is necessary and indeed opportune...' (1971: 268). Hence, he 
conceives of the function of the state within Italian Risorgimento, as that of a 
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‘ruling class’ (Gramsci, 1971: 104-105) - the State replacing social groups ‘in 
leading a struggle of renewal’ (Gramsci, 1971: 105-06). Passive revolution is 
thus a form of hegemony 'in which these groups have the function of 
"domination" without that of "leadership": dictatorship without hegemony...' 
(Gramsci, 1971: 105-06). Following this, Gramsci reminds us that '...the 
intellectual who is not firmly anchored to a strong economic group will tend to 
present the State as an absolute...' (1971: 117).
Third, the status of the international is a decisive factor in analysing hegemony. 
I argue that the international sphere remains under-theorised in discourse 
theory. Indeed, as the status of the international escapes theoretical elucidation, 
Laclau and Mouffe implicitly subscribe to a structuralist conception of the 
international. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, they differentiate between 
advanced industrial societies in which politics is dominated by democratic 
struggles and the Third World, where struggles are saturated around two 
camps. Consequently, in analysing the international sphere, Laclau and Mouffe 
posit a dichotomy between democratic states and authoritarian states. This 
contradicts their critical stance regarding dualisms in social science. To quote 
Laclau and Mouffe on the international:
...the proliferation of points of antagonism permits the multiplication of 
democratic struggles, but these struggles, given their diversity, do not 
tend to constitute a 'people', that is, to enter into equivalence with one 
another and to divide the political space into two antagonistic fields. On 
the contrary, in the countries of the Third World, imperialist 
exploitation and the prominence of brutal and centralized forms of 
domination tend from the beginning to endow the popular struggle with 
a centre, with a single and clearly defined enemy... (1985: 131).
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In Gramscian studies the international sphere is salient not only in relation to 
the uneven and combined development of capitalism but more importantly for 
its role within the struggle over hegemony in a national context. Although 
Gramsci was primarily writing within the context of the national state, he 
emphasises the role of the international. For him, 'international relations... 
follow (logically) fundamental social relations…' and the 'geographical 
position of a national State follows (logically) structural changes, although it 
also reacts back upon them to a certain extent' (1971: 176). He further posits 
that 'the line of development is towards internationalism, but the point of 
departure is "national" – and it is from this point of departure that one must 
begin. Yet the perspective is international and cannot be otherwise…' 
(Gramsci, 1971: 240). Moreover, Gramsci argues that 'capitalism is a world 
historical phenomenon, and its uneven development means that individual 
nations cannot be at the same level of economic development at the same time' 
(Gramsci, 1977: 69). It is on this basis, Morton contends, that Gramsci presents 
a theoretical framework that 'displays an awareness of the uneven development 
of social power relations and class struggle that provides a stimulus to taking 
the "national" social form as a point of arrival intertwined with the mediations 
and active reactions of "the international" dimension' (Morton, 2007b: 621). 
Additionally, the unevenness of capitalist development is not limited to the 
international context, Morton remarks, as Gramsci's analyses are informed by a 
spatial awareness based on 'uneven development of social powers at national, 
regional, and international levels', manifested in “Some Aspects of the 
Southern Question”' (Morton, 2007a: 4). 
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Furthermore, the Gramscian conception of hegemony and Gramscian historical 
materialist studies on transnational capitalism pave the way to conceive of 
hegemonic struggle at the national level within the conditions of the 
international. Gramsci contends that '[t]he more the immediate economic life of 
a nation is subordinated to international relations, the more a particular party 
will come to represent this situation and to exploit it, with the aim of 
preventing rival parties gaining the upper hand' (1971: 176). Similarly, in 
Gramscian historical materialist studies, there is a reciprocal relationship 
between hegemonic struggle at the national level and the world order (Cox, 
1987). As Rupert contends, Gramsci provides a 'critical reconstruction of the 
historical interplay between socio-political processes within particular states, 
and global relations and processes' (1995: 34). 
    
More importantly, references to the international are not confined to Gramsci's 
mode of thought and his analyses, but also shaped his political strategy – his 
praxis was based on internationalism. The Political Writings explicates his 
strategy of internationalism in relation to the concept of the 'united front' and 
the Bolshevization of the PCI. In opposition to Comintern’s tactic of creating a 
‘United Front’ drawing together socialists and communists, Gramsci argued 
that the PCI should remain independent from the PSI. He did not support the 
manifesto endorsed by Bordiga, believing it could generate a crisis and/or 
polemic with the Comintern. Gramsci sought to oppose Comintern by 
conquering the International Executive rather than through an open conflict 
with the International, which could end up isolating the struggle at the national 
level (Gramsci, 1978: 191-200). In a later dispute, Gramsci supported 
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internationalism and, following Lenin, the Bolshevisation of the Party against a 
backdrop of increasing fascism, placing him in conflict with the far-left 
fraction of the PCI led by Bordiga (Gramsci, 1978: 313-334). Subsequently, he 
criticised that fraction for emphasizing the 'originality' and 'historical' value of 
the positions of the Italian Left, rather than the Marxist and Leninist conception 
of the Communist International (Gramsci, 1978: 361). In this sense, it has been 
argued that Gramsci developed a specifically 'Italian road to socialism' and is 
an influence on the later trend of 'Eurocommunism' (Mouffe 1979a and 1979b, 
Sassoon 1980). Yet, this depicts Gramsci as a 'moderate' Leftist; a 'European’ 
or ‘Western’ thinker advocating the formation of class alliances with [social] 
movements to create a counter-hegemony within the war of position in a 
democratic system (Femia, 2002a: 482 and 487). Indeed, in agreement with 
Femia and Gibbon, Gramsci was decisively concerned with the policies of the 
Comintern (Femia, 2002a: 487 and 494; Gibbon, 2002: 505-509). 
An additional category that shapes the debate between Gramsci and Laclau and 
Mouffe is historicism. In his criticism of 'vulgar materialism', Gramsci refers to 
'absolute historicism' (Gramsci, 1971: 419-72):
It has been forgotten that in the case of a very common expression 
(historical materialism) one should put the accent on the first term –
"historical" – and not on the second, which is of metaphysical origin. 
The philosophy of praxis is absolute "historicism", the absolute 
secularisation and earthliness of thought, an absolute humanism of 
history. It is along this line that one must trace the thread of the new 
conception of the world (1971: 465).
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Yet Laclau and Mouffe argue that Gramsci fails to develop a 'radical historicist' 
analysis. They attribute this to the essentialism they believe Gramsci develops 
around the political centrality of the working class (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 
70). Morton, meanwhile, criticises Laclau and Mouffe's treatment of history, 
arguing that their reading of Marxist theory constitutes a form of 'austere 
historicism', 'that reduces past forms of thought to their precise historical 
context and tends to relegate Gramsci to history' (Morton, 2007a: 27). By 
asserting a break with the past, Laclau and Mouffe prevent 'the texts of 
historical materialism (such as the Prison Notebooks) from generating new 
meanings in different contexts' (Morton, 2007a: 26). Moreover, Morton 
accuses Laclau and Mouffe of conducting a closed reading of Gramsci that 
fails to internalise his historicist method of thinking (2006: 48). Hence, 
according to Morton, antagonism is defined independently of historical 
processes and history 'becomes a succession of articulatory practices 
discursively produced and formed' (Morton, 2006: 49). As Rupert argues, 
'Gramsci insisted that the "philosophy of praxis" was a situated knowledge, 
constructed within and relevant to the historical relations of capitalism in 
particular times and places' (Rupert, 2006: 96).
On historicism, Gramsci reminds us of the link between ideas and the material 
context. Indeed, for Gramsci, a philosophy can only become 'historical', 'purify 
itself of intellectualistic elements of an individual character and become "life"'
if 'it never forgets to remain in contact with the "simple" and indeed finds in 
this contact the source of the problems it sets out to study and to resolve' (1971: 
330). If such a reading of historicism in relation to historical praxis is followed, 
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discourse theory itself is historical, as Laclau and Mouffe strategically 
articulate the politics of discourse as a method of integrating alternative 
subjectivities into the leftist project. Yet discourse theory implicitly operates 
within a liberal context, abandons revolutionary objectives and equates 
historical materialism with fascism through the binary opposition they posit 
between democracy and fascism. Moreover, Laclau and Mouffe close the 
possibility of analysing capitalist development historically. They over-
emphasise rupture from industrial societies without considering the continuities 
and re-definitions and re-constitutions of the hegemony of the ruling class 
within capitalist societies.
The final area of debate concerns agency and structure. It can hardly be posited 
that post-structural research erases agency. Yet I shall argue that discourse 
theory's preoccupation with the plural reduces agency to subject positions. This 
fails to provide a stable standing from which to create a structural 
emancipatory struggle. Although Laclau and Mouffe aspire to conceptualise 
unity through the emphasis they place on the conceptual tool of hegemony (it 
can be argued that they attempt to theorise unity more thoroughly than other 
post-structuralist thinkers considering the debate on universality and 
particularity), their discourse theory is better able to explain diversity than 
unity, that in return operates in individualism. 
The divergent positions of Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe regarding structure 
and agency are largely due to their differing ontological approaches. Laclau 
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and Mouffe draw on poststructuralism to criticise 'essentialist' and structuralist 
conception of society and agency. Structure has a negative connotation. It is 
believed to stand in the way of freedom and emancipation. They argue that 
society is not a fully intelligible and structural totality, but rather that it 
encompasses an 'excess of meaning'. Hence 'society as a unitary and intelligible 
object… is an impossibility' (Torfing, 1999: 113). Accordingly, agency is not 
the product of a 'self-identical subject endowed with a set of objective interests' 
(Torfing, 1999: 113). Following Derrida, poststructuralists reject pre-given and 
underlining essences which fix social identities around a determinant centre 
(Torfing, 2005: 13). They argue that meaning can only be partially fixed in and 
through discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 112).
Moreover, although Laclau and Mouffe are cautious not to replace 
'essentialism of the totality' with an 'essentialism of elements' (Laclau and 
Mouffe: 1985: 103), the definition of 'social totality' they offer remains 
ambiguous and does not go beyond a vague claim that 'radical' struggles over 
'the seizure of power in the classical sense' (by which they mean struggles in
which political space can be divided in two) tend not to be sutured in advanced 
industrial societies (1985: 131-132).
Indeed, Laclau articulates emancipation(s) in the plural sense (Laclau, 1996: 
vii) whilst Mouffe states that the 'explosion of particularisms' presents 'an 
increasing challenge to Western universalism' (Mouffe, 1993: 1). Moreover, 
Laclau and Mouffe are cautious not to propose a form of unity from these 
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particularisms as a new subjectivity, believing it as a standing against 
radicalism (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 167). Rather, they articulate a 
'proliferation of particularisms' based around the logic of autonomy through 
which each struggle 'retains its differential specificity' (Laclau and Mouffe: 
1985: 164 and 182), a stance criticised for confusing authority with 
authoritarianism (Sim, 2000: 31). Describing this 'proliferation of 
particularisms', Laclau and Mouffe write that:
we are faced here with a true polysemia. Feminism or ecology, for 
example, exist in multiple forms... we have a radical feminism which 
attacks men as such; a feminism of difference which seeks to revalorize 
"femininity"; and a Marxist feminism for which the fundamental enemy 
is capitalism... therefore a plurality of discursive forms of constructing 
an antagonism on the basis of the different modes of women's 
subordination. Ecology, in the same way, may be anti-capitalist, anti-
industrialist, authoritarian, libertarian, socialist, reactionary, and so on... 
(1985: 168). 
What is evident here is that Laclau and Mouffe do not analyse autonomous 
subjects such as classes. They deny a unified or unifying essence of the subject 
and this denial underlines the plurality of subjects (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 
181). Torfing summarises this stance, claiming that Laclau and Mouffe fail to 
theorise the 'subject before its subjectivation' (Torfing, 1999: 56). In this they 
follow the poststructuralist position that emphasises the formation of political 
subjectivities while avoiding the formulation of a new theory of subject. This 
stems from the attempt to understand various new social movements within 
gendered, racial, urban and environmental politics following the abandonment 
of the idea of 'universal class' (Torfing, 1999: 56). Indeed, Laclau and Mouffe 
highlight that ‘every relation of representation is founded on a fiction’; as a 
presence that is absent (1985: 119). In other words, they argue that ‘political 
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practice does not recognize class interests and then represent them: it 
constitutes the interests which it represents’ (1985: 120). To phrase 
alternatively, they subscribe to the position that the political constructs 
identities and interests.
Based on that critique, I adopt van der Pijl’s position that approaches class 
struggle in the extended field of social reproduction. This enables me to 
integrate women rights/feminist groups, human rights and environment groups 
into the research design. It approaches struggles against patriarchy, 
environmental degradation and human rights violations as an instance of class 
struggle against commodification and discipline of capital. Indeed, van der Pijl 
refers to the 'twin concepts of commodification and socialisation' in explicating 
capitalist discipline over society (van der Pijl, 1998: 32 and 37). There is not 
one form of exploitation in the production process of physical goods, but rather 
'different forms in which society and nature are subjected to the discipline of 
capital' (van der Pijl, 1998: 47). Capitalist discipline is imposed and can be 
contested through 'the process of social reproduction in its entirety, the 
exploitation of the social and natural substratum, which likewise has to be 
made subject to the requirements of capital accumulation' (van der Pijl, 1998: 
36). In this sense, class struggle is understood in relation to the 'reproduction of 
labour power in the broadest sense', including bodily exhaustion; processes of 
socialisation through institutions such as schools and hospitals; the subjection 
of the public sphere to market rule; and the exhaustion/destruction of the 
biosphere through which life itself is subordinated to capitalist cost-accounting 
(van der Pijl, 1998: 43-49). In a similar vein, Gill characterises the current 
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world order as one of 'market civilisation', as capitalist logic and practices 
penetrate everyday life through a liberalised and commodified set of historical 
structures to a far greater extent than previous periods under welfare-
nationalism and state capitalism (Gill, 1995: 399). As Gill contends, market 
civilisation entails social disintegration and the implementation of exclusionary 
and hierarchical forms of social relation, which generate 'ahistorical, 
economistic, materialistic, “me-oriented”, short-termist, and ecologically 
myopic' patterns (Gill, 1995: 399). From such a perspective, the discipline of 
capital extends beyond the workplace to processes of social reproduction, in 
turn paving the way to conceive of new social movements as class struggle 
(Bieler, 2000: 11-12). 
3.5) Conclusion      
This chapter is the result of two primary concerns: the easy dismissal of social 
movements as 'false consciousness' by certain sections of the Left; and a 
careless conclusion of ignoring criticisms of Laclau and Mouffe by arguing 
that their criticism is related to economism of the Second International, that is 
irrelevant to historical materialism. Accordingly, it aims to come to terms with 
key criticisms directed by Laclau and Mouffe. In agreement with Laclau and 
Mouffe, it argues that dismissing new social movements as 'liberal', is a 
standing that is open to 'the danger that they may be articulated by a discourse 
of the Right' (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 164). Yet although I am sympathetic 
to this concern – and believe it is important to integrate social movements into 
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counter-hegemonic strategy – I have articulated a number of theoretical 
concerns with the conception of hegemony offered by Laclau and Mouffe. 
I disagreed with Laclau and Mouffe's reading of Gramsci, which sees him as an 
economic essentialist and class reductionist. In that sense I argued that it is 
possible to integrate social movements in the struggle over hegemony within a 
Gramscian historical materialist framework. Concomitant with van der Pijl, 
class struggle is interpreted as 'the extension of exploitation within the sphere 
of social reproduction' (1998: 46-48). In this sense, I argued that the current 
struggle over Turkish membership of the EU can be conceived of as resistance 
to the forms of social reproduction imposed by the neoliberal mode of 
production and its capitalist discipline. Understanding the struggle as such 
paves the way to include struggles around, for example, feminism/women's 
rights, environment and human rights in a potentially counter-hegemonic 
strategy. On the contrary, Laclau and Mouffe fail to adequately articulate what 
they mean by 'a non-economistic understanding of economy' (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2002: 136), and that they operate within capitalism's structured 
separation of economics and politics: a condition that 'de-socialises the 
material'. 
I then analysed the Gramscian concept of hegemony, showing it to be superior 
to that developed by Laclau and Mouffe. It is Gramsci more than Laclau and 
Mouffe to deliver necessary conceptual tools to analyze hegemony of ruling 
class and develop strategies to contest it. On the one hand, Gramscian 
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conception of the state and civil society as 'integral state' and/or 'ethical state' 
enables us to account for the role of state in hegemonic struggle. Contrarily, 
though Laclau and Mouffe's approach criticises the state, it fails to critique the 
capitalist state per se. That is why it remains silent on the role/status of state 
within the struggle over hegemony. On the other hand, Gramsci conceives of 
civil society as a terrain on which hegemony is both contested and consolidated 
paving the way to contest neoliberal civil society that operate as ‘fortresses and 
earthworks’ in the war of position (Gramsci, 1971: 235 and 238). Laclau and 
Mouffe define hegemony as a form of politics emphasizing the existence of 
multiple hegemonic articulations within the open and indeterminacy of the 
social. This in turn fails to unfold instruments of neoliberal civil society that 
actually contributes to ruling class to articulate its vested interests on a 
universal terrain. As the state is under-theorised and neoliberal civil society is 
overlooked, it resonates all too easily with an approach that promotes 
neoliberal hegemony through advocating the withering away of the state from 
economy – that results in operating within the neoliberal order's separation of 
the state and civil society. It is possible to observe repercussions of this 
theoretical stance in the political sphere. It is this stance that paves the way for 
particular leftist organic intellectuals to give their consent or to remain silent to 
AKP hegemony that is interpreted as external to secular strong state due to its 
references to political Islam. They turned a blind eye to AKP’s neoliberal 
agenda and conceive it as an alternative path to democratisation. Though, 
following Gramsci, AKP hegemony can be read as a typical transformism, 
reproducing hegemony of ruling class with a new face while containing social 
unrest in society due to neo-liberal restructuring (these points are further 
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developed in the following chapter).     
Additionally, I argued that the international sphere is left under-theorised in the 
work of Laclau and Mouffe, who have no account of the international 
dynamics of struggle over hegemony in a national context. Claiming a break 
with past forms of industrial society, they fail to analyse the history of 
capitalist development. In their pre-occupation with explicating diversity and 
pluralism, they fail to produce the coordinates for a politics of unity, operating 
within neoliberalism's individualism.
Finally, I showed that Laclau and Mouffe fail to engage with the strategies 
used by the ruling class to lead subaltern groups through coercive and 
consensual mechanisms; issues that lie at the core of Gramsci's concepts of 
trasformismo and passive revolution. In this sense, Laclau and Mouffe's 
interpretation of hegemony is one-sided. It pre-eminently criticizes the failure 
of the Left to come up with a universal vision that would enable it to lead other 
classes. Thus, this critique speaks with a debate on counter-hegemony but falls 
short to define hegemony of the ruling class and examine its contradictions. 
That is to say, their concept of hegemony is either incomplete – lacking an 
account of the discipline of the dominant hegemonic system - or it operates 
within pre-eminent hegemonic order.
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Chapter 4 - Integration of a Peripheral Country into the Capitalist World 
System: Political Economy of Turkey
4.1) Introduction
This chapter provides a political economy reading of Turkey’s integration into 
the capitalist world structure. Analogous to the criticism to mainstream 
literature to conceive of European integration process independent and 
autonomous from structural dynamics of globalisation (as elaborated in 
Chapter Two), in this chapter I aim to situate Turkey-EU relations within 
broader structural dynamics and provide a historical background of social 
relations of production and highlight particular coordinates of class struggle 
historically. This prepares the ground for debating current struggle among 
social forces in the three empirical chapters which follow. It is also intended to 
address how peripheries are situated within particular world orders and how the 
world order conditions the integration of Turkey into the European structure. 
As stated in the previous chapter, Gramsci in Prison Notebooks provides the 
hints to conceive of class struggle at the national level within the conditions of 
the international (1971: 176). I also aim to present a reading of political 
economy of Turkey from a Gramscian historical materialist theoretical lens.
The analysis for the two following sub-sections is structured on three levels: 
the social relations of production, the form of the state, and the world order. 
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According to Cox, production is not limited to the production of goods but 
encompasses social relations of production (Cox, 1987: 11-12). Social forces 
engendered by relations of production structure particular historical blocs, 
‘upon which state power ultimately rests’ (Cox, 1987: 105). Hence, the state 
ceases to be a ‘black box’ beyond human agency. On the contrary, there are 
different forms of state conforming to particular configurations of social forces 
(Cox, 1987: 147-148). Thus, the world order is shaped and conditioned by 
particular forms of state and social relations of production (Cox, 1987: 109). 
Drawing on this analytical framework, this chapter examines the integration of 
Turkey into the European structure against the background of configuration of 
social forces, forms of state and world order. Particular attention will be 
devoted to pre-eminent accumulation strategy and state-society relations for 
each period. 
After summarizing the Kemalist period and the etatist project, I will turn to 
consider post-war reconstruction under Pax Americana. It was during this 
period that the integration of Turkey into the Western bloc began. Although the 
relationship between Turkey and the EEC can be traced back to the 1950s, I 
will argue there was little consensus regarding membership or the liberalization 
of trade until the neoliberal turn in the 1980s. Indeed, the socio-economic order 
and development understanding of the ‘import substitution industrialization’ 
(ISI) period under Keynesian embedded liberalism were incompatible with the 
liberalization envisaged by the completion of the Customs Union, meaning that 
the period can be identified as tug-of-war between structural adjustment and 
industrialization/development. Until the 1980s, Turkey repeatedly failed to 
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liberalize its trade regime as envisaged by the Additional Protocol. Yet, as 
development was dependent on technology transfer and foreign capital from 
the core countries of the capitalist world structure, industrialization and 
development can hardly be interpreted as a counter-hegemonic strategy vis-a-
vis structural adjustment. In the second sub-section, I highlight that it was after 
the neoliberal turn and the containment of the labour movement in the 1980s 
that Turkey applied to become a full member of the EEC; it was then that 
completion of the Customs Union was presented as the only viable means of 
becoming a member afterwards. 
4.2) Embedded Liberalism, Pax Americana and Planning Development in 
Turkey
4.2.1) Historical background
The integration of the Ottoman Empire in the capitalist world system can be 
traced back to the nineteenth century and the liberal world order under Pax 
Britannica. A popular Turkish saying from the nineteenth century, ‘If you want 
to hang yourself, use an English rope’ (quoted in Boratav, 2007: 1), illustrates 
that the Ottoman economy had begun to be integrated via exchange and trade 
relations. Yet, as Cox highlights, ‘hegemony, though firmly established at the 
centre of the world order, wears thin in its peripheries’ (1987: 150), and in light 
of this it is important to note that the Ottoman economy was pre-capitalist, 
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based on agricultural production (Zürcher, 2005: 16). However, the Empire 
was compelled to pursue liberal policies in tandem with the liberal world order 
due to capitulations to and dependence on international capital for modernizing 
the declining Empire. Though the Ottoman Empire had never been a colony 
per se, it was subject to concessions, a standing Keyder refers to as ‘debt 
imperialism’ (1987: 37-38). Within this context, Europe was primarily 
concerned with the potential for structural imbalance generated by the probable 
dismemberment of Ottoman Empire. This was known as the ‘Eastern Question’ 
(Zürcher, 2005: 38), and it was felt that this in turn could upset the balance of 
power in Europe instrumental to sustaining free trade and open market 
economy.
  
This liberal world order was succeeded by a welfare-nationalist consensus as a 
non-hegemonic configuration of rival imperialisms among major industrial 
powers (Cox, 1987: 151-210), in which the Turkish Republic came into being. 
In the core capitalist countries, Taylorism began to transform the social 
relations of production from workshops to mass production assembly lines 
(Rupert, 1995: 59-78). Cox uses the term ‘welfare-nationalist’ to refer to the 
form of state of this era and remarks that the state was involved in national 
planning as state capitalism and/or corporatism (Cox, 1987: 161). Yet, as Cox 
reminds us, the welfare-nationalist state should not be seen as a departure from 
the liberal state: it merely provided compensation for the social defects of the 
market without challenging its liberal essence (1987: 165-166). In the core 
states of the global system, the welfare-nationalist state promoted 
industrialization through protectionism and the expansion of markets and 
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colonies (Cox, 1987: 154). In the periphery, the welfare-nationalist state took 
the form of a fascist/corporative state, a form Cox reads as a ‘catch-up’ model 
for the constitution of capitalist regimes through a process of ‘passive 
revolution’ (1987: 163). Morton conceives passive revolution as a pointer in 
analyzing modern state formation within the ‘causal conditioning of “the 
international”’ and uneven and combined development of capitalism (2007a: 
41). He (2007b: 601) identifies passive revolution with ‘class strategies of 
transitions to capitalism by tracing mechanisms tied to the state, which have 
assisted in the emergence of capitalism to become the primary organ of 
primitive accumulation and social development’ (conditions of passive 
revolution (s) is debated below). Similarly, van der Pijl examines the condition 
of passive revolution within the context of Hobbesian state and associates 
emerging state/society complex with slowness of social class formation and a 
strong state that ‘confiscates’ society thanks to its power that rests on 
bureaucratization (van der Pijl, 1998: 79). In relation to the thesis of world 
capitalist economy, van der Pijl concludes that ‘One might say that by aiming 
to catch up with the leading social system of production in the world economy, 
every contender state has by definition been “capitalist” already before it 
“turned capitalist”‘ (van der Pijl, 1998: 80).  
Gramsci reads the bourgeois revolution in Italy as a passive revolution - an 
outcome of the programme of Italian liberals (1971: 114). He remarks that 
‘what was involved was not a social group which “led” other groups, but a 
State which... “led” the group which should have been “leading” and was able 
to put at the latter’s disposal an army and a politico-diplomatic strength...’ 
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(1971: 105). In his analysis of passive revolution, Gramsci emphasizes the 
‘“Piedmont”-type function’ of the state that ‘replaces the local social groups in 
leading a struggle of renewal’ and he reads the function of social groups as of 
‘“domination” without that of “leadership”: dictatorship without hegemony...’ 
(Gramsci, 1971: 105-106). One of the originalities in Gramsci’s reading of 
passive revolution is his embedded reading of developments in Italy within the 
uneven and combined development of capitalism. To cite Gramsci:
‘...when the impetus of progress is not tightly linked to a vast local 
economic development which is artificially limited and repressed, but is 
instead the reflection of international developments which transmit their 
ideological currents to the periphery-currents born on the basis of the 
productive development of the more advanced countries-then the group 
which is the bearer of the new ideas is not the economic group but the 
intellectual stratum, and the conception of the State advocated by them 
changes aspect; it is conceived of as something in itself, as a rational 
absolute...’ (Gramsci, 1971: 116-17). 
In Turkey, the late nineteenth century witnessed the rise of a reformist 
bureaucracy, through the Young Turks, who were organized under the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Although there were liberal and 
protectionist fractions within the CUP, the project of building a ‘national 
economy’ prevailed particularly during the period following World War I, in 
which the liberal foreign regime had been accused of leaving domestic industry 
underdeveloped (Toprak, 1995; 2-17). Within this context, the newly founded 
Republic began to pursue a policy known as ‘etatism’. This followed a 
protectionist trade regime and supported state initiative designed to foster 
indigenous industry and the development of a national bourgeoisie. It should be 
understood as a coalition between the nascent bourgeoisie and state 
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bureaucracy as an accumulation strategy built on the oppression of the working 
class and the exploitation of the agricultural sector (Keyder, 1987: 106-107). 
The Kemalists conducted bourgeois revolution as a passive revolution. The 
specificity of passive revolution in the Turkish social formation needs to be 
raised with regard to three points. First, the Ottoman bourgeoisie was 
constituted mostly by the non-Muslim population and the Kemalist regime 
smashed the non-Muslim bourgeoisie. In this regard, the figures vary, but 
Keyder argues that following the evacuation of the Armenian population and 
population exchange with Greece, `about 2.5 million Greeks and Armenians 
had perished, departed or been expelled, a number which probably contained 
90 percent of the pre-war bourgeoisie` (Keyder, 1987: 69). Second, the 
Republic was founded after an anti-imperialist war and it must be questioned to 
what extent an anti-imperialist struggle can culminate in the institutionalization 
of capitalism. Third, the economic policies pursued after the Independence War 
were directed to provide economic independence that was conceived as 
imperative to safeguard political independence. 
However, there is strong evidence to suggest that the Kemalist regime 
conducted capitalist modernization as a passive revolution and these 
reservations are not sufficient to conclude that it was not a capitalist transition. 
Rather, the regime institutionalized capitalist modernization by manufacturing 
a national bourgeoisie through etatist policies. The indigenous bourgeoisie was 
not developed and the state took the initiative in institutionalizing capitalism as 
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a revolution from above without a national-popular base. Etatism can thus be 
read as a ‘policy of manufacturing the manufacturer’ (Gramsci, 1971: 67). 
Moreover, the Kemalist regime outlawed all interest-based associations 
including workers` associations; and in 1925 prohibited strikes (Keyder, 1987: 
104). In this sense, capitalist restructuring was carried out under populism as a 
modernising catch-up project and class conflict was suppressed under 
caesarism. Its official rhetoric was populist promoting a harmony of interests 
through the discourse of ‘a classless and unified society without any privileges’ 
(Işıklı, 2003; 66).      
4.2.2) Fordism and Hegemony under Pax Americana 
Following the end of World War II a new world order was established under 
the hegemony of United States. It was founded upon Fordism: mass production 
and mass consumption of consumer products. It was expanded through a 
process of multilateralism such as the Marshall Plan and the 
internationalisation of production. Internationalisation of production engenders 
a process in which production is organised on a transnational scale through 
conducting its different phases in different countries (Cox, 1981: 146). It is also 
identified as a transnationalisation process that goes beyond a structure within 
which national economies are linked by global trade and main pattern is 
‘geographical extension of economic activity across borders’ (Robinson, 2004: 
10 and 14). Transnationalisation re-organizes production on a global scale and 
entails a process of ‘the fragmentation and decentralization of complex 
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production chains and the worldwide dispersal and functional integration of the 
different segments in these chains’ (Robinson, 2004: 14-15).        
The Bretton Woods system rested on two pillars: a fixed exchange rate which 
provided stability for trade and investment; and the ‘most favoured nation’ 
principle, which would help to foster free trade. This post-war compromise was 
based on ‘embedded liberalism’, which encompassed 
multilateralism/international expansionism and a reliance on state intervention 
in economy for full employment (Ruggie, 1982: 393). In that sense, it can be 
differentiated from rival imperialisms of laissez faire through the increased role 
of the state in employment and welfare mechanisms and the state’s direct 
involvement in the economy through stimulation of unprofitable economic 
spheres (Cox, 1987: 220; Ruggie, 1982: 399).
According to Cox, two forms of state coexisted under Pax Americana: 
neoliberal states formed the core of the capitalist world system, whilst neo-
mercantilist developmentalist states predominated in the periphery. The neo-
mercantilist developmentalist states were founded upon a coalition of petty-
bourgeoisie ‘very largely bureaucratic and consisting of government and big 
corporation employees’, small businessmen; and small organized workers 
groups (Cox, 1987: 235). Yet, Cox notes that this developmentalist state was 
dependent on world capitalist accumulation due to foreign capital and 
technology transfer (Cox, 1987: 232). In the periphery, embedded liberalism 
took the form of state-corporatism. The developmentalist state not only 
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planned national economic development and controlled external economic 
impact, but found compromise among industrial capital and organized labour 
through corporatism (Cox, 1981: 145-146). It also intervened in relations of 
distribution to create demand in the domestic market. Within this period, 
planning offices, ministries of industry and labour were more decisive at the 
institutional level in shaping policies (Cox, 1987: 234).
4.2.3) Import-Substitution Industrialisation and the Social Relations of 
Production 
In the post-war context, Turkey was incorporated into Pax Americana by 
adopting liberal policies in the 1950s through promoting exports and foreign 
capital; and by liberalizing its trade regime. The motto that ‘development is 
unattainable without foreign aid’ turned out to be common sense, that would be 
followed with the Truman and Marshall grants received by Turkey. 
Accordingly, it integrated with the Western alliance and became a member to 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Council of Europe, the 
World Bank (WB) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). The Soviet demands on the Straits and territories of 
Kars and Ardahan were also effective for Turkey to approach Western alliance. 
Turkey was equally essential for containment strategy due to its geographical 
proximity to the Soviet Union. 
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The elections in 1950 signified the end of the one-party regime. The Democrat 
Party (DP) government came into power with the slogan of ‘enough is enough, 
let the nation speak’, and the element of populism was echoed in the DP’s 
positioning of itself as an ‘anti-elitist’ government. It is depicted in the 
literature as a government aspiring to protect economic freedom vis-a-vis state 
intervention and local tradition; and to protect religious freedom vis-a-vis the 
political impositions of the one party rule of the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) during the modernization process (Keyder, 1987: 117). In this sense, a 
group of studies read the period as a departure from etatism and depict the 
period as a ‘watershed’ which marked the transformation from ‘capitalism 
under bureaucratic tutelage’ to one determined by market principles. These 
studies also depict the so-called DP ‘opposition’ as similar to a ‘later day 
liberal resistance to absolutist rule’, a reading within the tradition of the ‘strong 
state’ (Keyder, 1987: 123). These studies further analyse the period with 
reference to the demands of larger farmers and small-town merchants for a 
more liberal programme designed to secure foreign capital (Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 
713). Accordingly, it is argued that the DP shelved industrialization and 
endorsed agrarian development as the engine of the economy, giving consent to 
Turkey’s role as a supplier of food and raw materials in the new international 
division of labour in return for securing inflow of foreign capital (Aydın, 2005: 
28-29). These studies also refer to the liberal environment in promoting multi-
party politics and note the end of the ban on class based organizations for 
workers and employers in 1946 (Hale, 1976: 61; Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 713). 
Yalman, however, identifies the period as ‘planless industrialization’, and 
disagrees with literature that depicts the era as a rupture from the period of 
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planned economy (2009: 190 and 198). For him, neither was the balance of 
forces undermined, nor was the etatist hegemony based on fostering 
industrialization and creation of a nascent bourgeoisie abandoned (2009: 190 
and 211). Moreover, although the ban on class based organizations was 
eliminated, the freedom to trade unionism and the right to strike were not 
assured (Yalman, 2009: 211). Indeed, the free market strategy could only be 
pursued to the extent that external borrowing was guaranteed. Thus, the 1950s 
witnessed an oscillation between state intervention and the free market (Aydın, 
2005: 32). Despite the economic boom of the early 1950s (a result of post-war 
demand for food and raw materials in Europe), the economy began to 
experience stagnation, with rising inflation and declining economic growth by 
1954. The liberal trade regime caused external balance deficits as imports 
could not be compensated by agricultural exports. The strong anti-communist 
stance of the DP - especially during its second term in office - alienated the 
liberal intelligentsia. 
In 1960 Turkey experienced a military coup that restructured social relations of 
production. In tandem with Fordist accumulation and embedded liberalism in 
world order, Turkey started to follow an industrialization strategy based on 
import-substitution, with the economy planned through three successive five-
year plans from 1963 to 1978. These policies were implemented through an 
investment program in the pioneering of the public sector and the protection of 
national industry via quotas, high tariff rates and an overvalued exchange rate 
mechanism. The production structure of the country was transformed and 
contribution of the industrial sector to Gross National Product (GNP) was 
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equal to agriculture by 1973 and overtook it thereafter (Ahmad, 1993: 134). It 
was claimed that these plans could trigger a regime change, or could be 
instrumental in developing a counter-hegemonic strategy as they were built on 
decreasing dependence on foreign resources. Furthermore, the 1961 
constitution granted rights to the working class. However, scholars argue that a 
de-linking from the world economy was not intended (Aydın, 2005: 34; 
Yalman, 2009: 224). Indeed, claims that there was the potential for a counter-
hegemonic strategy during this period are questionable. On the one hand, the 
plans set forth a mixed economy model within which private and public sectors 
were depicted as complementary rather than antagonistic (Aydın, 2005: 34-35). 
On the other hand, industrialization remained dependent upon core states in the 
capitalist world system due to the need for technology transfer and external 
borrowing (Aydın, 2005: 11). 
Yalman distinguishes this period as a new hegemonic project under 
developmentalism (2009: 217). The historical bloc was based on a compromise 
among the Kemalist bureaucratic cadres, the industrial bourgeoisie, industrial 
workers and the peasantry. Its populism stemmed from the belief that ISI 
would prove beneficial for all segments of society: for peasants through 
minimum prices and agricultural subsidies; for workers by higher real wages 
and improved working conditions; and for industrial capital through protecting 
the market (Boratav, 2003: 130-41). The private sector took advantage of high 
profits and rents in return for providing the peasants and workers with high real 
wages and internally produced terms of trade. The accumulation model rested 
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on high wages and a high agricultural income to consolidate an internal market 
(Aydın, 2005: 42).
4.2.4) The Developmentalist State 
The ISI worked in tandem with the structural dynamics of embedded liberalism 
and a system of accumulation based on demand-management. In tandem with 
state corporatism in the peripheral context under Pax Americana founded upon 
a compromise between petty-bourgeoisie and small organised worker groups 
(Cox, 1981: 145-146), the state not only protected the domestic market on 
behalf of industrial capital but controlled foreign exchange and foreign trade. 
At the institutional level, the State Planning Organization (DPT) was effective 
in supervising and directing the economy. Moreover, the 1961 Constitution 
identified the state as a ‘social state’, and it granted the working class the right 
to strike and collective bargaining power creating a period of institutionalized 
corporatism (Önder, 1999: 45). Thus, the ISI worked closely with mutual 
accommodation in labour-capital relations where real wages could be 
determined through industrial bargaining among the industrial bourgeoisie and 
labour aristocracies (Keyder, 1996: 151). In that sense, the period was a turning 
point for the labour movement. Not only did unionisation increase, but trade 
unions became stronger through politicization. Moreover, as the accumulation 
of the period necessitated the creation of domestic demand, the state intervened 
in relations of distribution. Accordingly, real wages were construed as an 
instrument of demand triggering production for capital (Boratav, 2003: 124). 
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This belief lead to state intervention designed to provide income distribution in 
order to keep real wages and agricultural income high.  
4.2.5) Turkey-EEC Relations: A tug-of-war between Development and 
Liberalisation
  
Within the liberal context under Pax Americana, Turkey applied to the EEC for 
associate membership following Greece’s application in 1959, and signed the 
Ankara Agreement on 12 September 1963. It envisaged a three-stage process 
which was to culminate in completion of the Customs Union, with a full 
membership status to be considered in the process. The first stage was to be 
preparatory, with the EEC unilaterally decreasing its customs, liberalizing 
quotas and providing financial assistance to Turkey, with the stated objective 
of preparing its economy for the transitional period. The second stage was to 
carry out that transition and was to begin with the signing of the Additional 
Protocol on the 1 January 1973 – this would set a timetable for eliminating 
tariffs and quotas. During this transitional period, Turkey was to gradually 
adopt the EEC’s common external tariff and begin to decrease its protectionism 
for two different groups of products in two lists, 12 years and 22 years for 
industrially sensitive products for Turkish economy. In return, the EEC would 
eliminate its tariffs on industrial products, with the exception of particularly 
sensitive goods such as textiles. The final stage would comprise completion of 
the Customs Union. Agricultural products were not included within the 
Customs Union with the exception of processed agricultural goods.
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However, there was little agreement on EEC membership or elimination of 
protectionism among Turkish social forces during the ISI period. Indeed, as 
social relations of production was determined by an alliance between petty-
bourgeoisie and organised labour under neo-mercantilist developmentalist 
state, Turkey-EEC relations in this period can be understood as a tug-of-war 
between those in favour of development and industrialization by protectionism 
and those who supported the liberalization required for completion of the 
Customs Union. This tension can be seen in the fact that on the day before the 
signature of the Additional Protocol, Turkey increased its tariffs to 50% by a 
decision of the Council of Ministers (Tekeli and İlkin, 1993: 92). As planning 
institutions and ministries of labour were influential to establish state policies 
under Fordism and the neo-mercantilist developmentalist form of state that was 
directed to protect external economic impact on national economy in the 
periphery (Cox, 1981: 145-146), Turkey constantly delayed the elimination of 
protectionism vis-a-vis European products in the 1970s and in 1978, asked for 
a five-year exemption as a result of economic crisis. During this period, there 
were proposals within the DPT and the CHP to revise the Additional Protocol –
these stemmed from concerns over the development of Turkish industry and 
agriculture (Tekeli and İlkin, 1993: 216-222). In addition, Tekeli and İlkin 
argue that the manner in which relations with the EEC was envisaged in the 
development plans demonstrate that an eclectic approach was adopted. They 
note that the plans prioritized ISI strategy and declared a wish that ISI should 
be implemented by taking the relations with the EEC into consideration (Tekeli 
and İlkin, 1993: 19-24). 
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Tekeli and İlkin categorize social forces during the negotiation process of the 
Additional Protocol into three groups. In the absence of an empirical study on 
the period, this analysis can provide an insight into the debate among social 
forces. The liberal Justice Party and majority of the country’s commercial-
industrial bourgeoisie advocated signing the Additional Protocol without delay 
to increase productivity and strengthen Turkey’s standing within the Western 
alliance. However, the CHP in the centre-left of the political spectrum, a 
fraction inside the DPT, and various domestically oriented chambers of 
industry in Anatolia suggested delaying liberalization, expressing concerns of 
development and industrialization. A third group, including Workers Party of 
Turkey (TİP) resisted the EEC, convinced that liberalization was contradictory 
to the industrialization and development of Turkey. They believed that the 
proposed relationship was to exploit Turkey, a standing summarized as ‘they 
are the partners and we are the market’ (Tekeli and İlkin, 1993: 56-59 and 94-
104). The position of labour was also divided. The Türk-İş – organized for the 
most part in state-economic enterprises - supported membership perspective 
and articulated that this would render Turkey ‘an equal party in the Western 
Alliance’, but criticized the lack of social mechanism in the Ankara 
Agreement. The Disk, meanwhile, saw the EEC as an economic dimension of 
imperialism (Tekeli and İlkin, 1993: 113-15). However, as developmentalism 
was not a counter-hegemonic strategy and the ISI model was dependent upon 
foreign finance and technology transfer, it is important to note that dissident 
voices could not be hegemonic around an anti-membership stance in this 
period.   
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4.3) Globalisation, the Neoliberal Turn and Structural Adjustment
4.3.1) Transnationalisation of Production and the Social Relations of 
Production 
The economic crisis engendered by inflation and indebtedness impelled the 
United States to abandon the fixed exchange rate and gold parity, signifying the 
end of the Bretton Woods system. Inflation then spread internationally, in 
tandem with increasing costs of raw materials such as oil; the growth of the 
unregulated Eurodollar market; and flexible exchange rates (Cox, 1987: 277-
278). The historical bloc founded upon Fordism and Keynesian demand-
management began to dissolve. Cox refers to Gramsci in depicting the situation 
as an organic crisis that yields one of two outcomes: the 'constitution of new 
hegemony or caesarism' (Cox, 1987: 273).
The new emerging model transformed the social relations of production. The 
production structure is transnationalised through the integration of different 
phases of production set in different geographies on a transnational scale (Cox, 
1981: 146). This process entails a new division of labour among the core and 
periphery. Whilst the core holds capital-intensive phases of production through 
technological innovation – requiring a supply of high-cost labour – the 
periphery carries out labour-intensive production, conducted by standardized 
technology and cheap labour, and remains dependent upon the core for its 
software requirements (Cox, 1987: 319).
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Cox reads Thatcher-Reagan model as a form of hyper-liberal state, as it 
retrieves social policy accomplishments and discards demand management and 
redistributionist tools (Cox, 1987: 286). Not only is tripartism abandoned, but 
the government-business alliance is consolidated through a weakening and 
fragmenting of the working class. Cox posits that internationalisation causes 
further fractions among the working class around two cleavages, 
established/non-established and national/international labour. Established 
workers are relatively skilled, unionized and generally employed in larger 
enterprises with considerably secure and stable conditions, whilst non-
established workers have less skills, are de-unionized and are often recruited 
from ethnic minorities, immigrants and women (Cox, 1981: 148). Moreover, 
globalization causes an additional split between workers employed in national 
and international oriented production structure. Workers employed in sectors of 
international production, meanwhile, possess a tendency to be potential allies 
of international capital. This does not result from the absence of class 
antagonism but international capital has the resources to address their concerns 
and they are isolated from general labour question within enterprise 
corporatism and so do not see the expansion of international production as a 
concern of the working class (Cox, 1981: 148). Moreover, Cox refers to 
particular strategies which pushed labour into a defensive position. First, the 
link between wages and unemployment disintegrates, leaving workers in 
established employment disaffected from general conditions of labour, in order 
to confine established workers dependent on employers (Cox, 1987: 283-284). 
Second, the alliance between government and business creates a cleavage 
between state and private sector workers and depicts state-sector workers as 
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damaging the public interest. Private-sector workers, meanwhile, are pictured 
as ‘taxpayers interested in reducing government spending’ (Cox, 1987: 284). 
Last but not least, new categories such as migrant workers, illegal workers, and 
part-time women workers are left outside trade union solidarities (Cox, 1987: 
284). Precarious work also damages class consciousness, rendering the worker 
to conceive of work instrumentally (Cox, 1987: 380). 
  
As production is integrated in a transnational setting, the role of state as a 
buffer between the external economic environment and the domestic economy 
under Fordism is re-visited. The state is also internationalised (Cox, 1981: 
146), transforming state structures and national policies and practices in 
accordance with the interstate consensus determined by the needs and 
requirements of international production (Cox, 1987: 253-254). State 
intervention in the economy is re-oriented to increase the competitiveness of 
industries and is shaped around the interests of exporters (Cox, 1987: 290). 
States also subsidize leading sectors in order to boost industrial 
competitiveness and provide transitional assistance to disadvantaged groups in 
society (Cox, 1987: 290-291). 
In periphery, the internationalisation of the state signifies that the adjustment 
policies of world economic institutions – imposed in return for debt renewal 
programmes – had to be taken into account (Cox, 1981: 146). Thus, 
internationalisation of the state advances the position of those state institutions 
which are related to structural adjustment. Ministries of finance and Prime 
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Ministers' offices thus gain increasing influence in shaping economic policy, 
while ministries of industry, labour ministries and planning offices decline in 
importance (Cox, 1981: 146). Moreover, Thatcherism and Reaganism envisage 
a more liberal structure, substituting Keynesian demand-management with 
monetarism. While a certain rate of inflation was tolerated under Keynesian 
demand-management in return for employment, inflation is now established as 
primary obstacle to economic growth and as a clear indicator for 
unpredictability of economic environment (Cox, 1987: 279).
4.3.2) The 24th January 1980 Structural Adjustment Programme and the 1980 
Military Coup as Passive Revolution 
Analogous with neoliberal restructuring at the structural level, the ISI model 
came under question in the 1970s in tandem with world recession, the foreign 
exchange crisis, balance of payment deficits and political instability. As the ISI 
strategy rested on foreign capital, the economic crisis resulted in financial 
bottlenecks and a foreign currency shortage. The United States embargo 
following Turkey’s 1974 intervention in Cyprus worsened the foreign currency 
bottleneck. Accordingly, ISI was discarded for rendering the economy 
dependent on foreign borrowing and vulnerable to external shocks. The DPT 
was accused of intervening in the market whilst its oversight of competition 
and protectionism was discredited and labelled cumbersome, inefficient and 
expensive (Öniş, 1987: 28; Öniş and Webb, 1998: 325). Indeed, the historical 
bloc founded upon the neo-mercantilist development state began to dissolve. 
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Within the context of rising inflation, there was a rapid reaction within the 
working class and labour was mobilized to protect real wages. The bourgeoisie 
began to perceive the Disk as a serious threat after it openly supported the TİP 
and advocated socialism. Meanwhile, violence and street fighting between 
Grey Wolves – the militants of youth movement affiliated with Nationalist 
Action Party (MHP) – and the Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of 
Turkey became commonplace. The military junta took over the administration 
on the 12 September 1980 and ruled the country until the November 1983 
general elections.
Notably, just before the military coup, the ISI strategy was replaced with a 
major adjustment programme – the 24th January 1980 Stabilization 
Programme. This envisaged a liberal trade regime supported by export 
promotion and the liberalization of imports. The programme was depicted as a 
means to 'reduce the rate of inflation...improve the balance-of-payments 
situation through rapid export-growth and, thereby, re-establish Turkey's 
international creditworthiness' (Baysan and Blitzer, 1990: 10). Exports were 
promoted through tax rebates, credit subsidies and incentives, and the import 
regime was liberalized through a reduction in tariffs and other protectionist 
restrictions. The size and scope of state involvement in the economy was 
reduced by 'rationalizing' state economic enterprises. The exchange rate regime 
was liberalized through the introduction of flexible exchange rates and the 
Turkish lira depreciated 4.2% annually from 1981 to 1987 to promote exports 
(Baysan and Blitzer, 1990: 11). The programme was designed to decrease 
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inflation through tight monetary control whilst the distribution of income was 
left to market forces.
The role of the Turkish military cannot be understood as autonomous from 
class struggle. Concomitant with Yalman, the 1980 transition can be read as a 
passive revolution (2009: 311). However, particular unease is raised in the 
literature in relation to stretching the concept of passive revolution from 'a 
particular path to capitalist domination’ during modern state formation process, 
towards strategies of 'maintaining capitalist domination' and/or 'restorations of 
capitalism' in understanding neoliberal transitions (emphasis in original, 
Callinicos, 2010: 491-92 and 503). Yet, for Morton, passive revolution is not 
limited to a condition of revolution without mass participation, but 
encompasses processes which enable us to understand 
‘...how a revolutionary form of political transformation is pressed into a 
conservative project of restoration while lacking a radical national-
popular “Jacobin” moment... Definitionally, then, a passive revolution 
can be a technique of statecraft which an emergent bourgeois class may 
deploy by drawing in subaltern social classes while establishing a new 
state on the basis of the institution of capitalism, as in the Risorgimento, 
or the expansion of capitalism as a mode of production, as in the case of 
“Americanism and Fordism”’ (2010: 317-318).
Hobsbawn contends that one of Gramsci’s originality is the concept of passive 
revolution, as a strategy of ‘long-term weakening of the forces of progress’ in 
the war of position (Hobsbawn, 1977: 210). Similarly, Forgacs reminds us that 
‘passive revolution within capitalism might reabsorb a failed revolutionary 
initiative from below’ (Forgacs, 1989: 82). Indeed, Gramsci also asks whether 
passive revolution can 'be related to the concept of “war of position” in contrast 
to “war of manoeuvre?”' (Gramsci, 1971: 108), paving the way for an 
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interpretation of the condition of passive revolution as a strategy of the ruling 
class within the long lasting war of position, rather than a condition linked 
exclusively to  bourgeois revolution.
    
Within the context of the Turkish social setting of 1980s, the key question in 
debating passive revolution is the status of the bourgeoisie vis-a-vis transition 
from an inward oriented to an export-oriented model. A group of studies refer 
to the development of a fraction inside the industrial bourgeoisie that was 
advanced under protectionism (Pamuk, 1981: 28-29), and accordingly read 
transition as something demanded by 'big business' who wanted to renew 
relations with international capital (Önder, 1999: 46).
Yalman, however, does not agree that there was an export-oriented group 
leading the neoliberal turn, or that there was a split between the domestic-
oriented and the export-oriented bourgeoisie (2009: 265 and 274-278). Rather, 
he refers to the partial structure of the bourgeoisie in substantiating his 
argument on passive revolution. In this sense, it can hardly be argued that the 
bourgeoisie was in a position to lead society around a new hegemony. It should 
also be noted that following the coup the military regime guaranteed its 
commitment to the adjustment programme to both international financial 
institutions and the domestic bourgeoisie (Yalman, 2009: 300). More 
importantly, as the new division of labour among the core and periphery within 
transnationalisation of production imposes the periphery a role of labour-
intensive production conducted by cheap labour, the labour had to be 
contained. Indeed, the military regime was instrumental in implementing the 
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economic transition by providing political stability, containing the labour 
movement and controlling the democratic process. For instance, the number of 
workers on strike rose from 6,414 on January 1980 to 57,000 after the
structural adjustment programme was introduced and workers returned to their 
work three days after the military coup of September 12th 1980 (Koç, 1998: 
186-87). The military regime suspended unionism, banned strikes, adjudicated 
unionists and smashed organic intellectuals on the Left of the political 
spectrum. The military regime was also instrumental to reduce wages without 
serious resistance from the labour movement (Boratav, 2003: 150).
Further evidence lending support to the reading of the transition as a passive 
revolution comes from the strong financial support provided during this period 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WBvi.  Funding was granted 
to Turkey within the context of the end of detente following the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution of 1979, and was articulated as 
strengthening the southern flank of NATO (Öniş and Kirkpartick, 1991: 11). 
More importantly, a reading of 1980 as a passive revolution shows the 
importance of the capitalist state in capitalist restoration, serving as a reminder 
for leftist intellectuals in Turkey who conceive of the military and the strong 
state independently of capitalist social relations. Therefore, it achieves 
additional significance for political praxis.  
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4.3.3) The Neoliberal State 
  
In this period, the state withered away from production by privatization of state 
economic enterprises and welfare state was cut back with relations of 
distribution were left to market forces. Indeed, the neoliberal turn is defined as 
'capital's counter-attack against labour' (Boratav, 2003: 149). In tandem with 
abandonment of tripartism and the alliance between bourgeoisie and neoliberal 
state in containing labour in the post-Fordist period at the structural level, the 
new regime severely curtailed social rights guaranteed by the 1961 
constitution. There was a strong campaign against 'overpaid workers' which 
presented wages as an obstacle to the competitiveness of Turkish products in 
global markets. In parallel with the objective set to render national economy 
competitive in international markets, the export-oriented strategy redefined the 
role of labour as a production cost (Önder, 1999: 54). Nominal wage increases 
were systematically kept below the level of annual inflation rate (Boratav, 
1990: 209). The state withered away from the agrarian structure and peasant 
incomes were left to be determined by market forces (Boratav, 1990: 218). 
Yalman describes strategies designed to contain the labour movement, 
including confining bargaining to real wages rather than general economic 
policy, declaring various sectors in the economy as 'strategic' to ban industrial 
action in these sectors, and promotion of new trade unions while 'outlawing' the 
Disk for a decade  (2009: 316-317). Alongside the new conception of social 
policy in the hyper-liberal form of state, social expenditures of the state fell and 
the state actively encouraged charities (Yalman, 2009: 324). For instance, in 
the 1980s, there was an increase in the populations in shanty-towns and the 
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working-class quarters of cities. Municipalities increased their services and 
granted partial property-rights to shanty-towns by allocating building-licenses 
and land permission. Boratav concludes that 'lower wages may lose their 
significance in a social atmosphere where the wage as such starts to become a 
secondary element determining the welfare of the family' (Boratav, 1990: 224). 
Such a strategy was designed not only to erode class consciousness but also to 
decrease the burden on the bourgeoisie and ultimately sought to prevent a 
social explosion without touching upon declining real wages. Moreover, this 
strategy of creating social mechanisms outside unionism was also instrumental 
in externalizing trade union solidarity (Boratav, 2005: 152-53). At the 
ideational level, Yalman reads the new hegemony as 'putting an end to class 
based politics' (2009: 308). The policies were directed to the elimination of the 
'saliency of class as the basis for collective identification and action' through a 
strategy of de-politicising society (Yalman, 2009: 309).  
The structural adjustment directed industrialists to rentier activities and 
industrial capital developed a tendency to suspend production in order to 
benefit from the quick returns of the speculative economy (Boratav, 2005: 61; 
Önder, 1999: 68). The surplus accumulated within the export-led strategy was 
largely shared by the rentier fraction; financial bourgeoisie that was able to 
take advantage of high interest rates; and exporters of agricultural and 
industrial goods (Boratav, 2003: 167-69). The wages of workers and peasants 
were squeezed. The disadvantaged social forces were fixed income groups, 
wage earners, low-ranked bureaucrats and agricultural workers. (Boratav, 
1990: 224). The tax system was illustrative of the new dynamics of relations of 
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distribution. The tax burden shifted to wage-earners with regular salaries 
(Boratav, 2003: 154).    
4.3.4) Financial Liberalization, Economic Crises and the Rise of AKP 
Government as an Instance of Trasformismo
Turkey's adjustment to neoliberal restructuring can be analysed in two phases: 
a period of trade liberalisation and export promotion from 1980 to 1988; and a 
period of financial market liberalisation and deregulation from 1988 to 2003 
(Yeldan, 2006: 196). In the late 1980s, the export-led model came to its limits 
as public sector borrowing requirements and inflation soared and the restored 
unionist movement began to confront the erosion of real wages (Öniş, 1994: 
106). In 1989, Turkey abolished controls on foreign capital transactions, 
declared the convertibility of the Turkish lira and opened its domestic asset 
markets to international competition (Cizre and Yeldan, 2005: 389). Financial 
liberalization triggered de-industrialisation as industrialists turned their 
attention to speculative gains with rapid and high returns and speculative 
capital was invested in state bonds rather than the productive sector (Aydın, 
2005: 113-115). Aydın highlights that to understand the processes of 
accumulation behind financial liberalization, it is important to note that 'the 
state had borrowed externally at a cheaper rate in order to pay its internal debts 
with phenomenally high interest rates' (2005: 134).
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The Turkish financial market was opened to the cycle of short-term speculative 
foreign capital movement, causing the appreciation of currency which resulted 
in reduced exports and accelerated current account deficits, followed by rising 
exchange rate risks and a rapid exit of foreign lenders (Akyüz ve Boratav, 
2003: 1555). Hence, the Turkish economy in the last two decades can be 
described as going through cycles of growth, crisis and adjustment as a result 
of the dependence of accumulation to short-term financial capital flows 
(Yeldan, 2006: 199-200). The rentier type of accumulation, current account 
deficits, short-term capital inflows and contraction in the productive sector 
created a foundation for economic recession as inflation and interest rates 
reached three digits, and were followed with the 1994 financial crisis (Akyüz 
and Boratav, 2003: 1552). The crisis was short-lived, with 7% of growth in the 
following three years in parallel with a depreciation of lira and the recovery of 
exports and attraction of capital flows. Yet following a short period of growth, 
the East Asian and Russian crises triggered another crisis in 1999. Eight banks 
had to be taken over by the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund, which in turn 
worsened public debts and deficits (Akyüz ve Boratav, 2003: 1552). In the 
context of this economic contraction and with a fragile banking system, Turkey 
signed a further stand-by agreement with the IMF in 1999.
This vicious circle turned out to be unsustainable in the period leading up to the 
crisis of 2001. As the state starved from public income, it resorted to internal 
and external borrowing, to such an extent that before the 2001 crisis almost 
half of budget expenditures were allocated to pay interest (Aydın, 2005: 106-
107). Turkey was offering real rates of 80% in 2001, 60% in 2002 and 75% in 
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2003, whilst the average OECD interest rates were around 2.5%-4% (Yeldan, 
2006: 202). The rate of total public debt to GDP was 29% in 1990 and 
increased to 61% by 1999 (Central Bank, 2001: 1). The domestic debt 
deteriorated in tandem with the sale of state bonds and treasury bills, and 
increased from 36.4 quadrillion Turkish lira in 2000 to 170 quadrillion Turkish 
lira by the end of 2002 (Aydın, 2005: 123). 
In May 2001, Turkey adopted the 'Transition to a Stronger Turkish Economy' 
programme (Central Bank, 2001). Kemal Derviş was recruited from the World 
Bank and worked – along with a team of technocrats – free from political 
interference. There was the expectation that he would generate security in the 
financial markets and that his links with transnational capital and foreign 
creditors would guarantee external support. In addition to internal borrowing 
and unstable banking sector, the programme blamed 'irrational' public 
expenditures, 'excessive' employment in the public sector, disproportionate 
wage increases in public employment, financial deficits in social security 
institutions, 'redundant' agricultural subsidies and 'inefficient' public economic 
enterprises for the financial crisis (Central Bank, 2001: 1 and 4). Accordingly, 
the programme sought to provide macroeconomic stability and suggested a 
tight fiscal policy through decreasing inflation, placing restrictions on public 
expenditures and wages, reforming the banking system, substituting subsidies 
for agricultural products with direct income support mechanism and hastening 
privatization. In other words, the programme was directed to consolidate 
structural reform to convince foreign capital to invest in Turkey as an 
'emerging market' (Aydın, 2005: 132).    
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The economic crisis prompted conflicts among coalition governments. Against 
this background, the AKP came to power in the 2002 elections that signified a 
radical change in the make-up of parliament. None of the three political parties, 
the Democratic Left Party (DSP), MHP and Motherland Party (ANAP), that 
formed coalition in 1999 elections could pass 10% threshold and be 
represented in the Parliament. Scholars read 2002 election results as an 
expression of a deep anger in society towards the political parties who had 
formed the previous coalition governments. The AKP came to power by taking 
34% of votes in the 2002 elections and consolidated its hegemony with 46% of 
votes in the 2007 elections and 49% of votes in 2011. The hegemony of the 
AKP can be explained by reference to two transformations. First, the Milli 
Görüşvii (National View) movement underwent an internal transformation with 
a reformist fraction – organized under the AKP – transforming anti-European, 
statist/developmentalist and nationalist components (Uzgel, 2009: 18). Second, 
the AKP defined itself as a 'conservative democratic' party, a concept that 
highlights its new orientation which seeks to associate globalisation with 
traditional societal and religious values (Uzgel, 2009: 21-22). The international 
context was convenient as it enabled Turkey to be presented as a model for 
'Muslim democrats' in the Middle East by the New Right.
It is my belief that the AKP hegemony can be read as 'trasformismo'. Gramsci 
originally used the term to describe the process whereby the political 
programmes of right and left wing parties converge to such an extent that 'there 
cease[s] to be any substantive difference between them' (footnote 8, Gramsci, 
1971: 58). In other words, the concept expresses a condition of 'formation of an 
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ever more extensive ruling class' (Gramsci, 1971: 58). Yet, he also refers to 
trasformismo in relation to a strategy of the ruling class to lead 'even those 
[who] came from antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile' 
(Gramsci, 1971: 59). In accordance with Cox, I would argue that although 
'trasformismo worked to co-opt potential leaders of subaltern social groups', it 
can be extended to the 'strategy of assimilating and domesticating potentially 
dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition and 
can thereby obstruct the formation of class-based organised opposition to 
established social and political power' (Cox, 1983: 166-167). In this sense, and 
in disagreement with Tuğal, the AKP hegemony does not stand as a passive 
revolution (Tuğal, 2009). It can, however, be read as trasformismo to the extent 
that the ruling class managed to include SMEs and disadvantaged groups from 
globalization to the capitalist discipline (that Tuğal refers as Islamic 
opposition). The AKP adopted the macroeconomic policies of the 'Transition to 
a Stronger Turkish Economy' programme and presented a strong political 
position to implement it with a majority in Parliament. A word of caution is 
needed regarding this reading of trasformismo, however, as the AKP is not 
coming from a leftist tradition. Yet, as Cox highlights Islam ‘can be seen as a 
metaphor for the rejection of western capitalist penetration’, carrying a 
progressive potential in terms of alternatives to globalization in the peripheral 
context (Cox, 1992: 41). In that sense, social forces that are disadvantaged 
from globalization bearing a progressive potential are incorporated to the 
neoliberal AKP hegemony that served to disarticulate dissent. This means that 
there is a need to consider the specificities of Turkish social formation whereby 
the social base of the AKP overlaps with the popular masses that the Left 
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(which failed to recover from the military coup) might ordinarily be expected 
to organise.
In this sense, the AKP hegemony consolidated the neoliberal transition 
following the 2001 crisis by presenting itself as a rupture from previous 
governments and/or right-wing political parties and depicting the main struggle 
in society as 'people versus elites' via a populist discourse. As underlined in the 
previous chapter, hegemony is related to moral and intellectual leadership. 
Hence, the reading of the AKP as hegemonic does not stem solely from 
election results: winning an election is not sufficient to label a particular 
government hegemonic. Rather, its status as hegemonic stems from the fact 
that it succeeds in leading different segments in society within the neoliberal 
project. Although the AKP defines its social base as SMEs and farmers, both 
internationally oriented bourgeoisie and national oriented SMEs provide 
support: the former group underpins its economic programme – believing it can 
be implemented smoothly under a strong majority in the Parliament – whilst 
the latter group supports its policy of making SMEs export-oriented by 
enabling them to become competitive in international markets. In drawing 
support, the AKP develops a particular reading of state and society relations. It 
is argued that the ‘strong state’ supported ‘big economic enterprises’ and 
turned a blind eye to the SMEs in tandem with the ‘state’ policy (etatism) to 
create a strong bourgeoisie. AKP highlights that this tradition has constrained 
domestic production and made economy uncompetitive because it is dominated 
by the pattern of taking licences from foreign countries and getting support 
from the state (Interview No. 50). From such a perspective, the AKP aspires to 
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restore SMEs that are identified as real ‘competitive’ and productive segments 
in industry (Interview No. 50). Accordingly, it is allegedly argued that this 
policy will distribute welfare to society equally and justly and consolidate 
democracy by increasing welfare of middle-income groups (Interview No. 50). 
The AKP even aspires to present itself as a social democratic party by referring 
to the concept of ‘development’ and ‘justice’ in the name of the Party 
(Interview No. 50), a move that is well-received by low-income groups. 
However, the AKP social policy coincides with hyper-liberal standing on 
social policy. It is co-opted to the idea that employment can only be created on 
the condition of economic growth and it endorses individualistic solutions and 
charities - a process that began in 1980 with the neoliberal policy of containing 
labour. Indeed, in election manifestos, AKP debates social policy in relation to 
unemployed, poor, diseased, handicapped and retired people that require 
medical care. There is a shallow reference to labour (AKP, 2001: 40). AKP 
conceives social state as providing social justice for mostly socio-economically 
disadvantaged groups by developing social assistance and contributions such as 
distributing coal and schoolbooks for poor people, compensating health 
expenses for dependent people and increasing salaries of handicapped people 
(AKP, 2007: 90-96). AKP acknowledges that concrete steps are taken to 
economically and socially integrate handicapped people, constituting around 
eight and a half million people (AKP, 2007: 104). However, despite the AKP’s 
social base, the Party did not take any initiative to transform relations of 
distribution. The Party turns a blind eye to informal economy and 
unemployment and the tax burden still relies on middle and low income groups 
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by indirect taxation (Bakırezer and Demirer, 2009: 167). More importantly, the 
party continues to perceive Turkey's low wages as giving the country an 
advantage in global markets for competitiveness of the economy (Bakırezer 
and Demirer, 2009: 175). Thus it can be said that the AKP's policies comply 
with the structural dynamics of the withering away of the welfare state and that 
they rely on an individualistic hyper-liberal form of social welfare.
Despite this, particular intellectuals from radical liberal and leftist groups gave 
their consent to the AKP - in particular during in its first and second terms in 
office. This is a result of an analysis that conceives state and society separately 
that in turn misconstrues power relations (as explicated in the previous 
chapter). Indeed, the interviewee from Kurdish political party – BDP – (that 
will be analysed as emancipatory left in Chapter Seven) acknowledged that 
they gave consent to AKP rule in its first term in office due to its reference to 
dialogue in solving Kurdish problem, its commitment to democratisation and 
struggle against mechanisms of ‘strong state’ (Interview No. 60). Yıldızoğlu 
interprets this support as trasformismo (Yıldızoğlu, 2009: 121). These 
intellectuals read the AKP's hegemony as progressive, seeing it as 'an 
alternative form of modernity' which comes from below and will be 
instrumental in curbing the so-called 'state mechanism'. Yıldızoğlu contends 
that this reading depicts democracy as tolerance of the ‘individual’s need to 
practice religion as an individual freedom’ based on identity politics. In that 
sense, Yıldızoğlu argues, it hides a dark fantasy embedded in a passive 
nihilism/elitism stemming from consecutive traumas, including 1968 trauma, 
the 1975-78 collapse of the Mao regime and the 1981 military coup (2009: 
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117). These intellectuals have adopted hostility towards the state in the name of 
societal peace and rather than being a part of the democratic struggle against 
capitalism, they subscribed to neoliberal ideology (Yıldızoğlu, 2009: 118 and 
124).
Another instrument of the AKP hegemony is the ‘new’ foreign policy 
orientationviii, that envisages a more active role for Turkey in the region and 
global politics. Turkey is conceived as ‘unique’ due to its geographical location 
and multiple identities that should aspire a more active regional role. Yet, due 
to concerns over neo-Ottomanism and imperial assertiveness, Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, that is treated as architect of this new orientation, stresses 
that this pro-active role is embedded within supranational organisations, and is 
based on soft power via civil and economic mechanisms (Davutoğlu, 2008: 77-
79). The policy aspires to find ‘harmony’ between Turkey’s Western 
orientation and further develop relations with Turkish Republics in Middle 
Asia and countries in Caucasus, Middle East, Balkans and Black Sea Region
(Davutoğlu, 2010). This policy aspires to have ‘zero problems’ with 
neighbours (AKP, 2007: 214-215). AKP endorses economic relations as the 
basis to open dialogue in solving political problems (AKP, 2001) and develop 
pro-active policies such as the initiative to find a joint committee to study 1915 
events among Turkish and Armenian historians (AKP, 2007: 215).
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4.3.5) Turkey-European Union Relations following the Neoliberal Turn
Turkey did not liberalize its protectionist policies during the ISI period in the 
1970s as envisaged by the Additional Protocol. Rather, having frozen 
liberalization in 1978, Turkey waited until 1980s to resume a process of 
liberalization. For instance, in 1988, Turkey had reduced 20% of the tariffs in 
the '12 year list' – despite the Additional Protocol envisaging full liberalization 
of these tariffs by 1985 – and 10% of its tariffs on the '22 year list' (Tekeli and 
İlkin, 2000: 185-186). Moreover, Turkey continued to protect its economy 
through the use of non-tariff barriers such as duties and equities. Following 
1989, however, Turkey did begin to implement tariff reductions. 
Turkey applied for full membership to the EEC on 14 April 1987. The right-
wing ANAP presented membership to Turkish society as the means to 
consolidate democracy, complete the modernization project and put an end to 
the isolation of Turkey in the international sphere following the Cyprus 
intervention and subsequent problems with Greece. Tekeli and İlkin highlight 
that membership was presented as decisive to render an export-led growth 
strategy sustainable and provide additional financial assistance to implement 
the programme (Tekeli and İlkin, 2000: 100-101). Membership application was 
received positively domestically. Right-wing political parties supported the 
process. Contrary to their former critical stance, a number of left-wing oriented 
intellectuals, Kurdish groups, and social democratic political parties began to 
see membership as a road to reforming anti-democratic practices 
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institutionalized following the military regime (Tekeli and İlkin, 2000: 103-
104). Of the political parties it was only the religious-conservative parties who 
objected to membership (Tekeli and İlkin, 2000: 100-104). As far as labour was 
concerned, the Disk was banned from 1980 to 1992 and the Türk-İş supported 
the government's policy. Hak-İş rejected membership on the grounds that 
membership would be inconsistent with trade unionist rights (Tekeli and İlkin, 
2000: 105-106).
The European Commission recognized Turkey as an eligible country, but 
underlined that Turkey could not undertake the obligations stemming from EU 
membership as a result of its uncompetitive economy, inadequate social 
protection for workers, macro-economic instability, high inflation and 
unemployment rates, undemocratic practices and its record of violating human 
rights. It was also stressed that the EU was not ready for another enlargement 
given its goal of introducing the Single Market by 1992. The Commission 
suggested Turkey to deepen further its relations with the EU by completing the 
Customs Union (European Commission, 1989). 
Following its application, Turkey presented a ‘precipitated tariff reduction list’ 
to the EU in 1988 and started tariff reductions (Interview No. 36). The 
international oriented capital fraction supported the Customs Union for 
increasing economies of scale and stimulating competitiveness (Interview No. 
5, 32, 43 and 63; TÜSİAD, 2008a: 19). It was expected to decrease prices of 
raw materials, rendering international oriented capital more competitive in 
world markets (MESS, 1994: 17). The liberal think-tank, Economic 
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Development Foundation (İKV) endorsed that international trade is 
increasingly organized around economic blocs and Turkey should not be 
isolated from that structural imperative (MESS, 1994: 12-13). Membership was 
conceived as a step to integrate with neo-liberal structure, through 
consolidating macro-economic stability with reference to Maastricht criteria 
and contributing to adopt the rules of international trade (TÜSİAD, 1996: 55-
56).  
Within the context of its export-promotion strategy and the neoliberal turn 
Turkey was in a position to liberalize its trade regime vis-a-vis the EU and 
completed the Customs Union by a decision of the EU-Turkey Association 
Council on the 6th March 1995. Internationally oriented capital pioneered 
completion of the Customs Union that is expected to stimulate 
competitiveness, accelerate production capacity and bring technology transfer 
(Interview No. 5 and 11). In line with the hypothesis introduced in Chapter 
Two, both labour and capital in international oriented textile sector endorsed 
completion of the Customs Union due to elimination of quotas (Interview No. 
64). In parallel with internationalisation of state and its priority to subsidise 
leading sectors to stimulate international competitiveness of the country, 
concerns of textile sector, that has a pre-eminent position in export-promotion 
strategy, were prioritised during the negotiations. At the institutional level, the 
organic link between bureaucracy and exporters was provided by exporters’ 
unions, which are institutionally affiliated with the Under-secretariat of Foreign 
Trade (Interview No. 36). The automotive industry supported the Customs 
Union on the condition that imports of second hand motor vehicles would be 
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subjected to a special permissionix (Interview No. 36 and 63). The international 
oriented labour formed an alliance with the international oriented capital for 
the completion of the Customs Union, on the condition that the membership 
would be attained. For instance, both the Textile Trade Union (Tekstil-İş) and 
the Textile, Knitting and Clothing Industry Workers’ Union (Teksif) supported 
the Customs Union (Interview No. 9 and 31). The current President of Tekstil-
İş Rıdvan Budak was then the President of the Disk and visited Brussels to 
convince the socialist group in the European Parliament not to block the 
Customs Union.x The Tekstil-İş posits that the Customs Union provided 
standardization of production in textile and increased quality of textile products 
(Interview No. 9). 
As expected from the hypothesis, nationally oriented capital raised concerns 
before completion of the Customs Union. It is highlighted that the SMEs would 
not be able to compete with European products (MÜSİAD, 1996: 109). The 
Customs Union was expected to stimulate imports of raw materials that would 
negatively affect SMEs and public economic enterprises that provided raw 
materials for major industries. Moreover, it is stressed that increasing imports 
would cause foreign exchange bottleneck and overvalue exchange rates (İSO, 
1995: 16 and 30; MESS, 1994: 28; MÜSİAD, 1995: 53). Turkey would be 
subjected to terms and conditions of international trade that would put extra 
pressures upon SMEs (MÜSİAD, 1996: 108). Additionally, Turkey would be 
dependent on EU’s foreign trade regime that would negatively impact its 
privileged relations with other economic blocs such as Economic Cooperation 
Organization, Islamic Conference Economic Council and Black Sea Economic 
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Cooperation (MÜSİAD, 1995: 53). Indeed, MÜSİAD was suggesting a new 
economic bloc - Cotton Union – among dependant countries in Middle East 
and Turkish Republics (MÜSİAD, 1996: 4). 
There were dissident voices among labour such as ‘membership first’ policy of 
the Türk-İş or ‘they are the partners and we are the market’ of the Hak-İş. It is 
underlined that the Customs Union will deteriorate economic problems by 
accelerating unemployment and constraining independence on foreign trade 
regime (Türk-İş, 2002c: 235-241). However, Türk-İş gave its consent to the 
Customs Union on the condition to get prior guarantees for membership and 
protective measures for SMEs (Türk-İş, 2002b: 345). The Hak-İş objected to 
completion of the Customs Union on the grounds that it would negatively 
affect industry due to pressures of competitiveness and generate dependency to 
EU without participating to decision making - in contradiction with
independence of foreign trade regime and foreign policy (Hak-İş, 1992: 180-
181; 1995: 82-83; 1999: 49). 
4.4) Conclusion
This chapter sought to provide a reading of Turkish social formation from the 
perspective of political economy to provide a background for subsequent 
empirical chapters. It did so by embedding Turkey's relations with the EU 
within the history of Turkey's integration into the capitalist world system. The 
chapter was structured in two sub-sections. In the first, the debate surrounding 
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Turkey's integration into the EEC was embedded within an analysis of 
hegemony under Pax Americana and the social relations of production shaped 
by Fordism; embedded liberalism; and ISI and neo-mercantilist developmental 
states in the periphery. The second sub-section examined Turkey-EU relations 
following Turkey's neoliberal turn within the wider context of globalisation.
The chapter began by reading Kemalist modernization and the following etatist 
period as a passive revolution designed to foster national industry and create a 
bourgeoisie under the world order of rival imperialisms. Then it was argued 
that during the neo-mercantilist-developmentalist period there was no clear 
consensus on EEC membership or on the elimination of protectionism among 
the pre-eminent coalition of social forces which formed the neo-mercantilist 
developmentalist state. Rather, the relationship was identified as a tug-of-war 
between social forces in favour of development by protectionism and those 
which supported the liberalization engendered by the Customs Union. It was 
noted that tariff reductions were constantly delayed during this period. Notably, 
there were critical groups inside the national chambers of commerce in 
Anatolia, including a fraction within the DPT, social democratic political 
parties, and Türk-İş. Whilst these groups were not against membership per se, 
they supported delays in liberalisation, citing concerns over development and 
industrialization. Moreover, the leftist oriented TİP and Disk opposed 
membership, interpreting membership as the economic dimension of 
imperialism and organising around the slogan 'they are the partners and we are 
the market'. However, it can hardly be argued that these dissident groups were 
able to form an alternative historical bloc around an anti-membership 
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perspective. Indeed, Turkish economy was dependent on core countries for 
development as a result of the need for foreign capital investment and 
technology transfers.
I then showed how, in parallel with the accumulation crisis of Fordist period, 
the ISI model was replaced with an export-oriented model which was 
enshrined with the 24th January 1980 economic programme. This programme 
aimed to stimulate economic growth by liberalizing foreign trade regime and 
increasing the creditworthiness of the economy through reducing inflation and 
'rationalising' the state's involvement in the economy. This chapter, then, reads 
the 1980 military coup as a passive revolution within the struggle of war of 
position. It suggests that the bourgeoisie was not strong enough to lead society 
around a new hegemonic project and so the structural adjustment programme 
was instituted through a military coup. This proved instrumental in suppressing 
the labour movement and transformed real wages from a factor used to create 
demand for a domestic economy to a production cost. It is within this context 
that Turkey applied to become a member of the EEC in 1987. This move was 
presented as a natural part of the export-promotion strategy and – it was argued 
– was necessary in order for Turkey to receive financial assistance so that it 
could finance its export-promotion model. There was no pre-eminent labour 
perspective shaping the debate. After the EEC found Turkey's membership 
application to be premature, Turkey adopted a liberalization list and completed 
its Customs Union by 1995.
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I have shown how the 1990s saw a vicious circle of growth, crisis and 
adjustment in tandem with the liberalization of Turkey's financial system 
during the neoliberal period. Accordingly, the chapter reads the rise of AKP 
against the background of the 2001 economic crisis. It argues that the AKP's 
hegemony can be interpreted as trasformismo that consolidated neoliberal 
restructuring. It did so by expanding the ruling class through incorporating 
nationally-oriented SMEs into neoliberal hegemony, and by eliminating a 
potentially progressive movement through the integration of popular masses 
who are disadvantaged by globalization. It achieved this latter tactic by 
presenting itself as a rupture from previous right-wing political parties, that is 
interpreted as a populist movement struggling on behalf of the people 'versus 
elites'. It is within this background of state-society relations that the current 
struggle among social forces in Turkey regarding EU membership is shaped.       
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Chapter 5 - European Membership and Intra-class Struggle among 
Capital
5.1) Introduction 
I examine the position of capital vis-a-vis globalisation and membership 
perspective and debate intra-class struggle in this chapter. Following the 
hypothesis that transnationalisation of production has generated a new division 
between internationally and nationally oriented social forces of capital and 
labour, it is presumed that internationally oriented capital will develop a 
supportive stance conceiving of membership as the means to stimulate exports 
and consolidate open market economy. Contrarily, nationally oriented capital is 
expected to oppose membership as they will be exposed to pressures of 
competitiveness via two processes. On the one hand, they have to compete with 
European enterprises as a result of participating in the Internal Market. On the 
other hand, membership entails a process through which Turkey adopts EU`s 
foreign trade regime and decreases its tariffs for global products. Thenceforth, 
they will equally be subjected to rising competition from cheaper intermediate 
products of the third world including South Korea and China. 
The chapter starts by operationalising intra-class struggle for capital. Particular 
industrial sectors are selected - on the basis of their position in the production 
structure - to unfold position of different fractions of capital. Whilst the textile 
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and automotive industries are examined as internationally oriented industries, 
agriculture constitutes a nationally oriented sector. It is a sheltered sector that 
continues to produce for domestic market. The debate is followed with an 
analysis on civil society. Guided by Gramsci’s conception of civil society as a 
terrain where hegemony is both contested and consolidated, particular 
institutions within civil society are examined in questioning whether capital 
can transcend its economic-vested interests and present neoliberal membership 
on a universal terrain. These institutions are approached as platforms for 
organic intellectuals of capital to articulate the neo-liberal discourse on a 
universal terrain. To put bluntly, at issue here is the hegemonic status of pro-
membership project.  
5.2) Revisiting Intra-Class Struggle inside Capital within the Context of 
Globalisation
As outlined in the second chapter, the principal means of Turkey's integration 
into the global capitalist structure is via trade rather than FDI. Thus, Turkey’s 
integration path constitutes a case of internationalism more than 
transnationalism. There are some enterprises that operate transnationally. 
However, transnational fraction remains far from constituting an additional 
category or establishing a hegemonic position within employer associations. In 
this sense, transnationally oriented capital is analysed within internationally 
oriented fraction. 
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As representatives of internationally oriented capital, Turkish Industrialists’ 
and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD), the Turkish Exporters' Assembly 
(TİM) and the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (TİSK) have 
been interviewed. TÜSİAD represents 55% of the private sector operating in 
the manufacturing and service sectors and its members in total conduct almost 
80% of exports in Turkey (Interview No. 5). It is defined as a 'voluntary based 
organisation', established to lobby governments for pro-market reforms and to 
enact policies that increase competitiveness (Interview No. 5). It is possible to 
identify organic links with European capital: it has been a member of Business 
Europe since 1987 and during the last two decades a number of TÜSİAD 
membersxi have become affiliated with the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists (ERT). TİM represents the interests of exporters organized in 
sixty exporter unions and twenty-six sectors as an independent but affiliated 
institution of the Under-Secretariat of Foreign Trade (Interview No. 65). TİSK 
is composed of twenty-three employer associations, whose members mostly 
operate in international markets (Interview No. 32). It is the institutional 
platform that represents employers in corporatist structures such as Economic 
and Social Council, Turkish Employment Agency and the Tripartite Advisory 
Board (Interview No. 32).
In explicating intra-class struggle, particular industries are selected. The textile 
and automotive industries are examined as internationally oriented sectors 
given their privileged position within the export-promotion strategy since the 
1980s. Moreover, following Cox’s analysis on internationalisation of state 
(1987: 290-291), these two sectors were subsidised by the neoliberal form of 
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state as leading sectors to stimulate international competitiveness. Textile and 
automotive industries constitute the majority of Turkish exports to the EU 
(Togan et.al, 2005b: 90). In this context, the Turkish Textile Employers' 
Association (TÜTSİS) and Automotive Manufacturers Association (OSD) are 
analysed. The majority of members in TÜTSİS operate in international markets 
and approximately 65-70% of its exports are conducted with EU countries 
(Interview No. 64). Similarly, OSD is composed only of private sector 
members who operate in international markets and conduct approximately 70% 
of their exports with the European market (Interview No. 63).
Nationally oriented capital is composed of sheltered sectors that primarily 
produce for domestic market. It is examined in relation to SMEs and the 
agricultural sector. It is inferred that these would be negatively affected by the 
opening of markets to competition and the elimination of state subsidies. 
Furthermore, as they primarily produce intermediate goods, they would be 
subjected to competition with cheaper goods produced in global markets. Thus, 
it is expected that they develop a critical stance vis-a-vis globalisation and EU 
membership. The Union of Turkish Chambers and Stock Exchange (TOBB), 
the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSİAD), 
İstanbul Chamber of Commerce (İSO) and OSTİM industrial zone in Ankara 
are interviewed as institutions representing the interests of SMEs. TOBB was 
founded in 1952 as the first compulsory membership employer association. It is 
comprised of 1.2 million enterprises from various sectors, and the majority of 
its enterprises are SMEs (Interview No. 80). The İSO has 15,000 members, 
97% of which are SMEs operating in manufacturing, representing 40% of 
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Turkish firms in manufacturing and comprising a collective total of 35% of 
Turkish exports (Interview No. 13). MÜSİAD is composed of around 3,000 
SMEs and was founded in response to a belief that the state prioritised large, 
İstanbul based enterprises represented by TÜSİAD (Interview No. 7 and 8). 
The OSTİM industrial zone in Ankara is composed of 5,000 SMEs, operating 
in manufacturing, commercial and logistical sectors (Interview No. 22).   
In this sense, agriculture will be particularly affected by participation in the 
Internal Agriculture is a sheltered sector in that – with the exception of 
processed products – it is not subjected to the Customs Union Market. Indeed, 
as far as trade policy is concerned, agriculture is highly protected in Turkey, 
with tariffs reaching to 124% for fish, sugar and sweets (Togan et.al, 2005a: 
45). The Union of Turkish Chambers of Agriculture (TZOB) is an official 
professional platform based on compulsory membership, which organises the 
interests of 5 million farmers (Interview No. 49). The majority of these are 
small scale producers who produce for the national market, though there are 
also larger firms operating in international markets (Interview No. 49). The 
Agricultural Credit Cooperatives of Turkey was founded in 1863 to provide 
support for farmers. It has 1.3 million members, most of which operate in the 
national market (Interview No. 53).
The Gramscian notion of the 'war of position' extends the struggle over 
hegemony to civil society. In this view, it is pertinent to unravel the ‘fortresses 
and earthworks’ – defence systems - in superstructure of civil society that are 
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cogently conceptualised by Gramsci as ‘the trench-systems of modern warfare' 
in the war of position (1971: 235 and 238). My contention is that such an 
endeavour is decisive to enquire hegemonic status of a particular project in 
civil society – to what extent ruling class presents its economic vested interests 
as a universal vision by transcending its economic-corporate phase.
In view of this, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) 
and the İKV are analysed as institutional platforms, whose studies are decisive 
in shaping and articulating ideas regarding the membership debate. These
institutions also have the social function of opening certain sensitive issues to 
public debate by asking 'experts' (who, from a Gramscian perspective can be 
seen as 'traditional intellectuals') to write opinion papers. Both TESEV and 
İKV are presented to society as cultivating 'independent and scientific' 
knowledge that is 'objective and technical' in a positivist sense. They are 
understood to represent an independent and alternative view of 'civil society', 
an argument substantiated by the fact that they are financially independent 
from state (Interview No. 4 and 76). Yet, in parallel with neoliberal hegemony, 
the knowledge they produce is depicted as autonomous from the economic 
base; and remains independent from political authority and the 'strong state'. 
Hence, they are largely composed of traditional intellectuals, who form part of 
a 'social utopia by which the intellectuals think of themselves as 
“independent”, autonomous, endowed with a character of their own' (Gramsci, 
1971: 7-8). 
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Yet it is possible to unravel organic links between these intellectuals and 
capital. The İKV was founded by the İstanbul Chamber of Commerce and the 
İstanbul Chamber of Industry in 1965 as a platform to prepare reports and 
develop a 'specialised' perspective regarding integration with the EEC on 
behalf of the private sector (MESS, 1994: 11). The administrative boards of 
these institutions are formed by entrepreneurs. For instance, Jak Kamhi – the 
İKV's President between 1987 and 1992 – was a TÜSİAD Executive 
Committee member and acted as a businessman in ERT for twelve years. The 
interviewee from İKV displayed intolerance towards this aspect of my 
dissertation and suggested that I should have rather picked a topic on the 
Europeanisation of any acquis chapter for my dissertation (Interview No. 62), 
an indicator that reveals acceptance of ideas associated with pro-membership 
as common sense and intolerance among the orthodox stance vis-a-vis critical 
approaches.
5.3) Transnationalisation of Production, Capital and Membership
5.3.1) International Oriented Capital, Globalization and Membership 
As expected by the hypothesis, internationally oriented capital conceives of 
globalisation positively, as a process providing technology transfer, 
delocalisation and accelerating the volume of trade (Interview No. 65). In 
return, closed economies are discarded for resulting in high prices and 
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downgrading quality of products and services in the domestic market 
(Interview No. 5 and 65).
Internationally oriented capital endorses membership to stimulate 
competitiveness and exports (Interview No. 5). For TÜSİAD, it is 
economically beneficial to be in the European economic area (Interview No. 
43). Moreover, European market is essential for Turkish industry as Turkey 
conducts more than 50% of its foreign trade with the EU countries (Interview 
No. 65). Yet, it is acknowledged that Turkish industry has already undergone 
effects of opening its market to international competition via the Customs 
Union (Interview No. 65). Indeed, Turkey has already integrated with the 
European market (Interview No. 65) and internationally oriented capital has 
secured expected economic advantages via the Customs Union (Interview No. 
43). In this view, interviewees highlight that there are no additional economic 
benefits of membership except participating to the decision making (Interview 
No. 6, 32, 63 and 64). However, it is highlighted that membership perspective 
and ongoing reform process consolidate a functioning market economy. For 
instance, interviewees give references to consolidation of a transparent public 
administration and enactment of competition law during the reform process 
(Interview No. 43). Moreover, membership perspective brings predictability 
and consolidates market stability, factors named as decisive to stimulate FDI 
flows (Interview No. 5 and 6). 
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Yet, internationally oriented capital endorses arguments transcending its vested 
economic interests in promoting membership. TÜSİAD identifies membership 
as a 'national project' (TÜSİAD, 2002: 1) and articulates a strategy to debate it 
as an issue above party politics (Interview No. 5). In this strategy, membership 
is presented as a necessity required by an international treaty that is no longer 
open to debate in Turkish society. Indeed, TÜSİAD asks traditional 
intellectuals to prepare reports – that is presented as expert opinion – on 
sensitive topics in critical junctures – such as before European Council 
meetings - in drawing support for pro-membership project (TÜSİAD, 1997, 
1999 and 2001). This varied between reform proposals on constitutional 
change to publishing position papers to open sensitive topics to public debate 
such as Kurdish question and human rights. This illuminates its strategy to 
transcend its vested interests in presenting membership on a universal terrain as 
a progressive process for society to consolidate democratisation and rule of 
law. 
Moreover, membership project is defended not only on economic grounds that 
can be taken as another hint for its hegemonic status. On the one hand, 
European Social Model and Europe's neoliberal turn are supported. Indeed, the 
neoliberal conception of social policy that presents competitiveness as a 
condition for employment and extends social rights on the basis of economic 
conditions is promoted (Interview No. 32). More importantly, social dialogue –
directed to protect the interests of the workplace collectively and cooperate to 
increase the competitiveness of the enterprise – is endorsed as a viable model 
(Interview No. 32). The 'confrontational' industrial relations of 1970s and 
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'politicised unions' are criticised (Interview No. 32). On the other hand, the EU 
is also presented as an anchor for the consolidation of democracy, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights, which are interpreted as preconditions to 
safeguard market economies (Interview No. 6, 43 and 65). It is argued that 
problems in democracy cause material deficits (Interview No. 5). The populist 
argument which links membership with modernisation also persists, viewing 
membership as the means to reach the standards of 'contemporary civilisation', 
a process that supposedly began with the founding of the Republic and its 
Western orientation (Interview No. 32).
The EU is also perceived as a 'peace project' (Interview No. 11) and 
membership is believed to lead to improved dialogue in foreign policy 
(Interview No. 6). As a counter-argument to criticisms on the grounds of 
national interests, TÜSİAD re-defines the 'violation' of national interest as 
reaching a deadlock resulting in the persistence of problems such as Cyprus 
and/or Armenia, which – they claim – generate 'material deficits' (Interview 
No. 5). On this issue, the Cyprus problem constitutes the bulk of the debate. It 
is acknowledged that Turkey cannot become a member of the EU without a 
solution due to the likelihood of a veto by Cyprus. The Cyprus problem also 
affects current accession negotiations as the EU froze eight chapters in 2006 on 
the grounds that Turkey has not extended the Customs Union to the Republic 
of Cyprus. The situation in the island is seen as unjust by TÜSİAD, as the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) – which accepted the Annan 
Planxii – is refused membership while the Republic of Cyprus – which rejected 
the Plan – was granted EU membership (Interview No. 6). In extending the 
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debate beyond narrow economic interests, TÜSİAD published two reports 
analysing the Northern Cypriot economy (TÜSİAD, 1998 and 2009). In these, 
TÜSİAD claims that there are economic problems in the KKTC, which arise 
from its political isolation and the pre-eminent state role in running the 
economy (TÜSİAD, 1998: 53 and 69; TÜSİAD, 2009: 35). The EU process is 
supported as the EU constitutes the second biggest trade partner of the KKTC 
following Turkey (TÜSİAD, 1998: 39), and it is believed that EU membership 
and standardisation of EU rules lie at the core of development of Northern 
Cyprus (TÜSİAD, 2009: 59). Yet despite these claims, it cannot be argued that 
internationally oriented capital proposes a solution beyond further negotiations. 
It is believed that membership will contribute to solve the Cyprus problem.
5.3.2) The Position of Textile and Automotive Industries
Interviewees from internationally oriented textile and automotive industries 
conceive of globalisation positively as a process that forces industries to 
comply with rules of international competition (Interview No. 63 and 64). 
Textile and automotive industries support membership perspective (Interview 
No. 63 and 64). Yet, in debating probable economic impact of membership to 
Turkish industry, the Customs Union is identified as a milestone to open 
Turkish industry to international competition. The Customs Union transformed 
the textile sector by accelerating its exports (Interview No. 64). Interviewee 
from automotive industry defined the Customs Union as an ‘educative process’ 
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to render Turkish industry competitive in the world market and a ‘global actor’ 
in automotive production (Interview No. 63). 
Thenceforth, it is remarked that participating to the Internal Market will have 
no further economic effects to Turkish economy (Interview No. 63). 
Automotive industry has already consolidated their markets outside and 
independent of membership framework (Interview No. 63). Interviewees from 
automotive and textile industries highlighted that they establish international 
linksxiii outside membership framework, which in return renders its economic 
activities within the Internal Market independent of membership status 
(Interview No. 63 and 64). Moreover, demand to Turkish products is 
contracting in tandem with the economic crisis in Euro-zone, a situation that 
drives Turkey to develop policies directed to diversify its foreign economic 
relations with alternative markets and to decrease its trade dependence to 
European market (Interview No. 63 and 64).   
The textile sector is negatively affected from EU’s liberalisation in 2005 that 
rendered China the major supplier to the EU market. The market share of 
China in the EU increased 50% from 22% to 40% between 2005 and 2010 
(Interview No. 64). Textile sector considers opening the Customs Union into 
question and proposing to downgrade it to a free trade agreement (Interview 
No. 64). It is posited that free trade agreements that the EU signs with third 
countries engender asymmetric relation as Turkey faces difficulties to convince 
third countries to sign free trade agreements separately (Interview No. 14 and 
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64). It is also acknowledged that after the stalemate in the Doha talks, the EU 
increasingly resorts to bilateral free trade agreements in trade liberalisation 
(Interview No. 64). For instance, Mexican, Pakistani and Iranian products are 
delivered in Turkish market with 10% customs, although Turkish products are 
subjected to 40% customs (Interview No. 63). 
5.3.3) National Oriented Capital Adapting to Globalisation and Membership
Analogous to aforementioned hypothesis, it is expected that nationally oriented 
capital will oppose membership as they will be negatively affected from 
competition as a result of participating to the Internal Market. In tandem with 
transnationalisation of production, SMEs that predominantly produce 
intermediate goods will be exposed to competition with cheaper world 
products. Moreover, it can also be assumed that they will oppose elimination of 
state subsidies in tandem with withering away of welfare state. Yet, on the 
basis of the empirical research, I argue that contrary to the expectation, national 
oriented capital supports membership, as it has been integrated with 
transnational production structure, and develops mechanisms of adoption.
Indeed, SMEs stress that there is no alternative to globalisation, (Interview No. 
80; MÜSİAD, 2005: 16). They conceive of competitiveness, the market 
economy model and export-orientation as the only viable strategies for survival 
in the neoliberal period (Interview No. 22; MÜSİAD, 2005: 41-42; TOBB, 
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2011a: 454-55). They also revisit 'nationalism' and aspire to develop a pro-
active strategy calling for 'national champions' who are able to compete in the 
global market through their export capacity (TOBB, 2011b: 733). Equally, 
SMEs adopt the role neoliberalism assigns to the state in relation to the 
economy. For instance, TOBB discredits protectionism and defends the 
withering away of the state from industrial matters on the condition that it is to 
be eliminated as a long-term strategy (TOBB, 2011a: 422). MÜSİAD defends 
the withering away of the state's role in the economy in order to consolidate the 
principles of market economy and to contain the political power of the 
'bureaucratic elite, secular capital and central authority', which is depicted as 
enjoying economic and political privilege from the inception of the Republic 
(MÜSİAD, 2002: 122). Notably, most of the SMEs organised under MÜSİAD 
were founded after the 1980s (Buğra, 1998: 525), at a historical conjuncture 
when the state had begun to wither away from the economy. In this sense, the 
SMEs organised within MÜSİAD did not experience a period of protectionism 
under the ISI model. Moreover, internationalism was decisive for MÜSİAD 
from its inception: it relied on attracting savings from Turkish immigrants 
settled abroad, particularly in Germany and, by the 1990s it had founded 22 
offices abroad (Özdemir, 2006: 64-66). In this sense, MÜSİAD's claim that the 
state has supported TÜSİAD and so-called ' secular capital' in its jargon are not 
related to the 'strong state'. Rather, SMEs within MÜSİAD flourish at a 
particular historical juncture and in a particular form of state.  
SMEs, therefore, claim that seeking EU membership is the only viable strategy 
for Turkey to take due to globalisation (TOBB, 2011b: 687). They claim that 
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the membership process forces Turkey to comply with international rules and 
standards; and increases the quality and competitiveness of Turkish industry 
(Interview No. 7, 8 and 13; MÜSİAD, 2004a: 99). Membership is conceived of 
as an 'anchor' for stability and security that will increase Turkey's credibility, 
attracting FDI and to guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law (Interview 
No. 7 and 80; MÜSİAD, 2001: 38-39). Economic integration with the EU is
defined as 'irreversible', based on the fact that Turkey conducts more than 50% 
of its trade with the EU, and that more than 60% of tourism income and foreign 
investment originates in EU countries (MÜSİAD, 2001: 38-39). It is also 
argued that EU membership would consolidate institutionalisation, helping 
develop a political culture governed by rules and meritocracy rather than 
patronage relations (Interview No. 80).
It is too great a step to argue that the majority of SMEs are internationally 
oriented. Thus, it is pertinent to consider their position within transnational 
production structures in order to understand their support for membership. In 
chapter two, trade is established as the main mechanism for integration of 
Turkish production structure with world capitalist structure. However, it is 
important to note Robinson's argument that the global economy operates 
through 'multilayered networks of outsourcing, subcontracting, collaboration, 
and so on, that increasingly link local and national agents to global networks' 
within which agents either 'globalize or perish' (Robinson, 2004: 19-20). 
Indeed, it should be noted that SMEs are integrated in transnational production 
structure either through outsourcing or contract manufacturing, in parallel with 
globalisation and the delocalisation of production. For instance, export-oriented 
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SMEs constitute a numerical minority within TOBB, but most SMEs either 
produce intermediate goods for the European market or conduct contract 
manufacturing on behalf of EU based companies (Interview No. 80). Similarly, 
SMEs operating through OSTİM (an organised industrial zone in Ankara) are 
sometimes presented as the 'backyard' of Europe's production structure as they 
engage in contract manufacturing (Interview No. 22). Indeed, the OSTİM 
model is shown as an example of cooperative mechanismsxiv among SMEs 
within the context of declining subsidies in the neoliberal form of state 
(Interview No. 22). The interviewee from OSTİM explained it as a mechanism 
operating through three circles. The first of these is relatively small in number 
and size and employs no more than ten workers. These enterprises operate in 
assemblies for montage, and are internationally oriented. They create demand 
for small enterprises/suppliers at the second and third circles, which constitute 
the majority of OSTİM members (Interview No. 22). Hence, although the 
majority of the SMEs produce supplier products for the domestic market, their 
products are assembled and then exported, meaning that nationally oriented 
capital is dependent upon international markets, making them – to an extent –
internationally oriented. 
Second, many SMEs have already encountered the effects of globalisation and 
the liberalisation of foreign trade especially after the completion of the 
Customs Union, either through bankruptcy or through adapting to new 
conditions. Concerns over the competitiveness of Turkish industry as a 
consequence of its integration to the Internal Market are considered to be 'out 
of the question' following the Customs Union (Interview No. 7). 
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Third, internationally oriented capital develops strategies for integrating SMEs 
into their discourse, articulating the interests of the 'private sector', which is 
presented as a monolithic entity with homogenous interests. For instance, the 
Turkish Enterprise and Business Confederation (TÜRKONFED), which mostly 
organises SMEs in the Anatolian periphery, was initiated under the leadership 
of TÜSİAD (Özsaruhan, 2005). Similarly, SMEs form the majority within 
TOBB, yet it is difficult for them to develop an alternative policy. Their 
interviewee explicated three reasons for this. First, membership in TOBB is 
compulsory for all enterprises: members of TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD must also 
be members of TOBB. This means TOBB is cumbersome and finds it difficult 
to take action (Interview No. 80). Second, the structure makes it difficult for 
SMEs within TOBB to form an alternative policy as internationally oriented 
enterprises (mostly members of TÜSİAD) are more influential in the final 
decision making process (Interview No. 80). Third, TOBB is a semi-official 
platform which is financially dependent upon state contributions. Thus, it is 
difficult for TOBB to form policy independent from political authority and pro-
European Governments (Interview No. 80). Indeed TOBB sees the pro-EU 
membership perspective as 'state policy' (Interview No. 80).
Criticism of the EU membership process from SMEs is related to national 
sensitivities and not economic competitiveness. The EU's approach to the 
Kurdish and Armenian problems is criticised (Interview No. 22; MÜSİAD, 
2004a: 17) and proposals regarding permanent derogations and restrictions on 
the free movement of workers are considered unacceptable (MÜSİAD, 2004b: 
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13-14). There is also a belief that the EU's policy on Cyprus problem is biased 
to the disadvantage of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots (MÜSİAD, 2006: 159).
5.3.4) The Position of the Agriculture Sector
Agriculture is not included in the Customs Union (with the exception of 
processed agriculture products), and remains protected within the structural 
constraints of World Bank policies. However, the food processing industry is 
subjected to the neoliberal regime and is integrated within global production 
structures. Hence, it can be argued that whilst processed agricultural products 
are integrated with the international market, unprocessed agricultural products 
are produced for the domestic market and need to be protected. However, the 
neoliberal state supports the internationalisation of agriculture as well. For 
instance, a special 'state support mechanism' called the 'Inward Processing 
Regime', has been established for exporters of flour and sugar, enabling them 
to import raw materials at cheaper prices from world markets, allowing them to 
process the raw material and export at world prices and operate in international 
markets. This mechanism seeks to eliminate custom duties for nationally 
oriented capital, allowing it to create a competitively priced product to be 
exported to the global markets. However, if the imported raw material is going 
to be consumed in the internal market, it is subject to customs. For instance, 
Turkey is a major exporter of flour. Yet, the interviewee highlighted that it is 
not possible to compete in world market if flour is processed with nationally 
produced wheat flour. Thus, it has to import wheat flour - that is subjected to 
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the Inward Processing Regime and is exempt from customs – in order to 
operate in international markets considering that Turkish wheat is 50% more 
expensive than wheat prices in global market (Interview No. 49).
It should be noted that the TZOB (which organises 5 million farmers producing 
for the domestic market) and the Agriculture Credit Cooperatives (who have 
begun to operate in international markets) endorse very different arguments 
regarding globalisation and membership (compare Interview No. 49 with 
Interview No. 53). The TZOB is critical about the effects of globalisation on 
the agriculture sectors of developing countries, with their main concern being 
competitiveness. They stress that Turkey cannot compete with agriculture and 
animal husbandry in global markets because Turkish farmers are poor; the 
agricultural structure is inefficient and fragile; unionisation is limited; holdings 
are divided into small plots; and technology remains underdeveloped 
(Interview No. 49). Moreover, they argue that globalisation not only curbs 
employment in the agriculture sector but also decreases prices and leaves 
agricultural industries incapable of generating sufficient income (Interview No. 
49). They note that in the last decade, globalisation has reduced employment in 
agriculture from 35% to 24% (Interview No. 49).
  
The TZOB, therefore, adopts a critical stance to EU membership in line with 
the main hypothesis. They claim that Turkish farmers cannot compete with 
European farmers (except in fruits and vegetables), a fact that would lead to the 
closure of small farms if Turkey joins the EU. They believe that competitive 
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European products would further decrease the prices of agricultural goods. 
They also argue that the levels of support for the EU's new Eastern and Central 
European members are around 75% lower than for older members (Interview 
No. 49), that the EU refers to permanent derogations in agriculture and that its 
new support mechanism (which will be implemented during 2012) will 
considerably curb agricultural support. Thus, they conclude that as a regional 
institution the EU cannot protect Turkish agriculture from globalisation 
(Interview No. 49). Moreover, the policies of the EU and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) overlap, as EU countries are decisive in shaping WTO 
regulations. Both the WTO and the EU consider direct support mechanisms 
provided on the basis of crops to deter liberal trade and instead recommend 
'direct income support' models, which support farmers on the basis of size of 
land or number of animals. This has been applied in Turkey since 2003 and has 
been criticised for discouraging production. Thus, it is felt that the EU 
abandons agriculture to market mechanisms (Interview No. 49).
Contrarily, the Agricultural Credit Cooperatives support membership, 
believing that the process of membership will increase the competitiveness and 
export capacity of agricultural products (Interview No. 53). They claim that 
Turkey will benefit from agricultural funds and complicity with EU standards 
in agriculture, and argue that farmers should learn to comply with market 
mechanisms (Interview No. 53). Liberalisation is defended as a means of 
integrating agriculture into the global market and increasing efficiency 
(Interview No. 53).
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5.3.5) ‘Neoliberal’ Civil Society and Membership 
Both İKV and TESEV endorse EU membership as a 'development and 
democratisation project' in the 'public interest' (Interview No. 4 and 76). There 
is a tendency to discredit closed economies to endorse anti-democratic regimes 
(Interview No. 76). These institutions play a decisive role in shaping the 
membership debate by commissioning researchers and scholars to write reports 
and by opening sensitive topics to public debate at critical junctures. For 
instance, the İKV initiated a platform supporting the elimination of the death 
penalty after Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) was 
arrested. They opened a signature campaign supported by various intellectuals 
at a critical juncture before 1999 Helsinki European Council (Interview No. 4). 
The TESEV, meanwhile, published a report (in both Turkish and English) by a 
well-known scholar Umut Özkırımlı with his work on nationalism, which 
debated nationalism and EU membership. This report sought to address public 
concerns over sovereignty transfer, the loss of national sovereignty and the 
dismemberment of Turkey, seen as major impediments to gaining public 
support for membership. The report states that these fears are groundless, and 
references Milward's work on the European rescue of the nation state to argue 
that although membership constrains national sovereignty, it strengthens the 
nation state (Özkırımlı, 2008: 63 and 104-109).
Similarly, these institutions are directed to shape public opinion and decision 
makers at the European level. A booklet was jointly published by Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels and Economics and Foreign 
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Policy Forum in İstanbul in 2004, at a strategic time just before the EU was to 
decide to open accession negotiations with Turkey. One of the writers is Kemal 
Derviş, who was well-known in Turkey with the 2001 ‘Transition to a Stronger 
Turkish Economy' programme (his role in financial liberalisation is mentioned 
in chapter four). The report gives the message that the EU policy-makers 
should not act on the basis of religious and/or geographical prejudices, but has 
to rely on universal norms and ‘fairness and objectivity’ in assessing 
compatibility of Turkey for membership based on Copenhagen criteria (Derviş 
et. al. 2004: 25). Rather than culturalist and essentialist discourses that would 
deny Turkey from the membership process, it is articulated, that probable 
Turkish membership would contribute to ‘the process of democratic 
consolidation and societal modernisation’ in Turkey and contribute to Europe 
to reshape its political identity based on multiculturalism ’governed by the 
universal norms of democracy and a modern socially-caring market economy’ 
(Derviş et. al., 2004: 25).
5.4) Conclusion
Grounded in an analyses on configuration of social forces as established in the 
second chapter that Turkey`s integration pattern to world capitalist structure is 
an instance of internationalism rather than transnationalism, I have examined 
the position of capital taking spatial fractionation as the basis of analysis. The 
following hypothesis is tested in the case of Turkish capital: whilst 
internationally oriented capital will develop a supportive stance vis-a-vis
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membership for elimination of protectionism in trade, nationally oriented 
capital will oppose membership due to rising competition and declining 
protectionism in their sheltered sector. Emphasis has been devoted to particular 
industrial sectors in analyzing intra-class struggle. Textile and automotive 
industries are observed as internationally oriented considering that they hold a 
pre-eminent role among other industries in export-promotion strategy 
implemented since the neoliberal turn of 1980s. Agriculture is selected as 
nationally oriented taking into account that it is not included in the Customs 
Union and it is a protected sheltered sector.  
Empirical analysis reveals that internationally oriented sectors pioneer pro-
membership hegemonic project to stimulate competitiveness and exports in 
line with the hypothesis. Membership is presented as a process to provide 
economic development, macroeconomic stability and increase competitiveness 
of the economy and quality of production. Yet, interviewees from 
internationally oriented capital highlight that participating to the Internal 
Market does not entail additional economic benefits for industry as Turkey has 
already opened up its market to international competition via the Customs 
Union. In view of this, I argue that internationally oriented capital has already 
attained its economic interests via the Customs Union. Yet, membership is 
defended to consolidate the infra-structure of a functioning market economy 
model. It is also argued that membership perspective provides stability and 
security for Turkish market, a factor decisive to attract FDI. 
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Contrary to the expectation stemming from the hypothesis, the nationally 
oriented capital does not oppose membership. SMEs and the agriculture sector 
give their consent to the pro-membership project. SMEs read globalisation as 
an irreversible process and conceive of developing `national champions` 
through adapting to export-orientation and competitiveness as the only viable 
strategy for survival under globalisation. Thenceforth, SMEs have either 
adapted to globalisation, believing competitiveness in international markets to 
be the only viable strategy of struggle within globalisation; or they have 
integrated into the transnational production structure via outsourcing and 
contract manufacturing, in parallel with delocalisation of production. 
Accordingly, membership is defended through references to international rules 
and standards, believing that these will discipline industry and render it 
competitive in international markets. 
In line with the expectation of the hypothesis, the TZOB develops a critical 
stance on the grounds that membership will engender closure of small farms, 
impoverishment and unemployment as Turkish farmers will not be able to 
compete with European enterprises as a result of participation in the Internal 
Market. Indeed, the EU policies on agriculture coincide with the policies of 
WTO and WB and they abandon agriculture to market mechanisms. Moreover, 
the argument that membership will provide protectionism for Turkish 
agriculture is not promising given that agricultural support to CEECs is 
considerably reduced when compared with previous cases of enlargement. The 
interviewee also refers to proposals for privileged partnership in which case 
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Turkish agricultural sector will not be able to benefit from agricultural funds. 
However, this fraction is marginalised. Even processed agricultural products -
such as food processing industry - are integrated with the international market 
and they are supportive of membership perspective. 
   
I have also debated the hegemonic status of pro-membership project as 
hegemony is a moment of intellectual and moral leadership that is presented at 
a universal terrain entailing transcendence of economic vested interests. It is 
plausible to argue that pro-membership project is hegemonic. On the one hand, 
internationally oriented capital transcends its economic vested interests by 
articulating universal arguments at the ideational level in defending 
membership. The EU is presented as an anchor for the consolidation of 
democracy and the civilising of politics against the mechanisms of the 'strong 
state'. European social model and neoliberal turn in the EU is well-received and 
social dialogue and social partnership is seen as a viable model for social 
policy. Moreover, dialogue in foreign policy is defended and Europe is 
articulated as a peace project. On the other hand, arguments associated by 
membership are presented as progressive by particular institutions – that are 
interpreted as neoliberal civil society - that aspire to produce ‘objective and 
scientific’ knowledge. They have a role to articulate ideas in favour of 
membership on sensitive topics at critical junctures. They are also instrumental 
for organic intellectuals of capital to endorse membership on a universal 
terrain. Yet, it is plausible to unfold their organic links with capital and to read 
them as ‘fortresses and earthworks’ (Gramsci, 1971: 238) that consolidates 
neoliberal membership project.  
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Chapter 6 - Labour Debating European Membership Perspective within 
the Struggle against Globalisation 
6.1) Introduction
In the previous chapter I have analyzed the position of capital vis-a-vis 
globalisation and membership question. I have argued that internationally-
oriented capital pioneers membership that is presented as an anchor to 
stimulate competitiveness and to consolidate a functioning market economy 
model. The EU is equally presented as an anchor to consolidate democracy and 
a peaceful project. Contrary to the propounded hypothesis that it can be 
expected from nationally oriented capital to oppose membership as it will 
increasingly be exposed to competitiveness in the global market, it either 
adopts to globalisation by a strategy of promoting `national champions` by 
export-promotion - that is seen as the only viable strategy of survival in the 
global period - or integrates with transnational production structure via 
outsourcing and/or contract manufacturing. The chapter concludes by 
conveying the idea that pro-membership project is pioneered by internationally 
oriented capital and adopted by nationally oriented capital. 
In this chapter, I am primarily concerned with the position of labour vis-a-vis
membership. It is debated by situating labour question within the context of 
globalisation and neoliberal restructuring. I follow a similar method and 
analyse labour movement and intra-class struggle in both nationally and 
internationally oriented industries. What strategies does labour develop vis-a-
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vis globalisation and where does labour stand vis-a-vis membership within the 
structure of transnationalisation of production? Can labour come up with an 
alternative to neoliberal pro-membership perspective? And if not, how can we 
account for their failure to develop an alternative? 
It might be expected that the Turkish labour movement would develop a critical 
stance towards EU membership in light of the fact that participation in the 
Internal Market would increase the pressures of competition on Turkish 
industry, leading to cuts in wages and social standards. Yet, following Bieler, it 
should be noted that globalisation has engendered cross-class alliances between 
nationally oriented and internationally/transnationally oriented capital and 
labour (Bieler, 2000: 155). Accordingly, the hypothesis I wish to analyse in 
relation to labour debate is as follows: trade unions that are organised in 
internationally oriented sectors – sectors that are integrated with the European 
production structure via the Customs Union – can be expected to develop a 
supportive stance to membership as they have already been economically 
integrated with the Internal Market and will conceive of regional integration as 
a mechanism providing protectionism against globalisation (incentive for 
positive integration) and membership as a platform to regain rights that are lost 
at the national level. On the contrary, trade unions organising workers for 
nationally oriented sectors will develop a more critical stance with concerns 
over de-industrialisation and de-unionisation as they will increasingly be 
exposed to pressures of competitiveness and loss in welfare gains (these claims 
further draw on the work of Bieler, 2000: 48; 2005: 461; 2006: 42). 
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I have interviewed trade unions organized in the internationally oriented textile 
and automotive industries; and trade unions in the nationally oriented 
agricultural sector and public employees. Whilst the former is well embedded 
within global markets, the latter would be negatively affected by increased 
exposure to globalisation. Furthermore, agriculture is a sheltered sector and 
agricultural products are not included in the Customs Union (with the 
exception of processed products), so the sector would be newly exposed to 
competition by products from EU countries. Trade unions organized in public 
sector are examined as nationally oriented expected to develop a critical stance 
vis-a-vis globalisation, privatization and de-regulation considering that they 
would be placed under increased pressure from neoliberal forces calling for 
social cuts and public sector 'efficiency'. Indeed, the public sector has already 
been subjected to structural adjustment reforms by the AKP Government, with 
budgetary cuts and the introduction of 'flexible employment' for public 
employees. Moreover, agricultural labour and public employees will be 
exposed to cuts in subsidies and social benefits with negative welfare 
implications in line with neoliberal measures of disciplining ‘state budget’.
The chapter begins by analysing the position of trade unions operating in 
internationally and nationally oriented production sectors in relation to 
globalisation and EU membership. This is followed by analysing the reasons 
behind their failure to form a united front to oppose neoliberal restructuring via 
the EU membership perspective. 
204
6.2) Operationalising Labour and Intra-Class Struggle
As it stands, the main division in labour is between industrial workers and 
public employees. There is no differentiation on the basis of industrial workers 
employed in the public sector and the private sector. The structure is highly 
fragmented. There are three confederations for industrial workers: the Türk-İş, 
Disk and Hak-İş; and four confederations for public employees: The 
Confederation of Unions of Public Employees of Turkey (Türk Kamu-Sen), the 
Confederation of Public Employees Trade Unions (Kesk), the Confederation of 
Public Servants Trade Unions (Memur-Sen) and the Confederation of United 
Public Workers' Unions (Birleşik Kamu-İş).
  
Internationally oriented labour is examined through the textile and automotive 
industries and Disk and Hak-İş confederations. There is no public sector in the 
textile industry (Interview No. 9, 31 and 45). Approximately 70% of textiles 
production is exported, and 50% of these exports are conducted with the EU 
(Interview No. 31). In the automotive industry, the United Metal Workers' 
Union (Birleşik Metal-İş) is organised only in the private sector, and operates 
in the metal, automotive, coal and steel sectors. During the last two decades, 
most of the enterprises in which Birleşik Metal-İş is organised began to operate 
in international markets, or became integrated within transnational production 
structures by operating as supplier enterprises for international firms (Interview 
No. 67). At the confederation level, the Diskxv is primarily organised in the 
private sector and has 420,000 members (Interview No. 12). Parallel to the 
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development of globalisation, it has begun to organise in international and 
multinational enterprises as well (Interview No. 33). Hak-İş is mainly 
organised in the private sector (accounting for approximately 80% of the firms 
in which it organises) and operates mostly in big enterprises – including 
transnational firms and former state economic enterprises that have been 
privatised (Interview No. 28 and 56).
Nationally oriented labour is analysed in relation to the agricultural sector and 
public employment. The Türk-İşxvi confederation is organised among industrial 
workers in public economic enterprises that primarily produce industrial goods 
for the domestic market. Türk-İş has the highest number of industrial union 
membership at the confederation level. Privatisation is transforming its 
membership profile in favour of private sector, though – with the exception of 
the textile and metal sectors – Türk-İş is still fundamentally organised in the 
public sector (Interview No. 2). In agriculture, both the Turkish Forestry-Soil 
Water, Agriculture and Agricultural Workers Trade Union (Tarım-İş) and the 
Real Trade Union for Workers in Agriculture, Land and Water Industry (Öz 
Tarım-İş) are mostly organised in the public sector (Interview No. 56 and 78). 
As the public sector decreases in size as a result of structural adjustment 
policies privatisation and sub-contracted work (outsourcing within public 
sector) increases. As a result, the interviewee from Tarım-İş remarked that 
membership has reduced from 25 branches organising 20,000 workers in 2000, 
to 10 branches organizing 13,000 workers in the last decade (Interview No. 
78). Additionally, the Union of Public Employees in Agriculture and Forestry 
of Turkey (Türk Tarım-Orman-Sen) and the Agriculture and Forestry Union 
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(Tarım Orman-İş) organise public employees in agriculture, forestry, animal 
husbandry and environment.
Public employees can be expected to develop a critical stance vis-a-vis
globalisation and neoliberal restructuring that is consolidated via membership 
perspective. Neoliberal restructuring entails social cuts in the welfare state and 
declining employment in public sector. The neoliberal campaign against the 
'inefficient public sector' has created new spheres for private initiative. 
Moreover, as the state has withered away from regulating relations of 
distribution, public employees have seen decreasing standards of welfare. As 
Robinson has noted, in addition to extensive enlargement to new geographies, 
capitalism operates by intensive enlargement through the deepening of 
commodification to include new spheres (such as health and education), 
incorporating them to logics of profit and capitalist production (Robinson, 
2004: 6-7). Intensive enlargement and capitalist penetration in new spheres -
such as health system and education – and commodification have negative 
welfare repercussion for public employees. Henceforth, it can be expected that 
they will develop a critical stance that can once again only be unveiled through 
empirical research.  
Trade unionism among public employees flourished during the 1990s. 
Although public employees initially sought to be organised within established 
industrial unions and confederations, they faced a number of legislative 
obstacles. Thus, a separate platform was created for public employees. It must 
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be noted, however, that political authority developed a strategy which sought to 
keep this movement illegal: as the first law in this regard (numbered 4688) was 
enacted in 2002, constituting a huge disappointment for public employees. Law 
4688 bans the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike that is 
interpreted by an interviewee as a strategy to reduce confederations to the 
status of an association (Interview No. 68).
Public employees are organised in four confederations. Türk Kamu-Sen has 
370,000 members and is organised in eleven branches in the public sector. It 
criticises trade unionism conducted on the basis of class struggle, articulating 
instead unionism as a social mechanism. It places emphasis on strengthening 
central authority and the state and defines its ideology as one of nationalism 
(Interview No. 48 and 57). Kesk has 250,000 members: it promotes class 
struggle and believes struggles for democracy and the Kurdish problem to be 
inseparable from class (Interview No. 68). Memur-Sen increased its 
membership from 35,000 in 2005 to 400,000 in 2010 under the AKP hegemony 
(Interview No. 48). This is through a policy of populism and the creation of a 
'labour aristocracy'. Memur-Sen defines its approach to trade unionism as 
'societal trade unionism', and advocates collaborative capital-labour relations 
built around social partnership (Interview No. 61). Birleşik Kamu-İş currently 
has 30,000 members (Interview No. 54) and was founded in 2008 by former 
Kesk members. Eğitim-Sen is a trade union organising teachers affiliated with 
Kesk. It defended the right of students to be educated in their specific mother 
tongue including Kurdish, resulting in another split among public employees 
over issues concerning Kurdish and Turkish nationalism. Particular Kesk 
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members accused Kesk of orienting unionism to solve the Kurdish problem. 
They claimed that this undermined unionism's basic principles, placing class 
struggle in a secondary position (Interview No. 54). They founded Birleşik 
Kamu-İş.
6.3) Labour, Globalisation and European Integration
6.3.1) Internationally Oriented Labour 
6.3.1.1) Internationally Oriented Labour and Globalisation: ‘Another 
Globalisation is Possible’
Trade unions organised in internationally oriented sectors define globalisation 
as 'irresistible' (Interview No. 31). Disk considers globalisation as a process 
which creates a new division between countries whose production is based on 
advanced technologies produced by a skilled work force; and countries whose 
production is less reliant on technology, is labour intensive and relies on an 
unskilled work force (Disk, 1996: 69). Turkey falls within the latter category 
and the state operates to 'intensify the exploitation of labour' by overlooking 
unionist demands and creating divisions among the working class in the 
interests of being competitive in international markets (Disk, 1996: 69; Disk, 
2000a: 6). Globalisation decreases the bargaining power of labour and 
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generates de-unionization, whilst flexible, part-time and atypical forms of work 
increases (Interview No. 31 and 45; Disk, 2004b: 21 and 27). It creates 
opportunities for capital to attack demands for unionisation and collective 
bargaining by threatening to move to other countries or cut wages for the sake 
of competitiveness (Interview No. 3, 45 and 67). Additionally, globalisation 
alters the stable industrial bases of the Fordist period and transforms the 
structure of enterprises through mergers, takeovers and contract work, 
processes which further serve to make it difficult for unions to organise 
workers. More importantly, globalisation attacks internationalism by 
generating competition and antagonism among workers in developed and 
developing countries (Interview No. 67). At the ideological level, meanwhile, 
Disk believes that globalisation endorses individualism and weakens 
collectivism (Interview No. 67).
Indeed, the position of internationally oriented labour vis-a-vis globalisation 
corresponds to the expectation from the hypothesis. Globalisation is taken as a 
fact that necessitates a struggle at the international level. It is stated that free 
movement of capital has 'dynamited' social rights acquired at the national level 
(Interview No. 33) and globalisation necessitates re-thinking about unionism 
(Disk, 1996: 69). Globalisation has transformed the structure of production 
from big industrial complexes and mass production to small workplaces which 
employ three to five workers in informal economies, often in atypical and/or 
part-time employment. Accordingly, the classical tools of struggle operative 
during the Fordist period (such as strikes and unionisation on the basis of 
'industrial sectors') have to be further developed in the global era to integrate 
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these excluded groups into the working class (Interview No. 68). From this 
perspective, internationally oriented labour conceives of the 
internationalisation of labour as the only viable way to struggle against 
globalisation (Disk, 1996: 70-72 and 2004a: 35; Interview No. 12). Disk, 
therefore, believes that ‘another globalisation, in the interest of workers, is 
possible’ (Interview No. 33). Indeed, Disk refers to the strategies of 
international solidarity to enable collective bargaining at the international level, 
a move designed to organise all workers employed in a multinational enterprise 
(Interview No. 12 and 33). Interviewees gave concrete examples of 
international solidarity such as 'social responsibility declarations' and/or 
framework agreementsxvii (Interview No. 12, 33, 67 and 68).
Disk believes that trade unions should not confine their struggles to collective 
bargaining, however. They seek a united struggle of ‘societal resistance’, 
designed to create unity among retired and unemployed people, white-collar 
workers, female labour, students, migrant workers, peasants and workers 
employed in informal economies, as part-time and atypical work is promoted 
(Interview No. 12; Disk, 1996: 70-71; Disk, 2000a; Disk, 2004b). They argue 
that the strategy of international capital is gendered and that globalisation 
targets women as a form of cheap labour easily employed in atypical forms of 
work within the informal economy. This leads to labour migration among 
women, especially within the service sector (Disk, 2004a: 30 and 32).
Moreover, in each capitalist crisis, female workers are expected to make 
sacrifices first (Disk, 2004b). Disk reads the confining of unionism to 
collective bargaining as a neoliberal strategy demarcating class struggle as a 
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form of narrow economism. This is done to block organic links between trade 
unions and politics, and to present trade unions as narrowly 'utilitarian' 
platforms with concerns over collective bargaining (Disk, 2000b). This effort 
can only be addressed by questioning capitalism ideologically through class 
consciousness and class struggle (Disk, 2000b). It is this position in trade 
unionism that renders the Disk foremost among other trade unions to read EU 
as a capitalist integration model. 
Hak-İş – the second confederation I engage in this chapter as internationally 
oriented labour – perceives globalisation in a positive light, believing that it 
engenders economic growth through the transformation of inefficient state 
enterprises and the questioning of traditional power mechanisms between the 
state and so-called 'big capital' (Interview No. 28). Hak-iş internalizes the 
conditioning of employment to economic growth (Interview No. 3) whilst a 
policy of internationalism and regionalism is seen as the only way to struggle 
against globalisation (Interview No. 46). Indeed, particular trade unions 
affiliated with Hak-İş are organized in transnational enterprises such as Real 
Trade Union for Workers in Food and Tobacco and Beverages Industry (Öz 
Gıda-İş) that conceive transnational corporations as preferable platforms to 
organize workers when compared with national enterprises. The interviewee 
argues that transnational corporations are more inclined to safeguard rule of 
law and social standards (Interview No. 46). It is my contention that Hak-İş –
and its associated unions – constitutes a social force that gives consent to AKP 
hegemony and its neoliberal socio-economic content, and should be included in 
the neoliberal historical bloc. They operate as agents of trasformismo by 
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organising disadvantaged groups within a neoliberal form of unionism (as I 
argued in chapter four). In this sense, their references to internationalism are 
deficient as they fail to advocate class struggle at the national level. As it will 
further be elaborated below, it is only Hak-İş that internalizes conception of 
labour-capital relations around the notion of social partnership.   
6.3.1.2) Membership and Internationally Oriented Labour in Manufacturing
In line with the hypothesis, both Disk and Hak-İş support EU membership, 
though they do so for different reasons. Disk defines the EU as a capitalist 
integration model, but supports membership, citing the belief that 'another 
Europe is possible' (Disk, 2000a: 8-9; Interview No. 12). This motto confirms 
the assumption that internationally oriented labour would defend membership 
to regain their bargaining power that is lost at the national level due to 
globalisation. Yet, the interviewees from Disk did not raise any concerns 
regarding integration into the Internal Market – which reveals that workers 
they organise are employed in workplaces that are already integrated with the 
European market via the Customs Union. Indeed, they stated that Turkey has 
already been economically affected by the completion of the Customs Union
(Interview No. 33). Thus, the membership debate is interpreted in relation to 
political criteria and social policy (Disk, 2000a: 33), with the EU seen as a tool 
which can be used to develop social conditionsxviii in Turkey (Interview No. 12 
and 33). Additionally, interviewee from Disk noted that membership will 
provide free movement of workers (Interview No. 33). The membership 
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process is also read as instrumental for the consolidation of democracy in 
Turkey. It is argued that as Turkey lacks the social base for democratisation 
and the reformation of union and minority rights, an international anchor is 
needed to enable it to develop (Interview No. 9). Thus, Disk develops a 
'holistic' stance which underlines that – in Turkey – problems of labour cannot 
be separated from democratisation and the Kurdish problem (Disk, 2000b).
In this sense, the Kurdish problem is posited as another reason for supporting 
Turkish membership of the EU. Disk stipulates that finding a democratic 
solution to the Kurdish problem and increasing unionisation are two priorities 
for the consolidation of democracy (Disk, 1996: 24 and 30). Additionally, the 
EU is seen as a peaceful project capable of providing the stimulus for a 
decrease in military spending on combating terror in Eastern Turkey and vis-a-
vis Greece (Interview No. 33). The membership process is thus understood in 
relation to internationalism and is seen as integral to the development of 
mechanisms of compromise in international relations which combat the 
nationalist reflexes that have historically defined Turkey's attitude to Cyprus, 
Armenia and the Kurdish problem (Interview No. 9 and 12).
Hak-İş has changed its stance on European membership since the 1990s, when 
it pursued a critical approach to the Customs Union and European integration, 
neatly summed up by the phrase: 'they are the partners and we are the market' 
(Interview No. 3 and 28). Now, Hak-İş has maintained a policy of 
unconditional support for membership in all its economic, political and social 
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dimensions, without any 'reservations' (Interview No. 46). The interviewee 
identified the European Social Model as an 'ideal model' for industrial relations 
(Interview No. 3); and the EU is read as a democratisation project and an 
'anchor' to 'civilize' politics through freedom of speech and a culture of 
dialogue (Interview No. 3 and 46).
Notably, the unionism advocated by Hak-İş operates within neoliberalism. This 
stance is identified by Cox as 'social partnership in Western Europe and 
business unionism in North America' (1987: 374). Hak-İş describes its 
approach to trade unionism as facilitating an 'industrial democracy' (Interview 
No. 3) – an aim compatible with the mechanisms of 'social dialogue' proposed 
by the European model. Moreover, Hak-İş conceives of 'class' as a social 
phenomenon rather than a 'front' (Interview No. 3 and 46). In this sense, it is 
argued that labour and capital are 'social partners' and trade unionism should be 
conducted on the basis of cooperation rather than conflict (Interview No. 45). 
Accordingly, Hak-İş conceives of competitiveness and quality as 'common' 
problems shared by both workers and employers; and of social dialogue as an 
important mechanism to facilitate cooperation (Interview No. 28). Analogous 
to this, collective bargaining is not defined as a frontal battleground, but rather 
a 'technical platform' (Interview No. 3). Additionally, Hak-İş presents itself as 
offering a 'private sector trade unionism' and discredits public sector unionism 
for being 'bureaucratic' and conducting wage bargaining, a tool that it believes 
has become 'obsolescent' due to its failure to adopt to the challenges posed by 
global capitalism (Interview No. 46). It is argued that rather than 'conducting 
trade unionism on the basis of slogans', Hak-İş is 'efficient', contributing to an 
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increase in the 'quality, efficiency and competition' of the workplace; an 
approach that in return saves the workplace and generates employment 
(Interview No. 28). 
6.3.1.3) Position of Labour in Textile and Automotive Sectors
Labour organised in textile and automotive industries are content with the 
economic repercussions of liberalisation. They note that Turkey conducts more 
than 50% of its trade with the EU (Interview No. 9) and interpret the Customs 
Union positively as it consolidated market principles, rendering the textile 
sector competitive in global markets (Interview No. 45). Thus, concurrent with 
the expectation from the hypothesis internationally oriented labour has already 
integrated with the European production structure and is no longer concerned 
with the repercussions of participating in the Internal Market (Interview No. 31 
and 45).
Accordingly, membership is defended in relation to social policy conceiving of 
the EU as a platform to regain bargaining rights at the international level. In 
defending Turkish membership of the EU, textile labour refers to social policy. 
Interviewees affiliated with Tekstil-İş and Öz İplik-İş highlight that the 
European Social Model will improve working conditions in Turkey (Interview 
No. 9 and 45). Moreover, the EU is seen as an anchor triggering political 
reforms that will develop trade unionism, improve human rights and help 
consolidate democracy. They argue that the current political system rests on a 
216
political 'oligarchy': a top-down approach that leaves the social base 
underdeveloped (Interview No. 9). As the Customs Union is completed without 
positive integration, an additional argument to support membership is endorsed 
that membership will bring social standards (Interview No. 67). 
However, the Teksif and Birleşik Metal-İş unions adopt a more critical stance. 
The interviewee from Teksif argued that the Customs Union has curtailed 
domestic production as Turkish producers cannot compete with products from 
East Asia, which are covered by the EU's free trade agreements. This pressure 
to compete with Asian products has resulted in further de-unionisation and an 
increase in atypical work (Interview No. 31). Despite this, Teksif welcomes the 
economic and social repercussions of membership, basing the majority of its 
criticism on the potential for the EU to interfere with Turkey's 'national 
interests' in relation to Cyprus and the Kurdish problem (Interview No. 31). 
It is the Birleşik Metal-İş that believes EU integration and enlargement to be 
capitalist processes operating to the disadvantage of labour (Interview No. 67). 
Moreover, the interviewee noted that trade unions in other European countries 
did not secure advances in social policy through EU integration but rather 
national legislation (Interview No. 67).  
  
217
6.3.2) Nationally Oriented Labour 
6.3.2.1) Nationally Oriented Labour and Globalisation as De-unionisation and 
De-industrialisation
Nationally oriented labour is expected to develop a critical stance to 
globalisation and membership as they will be increasingly exposed to pressures 
of competitiveness resulting in closure of workplaces that they are employed. 
Moreover, globalisation entails de-unionisation and cuts in social standards 
gained at the national level. In line with this expectation, Türk-İş, agriculture 
sector and public employees oppose globalisation due to its effects on industry 
and the welfare state. However, when it comes to the membership question, the 
issues are either considered in isolation from globalisation, or EU membership 
is supported due to the perceived benefits in social policy and/or agricultural 
funds. Thus, these groups have developed a policy of 'membership on equal 
terms and conditions', highlighting that their support is conditional on Turkey 
benefitting from structural funds and the free movement of workers.
The interviewee from Türk-İş accused globalisation of generating de-
industrialisation and de-unionisation, with negative effects on economic 
development. Export-orientation endows capital with the capacity to search for 
cheaper intermediate goods in world markets, meaning that globalisation forces 
the closure of domestic enterprises that cannot compete with global prices 
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(Interview No. 34). They also believe that it provides capital with the 
opportunity to move to other countries (Interview No. 56) and that so-called 
economic ‘growth’ fails to generate employment (Interview No. 34). 
Agricultural labour argues that globalisation operates to create markets for 
international capital by curbing domestic production through direct support 
mechanisms, providing subsidies on the basis of land rather than production 
(Interview No. 47). The interviewees highlighted that Turkey is no longer 
agriculturally self-sufficient due to globalisation (Interview No. 48 and 78). In 
this sense, globalisation curbs domestic production, impoverishes the 
agricultural sector; and generates proletarianisation, internal migration and 
illegal work (Interview No. 30 and 47). Public employees criticize 
globalisation and the neoliberal campaign against the 'inefficient public sector', 
arguing that it generates commodification and views 'profitability' rather than 
the 'public good' as the determinant factor in the provision of public services 
(Interview No. 47 and 68). Privatisation, they note, curbs employment in the 
public sector and the state withdraws from fundamental sectors such as 
education and health (Interview No. 57 and 68). There is an increase in 
individualism and collectivism is eroded (Interview No. 54).
The effects of globalisation on social policy are also highlighted. It is noted 
that globalisation curbs the welfare state (Interview No. 48 and 52) and 
generates de-unionisation as national oriented capital squeezes wages and cuts 
working standards by invoking the need for 'competitiveness' (Interview No. 30 
and 61). It weakens the bargaining power of labour (Interview No. 56). In the 
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agricultural sector, globalisation is seen to engender impoverishment, 
unemployment, the rise of informal economies and internal migration 
(Interview No. 56 and 78). It is believed to increase unemployment and 
threaten the stability of employment for public sector employees (Interview 
No. 68). For instance, rather than creating employment, public schools turn to 
private firms to obtain services (Interview No. 68). The public sector is 
especially concerned by cuts made to the welfare state (Interview No. 47). 
Interviewees from public sector unions criticised the expansion of income 
disparities and decreasing welfare for public employees which have arisen 
from globalisation (Interview No. 54 and 61).
6.3.2.2) Membership and Nationally Oriented Labour in Manufacturing
Concurrent with the expectation from the hypothesis, the Türk-İş that organizes 
state economic enterprises opposed membership conceiving of the EU as an 
imperialist integration bloc seeking to dismember Turkey. However, its stance 
has changed in the last decade on the grounds that economic integration has 
already been completed via the Customs Union and membership can contribute 
to improve social standards in Turkey. Hence, contrary to the assumption that 
nationally oriented labour would develop a critical stance, Türk-İş supports 
membership with reserving that membership has to be attained on 'equal terms 
and conditions'. 
In the 1990s, Türk-İş' stance was critical towards the European social model 
and sceptical about the viability of internationalism as a strategy against 
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globalisation. This was largely based around the work of Yıldırım Koçxix
(1998, 2004 and 2006), who can be treated as an 'organic intellectual', decisive 
in shaping the policies of Türk-İş from 1993 to 2002. To quote Gramsci:
`every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an 
essential function in the world of economic production, creates together 
with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it 
homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the 
economic but also in the social and political fields` (Gramsci, 1971: 5).
In this sense, writings of Koç shed light to the former Türk-İş stance. Koç reads 
the EU as an imperialist bloc. He contends that workers of core and peripheral 
countries will not cooperate due to imperialism. He proceeds to argue that 
European trade unions are 'partners' with capital, as they share the surplus from 
imperialist exploitation. He asserts that supporting membership in the belief 
that it will result in improved social policy is a fatal mistake (2006: 71 and 
106), and draws an analogy between struggle against membership perspective 
and the Independence War of the Republic against imperialism. This leads him 
to the claim that the nation state can act as a site of resistance against 
imperialism and consolidate welfare regimes (Koç, 1998: 254 and 2004: 10-
11). In 2001, Türk-İş initiated a campaign resisting common projects financed 
through the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) by the MEDA 
resources and published a booklet, written by Koç, asserting that the EU did 
not intend to take Turkey as a member on 'equal terms and conditions', but 
rather was pursuing a colonial strategy designed to dismantle its unitary state 
structure (Koç, 2001: 12-14). Türk-İş presented a report to President Ahmet 
Necdet Sezer, highlighting that whilst Türk-İş would support full membership 
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of the EU, they believed that EU policy was reviving the Sevres Treatyxx and 
seeking to dismember Turkey (Türk-İş, 2002d).
This policy has been re-considered during the last decade, however.  In 2005, 
the Türk-İş administration launched its 'Brussels Initiative' and organised a 
conference in collaboration with the Central Organisation of Finnish Trade 
Unions (SAK), signifying a turning point in Türk-İş policy. Its former stance 
was criticised for excessive nationalism and for isolating Türk-İş from the 
accession process (Interview No. 1). Contrary to its previous position, Türk-İş 
now conceives the process of EU membership as presenting an opportunity to 
improve union rights and freedoms (Türk-İş, 2007: 12). Accordingly – though 
it decided to retain reservations concerning EU membership in relation to 
political issues such as the Kurdish, Cyprus and Armenian problems – it 
developed a policy in support of the membership process, premised on a belief 
that it would lead to improved social conditions. This policy seeks – and is 
named – 'membership on equal terms and conditions' (Interview No. 1). With 
it, Türk-İş argues that the process of becoming a full member of the EU can 
help Turkey realise the right to unionise, guarantee work; and fight against 
informal economies and unemployment. Additionally, it is believed that the EU 
can act as an anchor for the implementation of the European Social Charter and 
standards of International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Interview No. 2).
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6.3.2.3) Agriculture as a Sheltered Sector
It is expected that agricultural sector would oppose membership considering 
that it is a sheltered sector that is protected from liberal trade. Moreover, it is 
not included in the Customs Union and thus will be negatively affected from 
participating in the Internal Market via membership. Membership and 
liberalisation will lead to closure of small farms and de-unionisation and 
further cuts from state subsidies. However, trade unions in the agriculture 
sector are divided on the issue of whether EU membership will provide a form 
of protectionism against the forces of globalisation or trigger further 
liberalisation. On the one hand, it is argued that EU membership entails further 
liberalisation that has to be resisted. The Tarım-İş and Tarım Orman-İş oppose 
membership and criticise the socio-economic content it would impose. They 
argue that membership will not provide economic welfare, nor result in 
improvements to social policy (Interview No. 47 and 78). The EU is read as a 
capitalist union (Interview No. 78), shaped in parallel with the liberal policies 
of the WB and WTO (Interview No. 47). In this sense, it is argued that 
integration into the Internal Market will result in de-unionisation, the sub-
contraction of work, increases in black market work and further drops in social 
standards as a result of the pressures of being 'competitive' (Interview No. 78). 
They criticise the European social model, and the conception of 'social 
partners', arguing that this policy not only aims to protect the workplace but 
puts labour under the tutelage of capital (Interview No. 47 and 78). Moreover, 
the European Social Model is understood as a mechanism designed to sustain 
imperial exploitation (Interview No. 47).
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On the other hand, it is also posited that agriculture has already been subjected 
to liberalisation as a result of structural adjustment policies adopted in parallel 
with WTO and WB rules. In this view, the EU as a regional model can provide 
protectionism from globalisation. The interviewee from Türk Tarım-Orman-
Sen, takes globalisation as a fact and supports regionalism as a mechanism for 
protection (Interview No. 48). From this perspective, the EU's agricultural 
funds and social policies are viable mechanisms for the protection of 
agriculture. The EU's agricultural policy is also depicted as a 'model' directed 
to providing self-sufficiency and protecting domestic production (Interview 
No. 48), in contradiction with the policies of WTO, IMF and WB (Interview 
No. 48).
However, agricultural trade unions are united on political issues. They believe 
that the EU discriminates against Turkey in relation to the Cyprus problem, 
asking for unilateral concessions from national interests regarding problems 
with Cyprus and Greece (Interview No. 48 and 78); and supports a separatist 
solution to the Kurdish problem (Interview No. 48). Thus, they reject the idea 
that the EU is a democratisation project, arguing that its imperialism functions 
as an impediment to the consolidation of democracy (Interview No. 47). 
Indeed, they believe that democratic regimes can only be stabilised by internal 
societal dynamics (Interview No. 78). They reject the EU's position on issues 
such as privileged partnerships, permanent derogations on the free movement 
of workers, and structural funds (Interview No. 48).
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6.3.2.4) Position of Public Employees
Public employees are also presumed to take a critical stance vis-a-vis
membership. As pro-membership process entails further liberalisation, public 
sectors – such as education and health - would be subjected to privatisation and 
commodification. Additionally, they would also negatively be affected from 
social cuts and withering away of the welfare state. However, contrary to this 
assumption, public sector unions are supportive of EU membership. 
The Kesk sees the EU as a capitalist integration model and criticise its socio-
economic content. However, it reads the EU membership in relation to the 
consolidation of democracy reasoning that Turkey currently lacks the 
necessary social base for it to develop internally (Interview No.68). It is also 
posited that EU membership will force/enable Turkey to improve social policy 
and contribute to find a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem (Interview 
No. 68).
Memur-Sen and Türk Kamu-Sen support the socio-economic content of 
membership. Memur-Sen is in favour of a free market economy and believes 
membership would be progressive as it would increase welfare provision 
through increasing exports and attracting investment (Interview No. 61). 
Participation in the Internal Market is seen in a positive light, with the belief 
that it would increase standards for public employees (Interview No. 61).
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Moreover, they interpret European social model as an ‘ideal’ type fostering 
dialogue in industrial relations (Interview No. 61). Similarly, Türk Kamu-Sen 
is positive regarding EU membership, believing that it would result in the 
adoption of international norms and rules regarding social policy, and the 
elimination of restrictions on the freedoms and rights of unions.  It maintains a 
critical stance towards the effects EU membership would have on key political 
issues, however (Interview No. 57). Türk Kamu-Sen accuses the EU of 
discriminating against Turkey with regards to Cyprus by asking for 
concessions from national interests; and adopting a separatist perspective over 
the Kurdish and Armenian issues (Interview No. 48). 
It is only the Birleşik Kamu-İş that opposes membership. Birleşik Kamu-İş 
reads the EU as an imperialist bloc founded upon the exploitation of 
developing countries. It defends internationalism but criticizes the European 
working class for sharing in the surplus extracted through imperialist 
exploitation (Interview No. 54). They further argue that the EU as an 
imperialist power is inclined to develop strategies to dismember Turkey 
(Interview No. 54). 
6.3.3) Intra-Labour Debate: Why not a united front among labour?
The reasons for division among working class are manifold that has to be 
unravelled in clarifying the reasons for the failure of the left to come up with a 
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counter-hegemonic project against pro-membership perspective. These are 
explained below in relation to structural factors and reasons stemming from 
national trajectory. As far as structural factors are concerned, globalisation has 
generated two processes: an intra-class struggle between internationally and 
nationally oriented labour (Bieler 2000: 155), and the development of a 
cleavage between formal and informal labour (Bieler et. al., 2008a: 6), putting 
the latter at the risk of 'underbidding' and under constant 'threat of relocation' 
(Bieler et. al, 2008b: 272). My empirical research supports these observations. 
On the one hand, it reveals that labour organised in internationally oriented 
sectors is no longer concerned about unemployment and de-industrialisation 
that can arise from integration with the Internal Market. Additionally, as 
globalisation is increasingly accepted as a 'fact' – a process that cannot be 
reversed – analogous with transnationalisation of production undermining the 
struggle at the national level, internationalism and the struggle over 'social 
Europe' are defended. On the contrary, it is the nationally oriented labour that is 
concerned with economic repercussions of integrating in the Internal Market. 
They oppose globalisation and EU membership on the grounds that 
membership will generate de-industrialisation in addition to de-unionisation 
and hinder economic development.   
On the other hand, a considerable amount of nationally oriented labour 
operates in informal economy that weakens the base for unionisation. Notably, 
the bulk of SMEs and workers in the informal economy are not organised at all 
(Interview No. 28). This recalls Cox's description of working class polarisation 
within the form of hyper-liberal state, with a 'relatively secure and protected 
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minority, encompassed as a rule by enterprise corporatist relations' on one 
hand, 'and a fragmented and relatively unprotected majority of non-established 
workers' on the other (1987: 281). Notably, the mechanisms of 'wild capitalism' 
are operative mostly within the informal economies of domestically oriented 
enterprises in the private sector, which feature sub-contracted work and 
atypical forms of employment (Interview No. 33). Indeed, Turkey integrates 
into the transnational production structure with small workplaces within the 
informal economy. These function as sites of sub-contracted work and employ 
atypical labour, de-stabilising the production base for unionisation. It was 
highlighted in interviews that the classical tools of trade unionism target the 
small workplaces themselves rather than transnational capital, resulting in 
capital fleeing in response to demands for unionisation (Interview No. 30). 
Thus, globalization has reinforced the split among formal and informal labour 
in transnational chain of production. 
As far as reasons stemming from national trajectory are concerned, position of 
nationally oriented labour is weakening in the struggle. First, public economic 
enterprises, that constituted mass production sites under the period of import 
substitution policy, are privatised. The neoliberal campaign on `inefficient` 
public sector erodes production base and weakens position of nationally 
oriented labour. This process generates de-unionisation and the replacement of 
stable jobs with private sector positions built around competitive export-
promotion, which define labour as a 'production cost' (Interview No. 31).
Twenty-five thousand workers employed in public economic enterprises and 
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organised mostly within Türk-İş lost their jobs in the last two decades 
(Interview No. 34). 
Second, the right to strike is banned for public employees and legal restrictions 
place limits on their involvement in politics. These obstacles downgrade the 
status of public sector unions to 'associations' (Interview No. 52 and 54).
Third, there is also a cleavage between private sector and public sector 
unionism in industry. This cleavage prevented an effective common action in 
response to privatisation and its ideological attack that defines public sector as 
'inefficient'. Indeed, interviewees from both Disk and Hak-İş highlight that they 
face obstacles when seeking to organise labour in state economic enterprises 
due to the former's revolutionary ideological orientation and latter's organic 
links with political Islam (Interview No. 12 and 28). As the state directs 
workers to Türk-İş, it has created a platform to check and control the militant 
unionism of the 1970s and there is now a general understanding among Disk 
and Kesk that public sector trade unionism – often called 'yellow trade 
unionism' – is not progressive for class politics as it generates labour 
aristocracy and 'surrenders' by collaborating with the state and capital 
(Interview No. 67). It is argued that class consciousness is generated in the 
private sector (Interview No. 67). Hence, concomitant with Marx’s conception 
of capitalism to be historically progressive at a particular stage, there is an 
implicit assumption here that private sector would further consolidate capitalist 
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production relations that in turn will prepare the ground for the working class 
to form a class for itself. 
Fourth, the position of agriculture labour is marginalized. As processed 
agricultural products are included within the Customs Union, unions organized 
in food processing industry start to operate in international market and support 
membership (Interview No. 21), creating further fraction within the same 
sector. The EU agricultural policy is referred as a model to provide protection 
vis-a-vis globalisation (Interview No. 23). Seasonal work among agricultural 
workers causes 60% decrease in unionisation in winters, which renders 
membership profile fragile (Interview No. 26), and weakens agriculture trade 
unions to shape policies at the confederation level. Besides, Öz Tarım-İş 
conceives agriculture trade unions affiliated with other confederations as 
`rivals` and finds it problematic to organize joint platforms to discuss common 
concerns over agriculture sector independent of dialogue among confederations 
(Interview No. 26). 
Fifth, the AKP hegemony has created its own labour aristocracy, which 
conceives of unionism in terms of 'social partnership' rather than class struggle. 
Both Hak-İş among industrial workers and Memur-Sen in public employees are 
content to define themselves as `partners` to capital. For instance, Eğitim-Bir-
Sen (union organized in education affiliated with Memur-Sen), increased its 
membership from 2,000 in 2001 to 150,000 in 2010. The interviewee from 
Eğitim-Sen highlighted that this is not only related to its organic links with the 
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Government, but also a result of ‘new conception' of trade unionism that 
integrates market dynamics and operates on the promise of individual gains for 
members (such as promotions in public housing for those who join it). From 
such a perspective, trade unions act as a part of 'populist politics' and work to 
settle tensions in society endorsed by neoliberalism (Interview No. 52). For 
instance, when the AKP hegemony was in the process of transforming secure 
employment in the public sector, trade unions protested against the imposition 
of flexible, temporary forms of employment. To combat this, the AKP 
Government directed newly employed public sector workers on contract status 
(that is known as 4B status) to Memur-Sen. This was largely responsible for 
Memur-Sen increasing its membership from 35,000 in 2005 to 400,000 in 2012 
(Interview No. 48). In return, Memur-Sen is authorised to conduct collective 
bargaining, weakening opposition to new, insecure forms of employment and 
the imposition of flexible markets in the public sector (Interview No. 54).  
Interviewees from both Türk Kamu-Sen and Birleşik Kamu-İş criticised 
Memur-Sen for accepting 4B status whilst acting under the patronage of the 
Government (Interview No. 54 and 57). The mechanisms used to create a 
labour aristocracy are also evident in the fact that various municipalities ran a 
campaign under the slogan ‘either Hak-İş or no jobs’ in threatening workers to 
choose Hak-İş or be unemployed (Interview No. 12).
In view of these examples, I read these syndicalist trade unions as operations of 
trasformismo. I have argued in chapter four that the AKP power can be 
interpreted as an instance of trasformismo once it is defined in relation to the 
strategy of ruling class to co-opt potentially antagonistic groups to the capitalist 
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discipline. The AKP integrates potentially antagonist and disadvantaged groups 
from globalisation to the neoliberal project by drawing support from SMEs –
that is explicated in chapter five in debating nationally oriented capital - and 
low-income groups through populism. Hence, the AKP policies disarticulate 
dissent from globalisation and neoliberal restructuring by presenting itself as a 
`rupture` from previous right-wing political parties and main struggle in society 
as `public versus elites` via a populist discourse. I have also argued previously 
that social policy of the AKP rests on a hyper-liberal understanding that takes 
employment in relation to economic growth and prioritizes individualistic 
mechanisms such as charities and social assistance mechanisms. Notably, it is 
plausible to observe institutions among organized labour that are co-opted to 
this mechanisms of trasformismo under AKP hegemony and its neoliberal 
conception of social policy. It is only the confederations of Hak-İş among 
industrial workers and Memur-Sen in public employment that internalize 
definition of labour-capital relations as social partnership. They articulate 
market economy model and conceive of employment in relation to economic 
growth. More importantly, they are co-opted to the idea that `collective` 
problems of labour and capital can be addressed through mechanisms of social 
dialogue (Interview No. 28 and 61). In view of this, they subscribe to 
neoliberal understanding of social policy that puts survival of `workplace` at 
the centre and conceives of industrial relations as one of co-operation rather 
than conflict. That is why I have previously read reference of these groups to 
internationalism as deficient. 
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6.4) Conclusion
Turkey stands in the periphery of Europe. Throughout the research I have 
argued that EU membership question should not be read independent and 
autonomous from globalisation and neoliberal restructuring. Neoliberal 
restructuring, consolidation of market economy model and integration of 
Turkey`s production structure with transnational production are processes 
closely related with the European integration process. It was in the process of 
completing the Customs Union that Turkey eliminated its protectionism in 
trade. In the last two decades, financial liberalisation and monetary reforms are 
conducted under the surveillance of EU reform process. Indeed, the EU and 
IMF are often named as `double anchors` in presenting structural adjustment 
programmes. Moreover, it can be assumed that there is more space in Turkey to 
expect an alternative to neoliberal pro-membership perspective as Turkey 
completed the Customs Union prior to membership. To phrase alternatively, it 
is economically integrated with the EU via the Customs Union, a situation 
which fails to offer any benefits to socially disadvantaged groups. It is 
subjected to competition with European and global enterprises via the Customs 
Union without any compensatory social measures associated with full 
membership – such as regional funds; agricultural and structural funds; and the 
free movement of workers – mechanisms that result in the liberalisation of 
society and can serve to alleviate social tensions. This chapter has examined 
the position of labour and considers whether such an alternative has indeed 
emerged.   
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As the structure of production in Turkey is primarily integrated with global 
production via trade, I posit that an intra-class struggle is likely to develop 
between the nationally and internationally oriented production sectors. 
Accordingly, I have examined the following hypothesis in the Turkish case: 
trade unions that are organised in internationally oriented sectors – sectors that 
are integrated with the European production structure via the Customs Union –
can be expected to develop a supportive stance to membership conceiving of 
regional integration as a mechanism providing protectionism against 
globalisation (incentive for positive integration) and membership as a platform 
to regain rights that are lost at the national level. On the contrary, trade unions 
organising workers for nationally oriented sectors will develop a more critical 
stance with concerns over de-industrialisation and de-unionisation as they will 
increasingly be exposed to pressures of competitiveness and loss in welfare 
gains (these claims further draw on the work of Bieler, 2000: 48; 2005: 461; 
2006: 42). 
  
On the basis of the empirical research, I have argued that labour is split with 
regard to the membership question. On the one hand, internationally oriented 
labour - textile and automotive industries and Disk and Hak-İş confederations -
criticises globalisation for generating de-unionisation, increasing flexible work 
and putting labour on the defensive. However, globalisation is accepted as 
`irresistible` that can only be struggled at the international level. In this sense, 
in line with the hypothesis struggle at the international and European levels is 
defended, with the motto 'Another globalisation and Europe in the benefits of 
workers is possible' neatly stating the basic claim. Moreover, as the Customs 
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Union is already completed, there is no concern among internationally oriented 
sectors on the probable implications of participating to the Internal Market. In 
this view, struggle on economic integration is already lost in the 1990s with the 
completion of the Customs Union. Accordingly, membership is debated in 
relation to social policy and democratisation. Internationally oriented labour 
contends that European Social Model will contribute Turkey to improve its 
social standards and membership will offer free movement for workers. 
Moreover, societal dynamics in promoting democratisation in Turkey are 
believed to be constrained due to so-called `strong state` mechanisms. In this 
view, EU reform process is instrumental to contain instruments of strong state 
– military and Kemalist cadres - and stimulate democratisation, a reading of 
democracy and state that can be linked with discourse theory at the theoretical 
level.    
Yet, support to EU social regulation does not necessarily denote that 
internationally/transnationally oriented labour accords with neo-liberal 
restructuring (Bieler, 2006: 103). Indeed, although internationally oriented 
labour defends membership, its rationale is different from pro-membership 
project. In their view, globalisation has dynamited struggle at the national 
level. Moreover, the struggle over membership in the economic sphere is 
already lost with the completion of the Customs Union. That is why 
membership is debated in relation to social policy and democratisation. Indeed, 
Disk has not accepted neo-liberal restructuring and names EU as a capitalist 
integration model. However, it defends internationalism and conceives of EU 
membership as a platform of struggle to create Social Europe. It also defends 
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membership as a mechanism to regain trade unionist rights that suffered from 
severe setbacks following 1980 military coup and as a platform to check and 
balance excess market mechanism embedded within globalisation. Hence, I 
argue that support provided by the internationally oriented labour should not 
denote that it is incorporated to the pro-membership project and instead has to 
be analysed as an alternative rival class-strategy. They indeed defend Ha-vet 
(No – Yes) project - that stands as no to capitalist Europe but yes to Social 
Europe – supporting membership to create Social Europe (I will further 
elaborate this argument in the conclusion). 
Yet, I have also argued that particular unions – such as Hak-İş – internalise 
neo-liberal restructuring and their reference to internationalism is regressive
and deficient, as they fail to advocate a struggle at the national level. I have 
read these platforms in relation to trasformismo as they seek to integrate 
disadvantaged groups into the AKP hegemony. Hak-İş considers globalisation
positively and `progressive` to generate economic growth; internalises 
conception of employment in relation to economic growth; and is co-opted to 
neoliberal conception of social policy that defines labour-capital relations as 
social partners and prioritizes survival of `workplace` that can be secured via 
social dialogue. Moreover, rather than articulating a struggle at the European 
level for a more progressive one transcending European Social Model, they 
internalize market economy model and are content with mechanisms of social 
dialogue. Indeed, they consider European Social Model as an `ideal` model. 
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It is the nationally oriented labour that is presumed to develop a critical stance 
vis-a-vis membership as they will increasingly be exposed to pressures of 
competitiveness. In line with this hypothesis, the Türk-İş, agriculture sector 
and public employees interpret globalisation as generating two processes: de-
unionisation and de-industrialisation. It is seen to curb domestic production and 
negatively affect economic development/industrialisation. It impoverishes 
agricultural labour and generates proletarianisation and internal migration. It 
results in the commodification of the public sector and generates cuts to the 
welfare state and public sector employment. 
Yet, nationally oriented labour is divided on the socio-economic impact of 
European membership – on the question of whether membership will provide 
protection from globalisation via structural funds or will trigger further 
liberalisation. On the one hand, European integration is seen as a capitalist 
integration model and its policies coincide with policies of the WTO and WB. 
Thus, participating in the Internal Market will have negative economic 
implications and membership will engender de-industrialisation and cuts in 
social standards as a result of the pressures of being 'competitiveness'. 
Moreover, European social model rests on 'social partnership' that not only puts 
labour under the tutelage of capital but sustains imperialist exploitation in the 
periphery as well. European workers share the surplus created by imperialist 
exploitation. In this view, internationalism can hardly be pursued as long as 
imperialism endures. On the other hand, particular unions interpret 
membership as progressive to improve social standards after the struggle 
regarding the Customs Union is lost. Moreover, agricultural sector will be 
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exposed to competition in tandem with structural adjustment policies outside 
membership. In this view, regionalism provides protection against globalisation 
and common agricultural policy of the EU is in contradiction with structural 
adjustment policies of the WB. Yet, nationally oriented labour is united on 
national concerns. It is posited that the EU is an imperialist bloc directed to 
dismember Turkey by putting additional conditions regarding Cyprus, 
Armenian and Kurdish problems. Moreover, democracy can only be stabilized 
by internal dynamics rather than an incentive endorsed by an international 
anchor. 
On the basis of my empirical research on labour, it is possible to unravel two 
class strategies contesting pro-membership. The internationally oriented labour 
articulates a strategy of Ha-vet (No-Yes) that opposes capitalist nature of 
European integration but stands for Social Europe. In line with the hypothesis 
they are supportive of the membership process but for a different rationale. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, the nationally oriented labour supports membership 
on the condition that Turkey will benefit from social policy, structural funds 
and free movement of workers. Yet, it supports neo-mercantilist project that 
advocates `membership on equal terms and conditions` (this rival class strategy 
is further elaborated in the conclusion). However, the struggle over hegemony 
extends to political and civil society. Social forces have to be able to transcend 
their economic vested interests - the economic-corporate phase - in articulating 
their project on a universal plane for the hegemonic moment. It is this debate 
that is the main focus in the following chapter.
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Chapter 7 - Social Relations of Production and the Struggle in Political 
and Civil Society 
7.1) Introduction
Throughout the research, I have argued that it is the social relations of 
production that lie at the core of my analysis on the current struggle over 
hegemony. In this chapter, I aim to examine how the debate is reflected in 
political and civil society. There are two aims behind this endeavour. First, it 
enables us to comprehend whether there is any hegemonic pro-membership 
project. In other words, can the ruling class transcend its economic-corporate 
phase and present pro-membership project on a universal terrain? Second, it 
unravels the reasons behind the failure of rival class strategies to come up with 
an overall alternative in the struggle over hegemony. To phrase alternatively, it 
questions to what extent the counter-hegemonic social forces can transcend 
their economic corporate phase and contest pro-membership in political and 
civil society?  
Gramsci’s analyses on integral state and ethical state provide hints in 
understanding the role of state in the hegemonic struggle. Throughout the 
research, I have criticised conceiving of civil society and state as two separate 
and autonomous entities. In this chapter, the state is treated as a social 
relationship. Drawing on the work of Cox (1981: 145-46) on 
‘internationalisation of state’, state institutions are analysed in relation to state-
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society complex – ‘form of state’ - determined by pre-eminent accumulation 
strategy. It is neoliberal form of state that empowers state institutions linked to 
global economy such as finance ministries, central bank and prime ministers’ 
offices in shaping policies. It can be expected that these institutions will be in 
favour of membership as it entails a process of adjustment to ‘international 
rules’ determined by global consensus and transnationalisation of production. 
Contrarily, state institutions that are related to policies for groups 
disadvantaged from globalisation and welfare regime such as planning offices 
and ministries of labour can be expected to be sidelined and subordinated 
within national policy making due to their concerns over relations of 
distribution and welfare cuts.      
A second category is political parties. Gramsci attributes an essential role to 
political parties as the Modern Prince. I am primarily concerned with the role 
of political parties in the hegemonic struggle in reflecting upon and reacting to 
the interests of social forces. They are approached in relation to their social 
base. It is presupposed that right-wing political parties will pioneer 
membership akin to their support to globalisation. However, political parties 
whose social base rests on workers, SMEs, peasants and public employees can 
be expected to develop a more critical stance to globalisation and membership 
perspective.      
Following, I approach struggles against the discipline of capital over society as 
an instance of class struggle. In this I draw on van der Pijl's claim that 'the issue 
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is no longer that “capitalism” is showing signs of collapse, and “socialism” is 
around the corner. What is failing today is not capital but the capacity of 
society and nature to support its discipline` (van der Pijl, 1998: 48). Hence, 
class struggle is not confined to the manufacturing sector and my empirical 
research engages with women's rights/feminist groups, environmental groups 
and human right groups, and questions to what extent they might be able to 
form a united front with labour resisting EU membership and neoliberal 
restructuring.
The chapter starts with debating the stance of state institutions and political 
parties. I then turn to analyse struggles among alternative subjectivities in the 
extended sphere of social reproduction. In the next section of the chapter, I 
consider whether there is a united front among labour and struggles against the 
discipline of capital vis-a-vis the dominant neoliberal perspective regarding 
membership and explicate the reasons behind their failure to form a united 
front. 
7.2) Operationalising Political Society and Civil Society
7.2.1) State Institutions under the Neoliberal Form of State
The debate on hegemony is not limited to the society. Rather, it is the state and 
society as a social relationship that lies at the core of the struggle over 
hegemony. As argued in chapter three, the Gramscian notions of the integral 
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state and the ethical state pave the way to conceive of the state as a sphere of 
struggle over hegemony. Implicit in the concept of the integral state is the 
embedded relationship between political and civil society (Gramsci, 1971: 
263). Indeed, the role of state in the struggle is a salient feature in the thought 
of Gramsci.
`... the State must be conceived of as an “educator”, in as much as it 
tends precisely to create a new type or level of civilisation… because 
one is acting essentially on economic forces, reorganizing and 
developing the apparatus of economic production, creating a new 
structure, the conclusion must not be drawn that superstructural factors 
should be left to themselves, to develop spontaneously, to a haphazard 
and sporadic germination. The State, in this field, too, is an instrument 
of “rationalisation”, of acceleration and of Taylorisation. It operates 
according to a plan, urges, incites, and “punishes”…` (Gramsci, 1971: 
247).
Gramsci integrates role of the international sphere in understanding hegemonic 
struggle. However, it was Cox who comes up with the conceptual tool of 
'internationalisation of state'. This entails two processes: first, an intra-state 
compromise on adjusting national policies on the basis of needs and the 
requirements of international production; second, a transition in state structure 
that empowers ministries related to the economy (such as central banks, 
ministries of finance and prime ministers' offices) to transmit the global 
consensus to the national level (Cox, 1981: 146; 1987: 253-254).
On the basis of this framework, it can be expected that state institutions related 
to international production and linked to global economy will defend 
membership as Europeanisation entails a process within which state institutions 
will comply with `international rules` whereas institutions that develop policies 
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for segments of society disadvantaged by globalisation are more likely to be 
sidelined and subordinated in national policy-making over issues such as 
globalisation and EU membership. State institutions are analysed on the basis 
of two categories. First, the Central Bank of Turkey, the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Secretariat General for 
EU Affairs (ABGS) are examined as institutions related to the economy, and so 
as particularly influential in the shaping of policy in the neoliberal form of 
state. On the other hand, the DPT, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the Rural Affairs and Small and Medium 
Enterprises' Development Organisation (KOSGEB) are institutions whose 
influence in shaping policies are downgraded when compared with the period 
under the welfare nationalist state – when the form of state rested on the 
accumulation strategy of the ISI model of 1960s and 1970s. It is this category 
that is presupposed to develop a more critical stance vis-a-vis open economy 
and membership perspective.  
7.2.2) Political Party System 
Analogous to his activism inside the PSI and his role in founding the PCI, 
Gramsci names political parties as the new prince in the modern epoch. He 
establishes political parties as ‘the nomenclature for a class’ and attributes a 
central role in the hegemonic struggle that of forming a ‘collective will tending 
to become universal and total...’ by founding a new type of State (Gramsci, 
1971: 129, 247 and 152). Indeed, according to Gramsci, political parties do not 
‘mechanically’ express classes. Rather, they ‘react energetically upon them in 
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order to develop, solidify and universalize them` (Gramsci, 1971: 227). The 
role of political party as the ‘Modern Prince’ within revolutionary politics is 
debated in relation to historicizing Gramsci’s thought (Morton, 2007a: 207-
208). For instance, the idea of post-modern prince is conveyed drawing on and 
transcending beyond Gramsci’s Modern Prince - the communist party - with 
globalised forms of resistance (Gill, 2002: 244-248). This debate falls outside 
the scope of this research. Rather, I am primarily concerned with the role of 
political parties as an organism reflecting and reacting back to the interests of 
social forces in the struggle over hegemony. It is expected – on the basis of 
their social base - that whilst right-wing political parties will support 
globalisation and open economy, it is the political parties in opposition that 
will be more sceptical about socio-economic content membership envisages.
Turkey developed a multi-party political system following the end of the 
Second World War. In the 1950 elections the right-wing DP ended the centre-
left CHP's twenty-seven year rule, and since then Turkey has been ruled by 
right-wing governments – either in coalition form or under majority rule (with 
the exception of the 1973 and 1977 elections, when the centre-left CHP won 
33% and 41% of the votes respectively). The mainstream literature approaches 
party politics through the analytical category of the 'centre-periphery cleavage', 
in which the centre is depicted as a composition of nationalist, Kemalist and 
secular elites, whose authority is challenged by a 'periphery' composed of  
ethnic and religious groups (Mardin 1973; Heper, 1985; Kalaycıoğlu, 1994). 
This literature reads the right-wing single-party majority governments under 
the DP during the 1950s, the ANAP during the 1980s and the AKP during 
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2000s as mobilisation against – and opposition to – the dominance of the 
centre. This reading turns a blind eye to neoliberal transition and consolidation, 
reproduces neoliberal knowledge and presents right-wing governments as 
constituting an opposition to the 'strong state'. This reinforces neoliberalism by 
depicting the main struggle as one of 'elites versus society' in a populist sense. 
Against this, I embark on a class analysis and approach parties in relation to 
their social bases in society.
In this chapter, I examine the period from 1999 and 2002 under the coalition 
government formed by the right-wing ANAP, the DSP and the MHP; and the 
AKP Government that has been in office since the 2002 elections. As Table 
Five (below) reveals, there are discontinuities in right-wing political parties. 
During the 1950s it was the DP that stood at the centre of right-wing politics, 
but by the 1980s the ANAP was the governing party promoting neoliberal 
restructuring. Here, I read the AKP as the new conservative face of 
neoliberalism. This shift at the right-wing is cogently observed by Gramsci:
‘The problem arises of whether the great industrialists have a 
permanent political party of their own. It seems to me that the reply 
must be in the negative. The great industrialists utilise all the existing 
parties turn by turn, but they do not have their own party. This does not 
mean that they are in any way “agnostic” or “apolitical”. Their interest 
is in a determinate balance of forces, which they obtain precisely by 
using their resources to reinforce one party or another in turn from the 
varied political checkerboard...‘ (Gramsci, 1971: 155).
The AKP was founded by former members of the religious-conservative 
Welfare Party and transformed itself into a centre-right wing party coming to 
terms with globalisation and neoliberalism. Though the AKP identifies its 
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social base as formed by farmers, artisans and SMEs (Interview No. 50), it 
stands at the centre-right of the political spectrum in the last decade. As Table 
Three illustrates, since the 1999 elections the AKP has appealed to voters of 
centre-right parties - the True Path Party (DYP) and the ANAP - though with a 
populist discourse that serves to differentiate it from these traditional right 
wing political parties. The Party defines itself as 'conservative democrat' 
(Interview No. 50).  
Table 5: Election Results  1983-2011
AKP CHP MHP ANA
P
DYP SHP DSP Refah Indepe
ndent
1983 45,1%
1987 36,3% 19,1% 24,8% 8,5% 7,2% 0,4%
1991 24,0% 27,0% 20,8% 10,8% 16,9% 0,1%
1995 10,7% 8,2% 19,6% 19,2% 14,6% 21,4% 0,5%
1999 8,7% 18,0% 13,2% 12,0% 22,2% 0,9%
2002 34,3% 19,4% 8,4% 5,1% 9,5% 1,2% 1,0%
2007 46,6% 20,9% 14,3% 5,2%
2011 49,8% 25,9% 13,0% 6,5%
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, www.tuik.gov.tr  
The MHP is a right-wing nationalist party that identifies its social base as 
lower income groups and SMEs (Interview No. 59). In its election manifestos, 
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the SMEs are presented as the 'backbone of the economy' which requires 
support (MHP, 2007: 46-48). According to Çınar and Arıkan, contrary to its 
fascist, anti-communist orientation of the 1970s, the MHP has – in the last 
decade – articulated its policies around ethnic and cultural identities rather than 
a racial identity, seeking to appeal to the centre-right electorate (2002: 25 and 
38). The MHP identifies its ideational orientation as one of 'ülkücülük'
(idealism), promoting 'the love and ideal of serving to one's state' and a 
'devotion to the well-being of the state' (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 26 and 34).
As far as social democratic parties are concerned, both the DSP and the CHP 
occupy the centre-left of the political spectrum. The DSP appeals to workers, 
public sector employees, peasants, retired people and SMEs (Interview No. 
44). The CHP has constituted the main opposition in the Parliament since the 
2002 election. It was founded by Atatürk and ruled the country under a single-
party regime between 1919 and 1950. Its election manifestos reveal that it 
seeks to appeal to a group composed of nationally oriented capital, SMEs, 
artisans, and groups disadvantaged by globalisation, such as retired workers, 
peasants, workers, public officials and the military (CHP Election Manifesto, 
2007: 30-42). It is possible to unravel two fractions within the CHP: one that
conceives of the Party as a leftist social democratic organisation, operating a 
programme based on the welfare state, and another fraction known for its 
etatist and elitist tradition (Güneş-Ayata, 2002: 104). This struggle between the 
two fractions still endures under the current Kılıçdaroğlu administration 
(Interview No. 75), with the latter aspiring to conduct policies around 
republicanism, ulusalcılık and modernism, and shaping its opposition to AKP 
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hegemony through a discourse centred on secularism and political Islam. 
Although this fraction identifies farmers, retired people, workers and SMEs as 
its social base, they prioritise the 'educated segments' in society as the main 
cleavage in shaping party politics (Interview No. 58). It is also contended that 
the Turkish political landscape cannot be explained in reference to social class, 
a sociological category that they believe to have been developed by 
intellectuals in developed countries and which 'has an artificial status' in 
Turkish social formation (Interview No. 51). The social democratic fraction, 
however, accuses this fraction for limiting the party's social base to 'urban 
educated sects', the 'middle classes' and elitist groups concerned by secularism 
and modernism. It seeks to conduct politics around the nodal point of poverty, 
employment and the way neoliberalism is implemented by the AKP in order to 
appeal to low-income groups (Interview No. 75). The CHP has been a member 
of the Socialist International since 1976 and the Party of European Socialism 
since 1999.
Another fraction inside the Turkish left is the 'emancipatory left', which aspires 
to unite class struggle with identity struggles by bringing together social 
democrats, socialists, and citizens of Kurdish and Alevi origin (Interview No. 
27). The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) is the successor of the Democratic 
Society Party (DTP), dissolved on the 12th December 2009 due to its alleged 
connections with the PKK, and for threatening the unity of state, country and 
nation. The BDP is a social democratic political party, which highlights the 
lack of developed industrial structure in the south-eastern Turkey and Eastern 
Anatolia (Interview No. 60). Its social base is identified as labour and the 'poor' 
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(including, for example, unemployed people). The BDP also appeals to the 
Kurdish population, drawing support from capital deployed in the region in 
relation to identity politics and Kurdish sensitivities (Interview No. 60). 
Pressures have been exerted on the BDP (and former Kurdish parties) to stay as 
a marginalised single-issue party united around Kurdish identity, but it remains 
a mass leftist party with organic links to the emancipatory left (Interview No. 
27 and 60). It is a member of the Party of European Socialists and has observer 
status in Socialist International. The Equality and Democracy Party (EDP) and 
the Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP) are also affiliated to the emancipatory 
left. However, those parties are denied representation as they cannot pass 10% 
threshold in parliamentary elections. Because of this blockage vis-a-vis small 
parties, politicians resort to be elected to Parliament from the independent list. 
It is plausible to argue that the emancipatory left conceives of the problems of 
democracy and the Kurdish problem as interconnected, and develops organic 
links with Kurdish political movement. Notably, a recent instance reveals the 
organic links. The DTP group in the Parliament faced the risk of dismissal from 
the Parliament as they cannot number twenty after the ban on DTP. Ufuk Uras 
– the former leader of the ÖDP – who was elected from the independent list, 
joined the newly founded BDP group in eliminating the risk of dismissal.
7.2.3) Struggles Against the Discipline of Capital  
This research does not confine class struggle to the workplace, but conceives of 
it in relation to the commodification of social relations. As I have argued in the 
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third chapter, I disagree with Laclau and Mouffe that Gramscian historical 
materialism is class reductionist and economic determinist. Rather than 
drawing on a post-Marxist position in approaching social movements and 
alternative subjectivities, I draw on van der Pijl's reading of class struggle as 
resistance to the discipline of capital across the entire reproductive system. It is 
the penetration of capitalist logic in the process of social reproduction and its 
exploitation of nature and social relationships that have to be resisted (van der 
Pijl, 1998: 36). Thenceforth, struggles around patriarchy, the environment and 
human rights are examined as an instance of class struggle. Interviewees are 
queried on the economic and social aspects of globalisation and EU 
membership; conceptions of emancipation; and relations of force with other 
actors on the left of the political spectrum.
The women rights/feminist movement was situated within leftist politics in the 
1970s. The İKD was founded by the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) and was 
active between 1975 and 1980. This period was defined within the first wave of 
feminism that is associated with struggle for legal and political equality. The 
'second wave' of feminism (Arıkan et. al, 1996), however, flourished in Turkey 
during the 1980s operating in a depoliticised setting following the military 
coup and the neoliberal turn. It sought to struggle against patriarchy and 
oppression in everyday life, often around the motto 'the private is political' 
(Diner and Toktaş, 2010: 56; Özçürümez and Cengiz, 2011: 23 and 25).
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The Turkish women rights’/feminist movement flourished in a number of 
different fractions. The Association for the Support and Training of Women 
Candidates (Ka-der) was founded in 1997 to support female candidates in 
municipal and general elections, and to increase the number of women in 
political decision-making positions. It seeks equal representation in all political 
platforms and aspires to establish 30% of decision making positions to be filled 
by women (Interview No. 15, 16 and 26). The Association in Support of 
Contemporary Life (ÇYDD) was founded in 1989 to defend secularism and 
modernity. It provides scholarships for female students and seeks to help 
women acquire economic independence (Interview No. 17). Kamer was 
founded in 1997 to fight against domestic violence, honour killings and 
poverty, especially in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia (Interview No. 79). 
The Socialist Feminist Collective was founded in 2008 to increase cooperation 
among women for the feminist struggle against 'patriarchal capitalism', and 
seeks to raise consciousness of salaried and unsalaried female labour, and 
obtain recognition of 'emotional labour' in the private sphere (Interview No. 
69). The Capital City Women's Platform defines itself as a conservative-
religious fraction of the women's rights movement. It was largely founded by 
professional female theologians following the '28th February process', when 
5,000 conservative women employed in the public sector were dismissed due 
to wearing headscarves. It aims to problematise the status of women among 
conservative Muslim communities and campaigns against headscarf ban in the 
public sphere (Interview No. 29).
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The Human Rights Association (İHD) was founded in 1986 by a plurality of 
victimised groups, their relatives and human rights activists in order to raise 
consciousness of human rights among the public, and to institutionalise the 
protection of human rights at the state level (Interview No. 19). The Helsinki 
Citizens Assembly was founded in 1993 to work for the peaceful co-existence 
of different cultural groups and for an integrated and a borderless Europe with 
values such as the rule of law, the respect of human rights and citizenship. 
Within the Turkish context, its focus is on the Kurdish problem, the Cyprus 
issue and relations with Armenia (Interview No. 70 and 71). Mazlumder seeks 
to present the headscarf ban as a violation of 'human rights' and seeks to find a 
solution to the Kurdish problem (Interview No. 20). Greenpeace Mediterranean
works as a regional office of Greenpeace International and works for the 
environment, peace and increased dialogue domestically and internationally 
(Interview No. 74).
7.3) The Struggle over Hegemony in the Political and Civil Society
7.3.1) European Membership Question in the Neoliberal Form of State
There has been very little internal debate among state institutions regarding the 
membership question. Rather, interviewees stated that membership is accepted 
as 'state policy', independent of political parties and/or social forces (Interview 
No. 24, 37 and 40). It is argued that although there are political vacillations in 
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relationships with the EU, there has never been any departure from the pro-
membership perspective under any Government (Interview No. 36). For 
instance, ABGS continues to perform technical work independent of the 
political context (Interview No. 35), whilst the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Affairs continues to work adaption of EU acquis, despite the suspension 
of the eleventh chapter on Agriculture and Rural Development; and the 
thirteenth chapter on Fisheries (Interview No. 41). Institutionally, the process 
establishes EU Directorates in each institution, creating a 'European fraction' 
within state bureaucracy (Interview No. 55). There is a tendency to conceive of 
the process as a technical issue based on the adaption of EU acquis.
7.3.1.1) State Institutions that are related to Global Economy and Support 
Neoliberal Restructuring  
Ministries that are closely linked to the global economy, including the Ministry 
of Industry and Commerce; the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade; and the 
Central Bank have developed a stance supportive of liberalisation and 
economic implications of EU membership as expected from the hypothesis. 
Indeed, their rationale in defending membership is in parallel with ideas 
articulated within pro-membership project. The interviewee from the Ministry 
of Industry and Commerce sees liberalisation through the Customs Union as a 
decisive factor in stimulating the competitiveness of national industry and 
improving the quality of products (Interview No. 38). The liberalisation of 
trade is read as a ‘progressive’ process that transformed Turkish exports from 
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agricultural products to industrial goods (Interview No. 38). The interviewee 
from the Undersecretariat of Trade interpreted the Customs Union as critical in 
consolidating a market economy model (Interview No. 36), whilst the Central 
Bank names the EU and IMF as double anchors providing macroeconomic 
stability. The interviewee from the Central Bank defends membership 
perspective that is considered decisive to maintain price stability, low inflation, 
macroeconomic development and efficiency (Interview No. 23). Membership 
is believed to provide standardisation through adapting international rules and 
maintain security for Turkish markets; two decisive factors in attracting FDI 
(Interview No. 37 and 40).
The pro-EU perspective is equally supported in relation to foreign policy and 
democratisation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines membership as a 
strategic objective for Turkey in relation to its Western orientation and 
modernisation (Interview No. 37 and 42). They argue that there are no strategic 
alternatives to European integration in the international system (Interview No. 
42), and the EU is seen as a platform through which the consolidation of 
democracy can be ensured. The reform process is interpreted as significant in 
forcing complicity with international rules on human rights, the rule of law, 
and democracy (Interview No. 35). In that sense, it is remarked that 
compliance to the EU norms is the means to compliance with United Nations 
Convention, European Council Convention and/or decisions of European Court 
of Human Rights and ILO standards (Interview No. 35). It is argued that the 
social base in Turkey is weak and that the EU offers a 'stronger anchor' for the 
reform of democracy (Interview No. 35). It is also stressed that the pro-
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membership perspective helps to civilise politics, ensuring that government and 
civil society are mutually accountable and responsive (Interview No. 35).
Yet, there are two sensitive issues related to foreign and security policy. The 
membership of Greek Cyprus in the name of the island prior to a solution is 
criticised. Moreover, the EU is accused of breaking the Annan Plan's promise 
to end the isolation of the KKTC (Interview No. 37). It is stressed that 
recognising the Greek administration as the representative of the Republic of 
Cyprus is unacceptable for Turkey as it would de facto name Turkey as an 
occupation force on the island (Interview No. 42). However, it is 
acknowledged that the EU made an extension to the Additional Protocol on 
Cyprus meaning that – technically speaking, at least – each negotiation chapter 
cannot be closed until this deadlock is solved (Interview No. 42).
On a different note, interviewees complain that Turkey's position within the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was downgraded. Whilst 
Turkey declares its support for ESDP in principle, it seeks the creation of a 
consultation mechanism for non-EU countries who are NATO members. In 
other words, following the Berlin Plus formulaxxi, Turkey wants to be consulted 
if ESDP missions will benefit from NATO assets and Turkey will be asked to 
provide military personnel (Interview No. 42). The main concern is that 
although the Republic of Cyprus is not a member of NATO, it can benefit from 
NATO assets under the ESDP framework (Interview No. 42). Moreover, 
Turkish military personnel and assets are utilised via NATO for ESDP policies 
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without Turkey being consulted. In this sense, the EU is criticised for failing to 
keep its promise to consult Turkey with regards to ESDP operations (Interview 
No. 37). Additionally, regarding Justice and Home Affairs, the EU expects 
Turkey to sign a readmission agreement, through which it would be required to 
accept any refugees who had passed through it as a transit country, either to 
grant them leave to remain or to deport them to their home countries. It is 
contended that Turkey will also hesitate to give its consent without any 
concessions from the EU about visas applied to Turkish citizens (Interview No. 
35).
7.3.1.2) State Institutions that Struggle to Integrate with Globalisation
  
In line with the argument of Cox on ‘internationalisation of state’, the roles 
played by the DPT, KOSGEB, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, 
and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security in state policy are secondary 
under the neoliberal form of state. Moreover, they are related to groups 
disadvantaged by globalisation: labour, agricultural groups, and SMEs. For 
instance, the interviewee from the DPT acknowledged that the DPT plays only 
a limited, indirect role with regards to the membership question (Interview No. 
39). Despite this, empirical research reveals that these institutions adapt to 
ideas associated with neoliberalism's conceptions of the economy and social 
policy. In a nutshell, they are supportive of the membership project and justify 
this support with references to social policy; and regional and agricultural 
funds.
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During the 1990s the DPT believed the completion of the Customs Union 
could have negative repercussions on domestic industry (Interview No. 39). 
However, this stance has been revised and the DPT now conceives of 
membership as important to ensure complicity with international standards 
concerning economic competitiveness and democracy. Moreover, as Turkey 
has already been integrated via the Customs Union, membership is endorsed as 
it will enable Turkey to participate in EU decision-making (Interview No. 39). 
Additionally, the DPT internalises and operates on neoliberalism's ideas 
prioritising efficiency and competitiveness in the economy. The planned 
economic model with a large role for the public sector is discredited for being 
inefficient. It is argued that as a result of globalisation, the state's role is no 
longer to plan the economy, but to act as a regulatory institution 'promoting' the 
private sector and the functioning of the economy in a competitive manner 
(Interview No. 39). Similarly, alongside the strategy of export-promotion and 
neoliberalism's understanding of development, the KOSGEB is directed to help 
SMEs increase their exporting capacity and their competitiveness in 
international markets (Interview No. 21). However, the membership process is 
conceived of as a decisive factor in stimulating the competitiveness of SMEs 
and the quality of products (Interview No. 21).
Concurrent with the hypothesis, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs are concerned with negative 
economic repercussions of participating to the Internal Market. However, they 
support membership in relation to social policy and agricultural funds, 
257
conceiving of globalisation as ‘irresistible’ and EU regionalisation as a 
mechanism that can provide protectionism. The Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security reads globalisation as a process that engenders unemployment and 
negatively affects trade unions and the bargaining power of labour. Moreover, 
they place the 'workplace' at the core of industrial relations. However, the 
interviewee conceived of globalisation as an irreversible process (Interview 
No. 24). Similarly, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs argue that 
integrating to the Internal Market will stimulate competition and negatively 
affect particular items in the agricultural sector such as livestock production, 
milk and meat (Interview No. 41). It is argued that as the Turkish agricultural 
structure is one of small and partitioned holdings, it cannot compete with 
larger, more economically oriented farms in the Western Europe (Interview 
No. 41). 
However, these institutions defend the pro-membership perspective, taking the 
EU as a progressive model for Turkey and referring positively to EU social 
policy and/or structural funds. The interviewee from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs, for example, saw the EU's agricultural support 
mechanisms in a positive light (Interview No. 41). More importantly, the 
liberalisation of agriculture is conceived of as 'irreversible'. It is argued that 
even though customs for agricultural products will not be eliminated by 
membership, the Millennium Round compels Turkey to decrease its 
protectionism independent of the EU process. Hence, the interviewee 
underlines, membership should be seen positively as it will allow Turkey to 
benefit from EU structural funds (Interview No. 41).
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In a conference organised by the TZOB to debate the agricultural question, the 
Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs – M. Mehdi Eker – argued that 
membership will contribute to agricultural development in the long-run 
(TZOB, 2006: 34). The EU's Common Agricultural Policy is presented as a 
mechanism that will increase the competitiveness of agricultural products and 
increase welfare and social standards for agricultural workers (TZOB, 2006: 
32). Similarly, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security is positive about the 
European Social Model and social dialogue as a way of negating class 
antagonism and struggle. It is argued that this model not only contributes to the 
democratisation of industrial relations, but provides a viable alternative to the 
'ultra-liberal' American model (Interview No. 24). It is argued that as an 
international platform the EU can provide mechanisms to protect workers 
against globalisation (Interview No. 24). Moreover, it is believed that the EU 
reform process strengthens Turkish trade unions and would eliminate
restrictions on unionisation. For instance, there are criteria in Chapter Nineteen 
on ‘Social Policy and Employment’ of the European acquis, which require 
social partners to be more effective in social dialogue, fight informal 
economies and strengthen unionisation (Interview No. 24).
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7.3.2) Position of Political Parties in the Debate over Membership
7.3.2.1) AKP Government and Membership 
  
In chapter four, the AKP's rule is defined as hegemonic in the sense that it 
successfully ordered a number of social forces around the neoliberal project. 
This hegemony has established a consensus among internationally and 
nationally oriented capital (see chapter five). In parallel with the interests of 
internationally oriented capital, the AKP guaranteed the implementation of the 
2001 structural adjustment programme and is committed to monetarism and 
neoliberal transformation through parliamentary reforms (under the guidance 
of EU, IMF and WB) (AKP, 2001: 18-19). It remains committed to 
neoliberalism's macro-economic objectives: low inflation, tight budgetary 
discipline, price stability and the independence of the Central Bank. It aspires 
to complete the privatisation process, restructure the public sphere on the basis 
of the market economy, and provide growth through privatisation and 
attracting FDI (AKP, 2002: 37-39; AKP, 2007: 30). However, it believes the 
structural adjustment programme to be inadequate in addressing the concerns 
of SMEs. Thus, it promises to provide support of SMEs (AKP, 2002: 45-46). 
In this sense, the social purpose behind the AKP hegemony is the consolidation 
of neoliberal restructuring through the integration of nationally oriented capital 
with global structures and neoliberal forms of accumulation; and the co-opting 
of groups disadvantaged from globalisation through individualistic social 
policy mechanisms based on the charity model. This supports my earlier 
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argument that the AKP hegemony should be seen as an instance of 
trasformismo.
Analogous with its policies, the AKP can be examined within the pro-
membership project. In fact, the AKP identifies membership as a 'primary 
objective' in its 2002 election manifesto, stating that it will provide economic 
development and the consolidation of democracy (AKP, 2002: 37). Concurrent 
with the stance of nationally oriented capital, they claim that globalisation is a 
fact and that it can only be compensated by increasing the competitiveness of 
SMEs in international markets (Interview No. 50; AKP, 2001: 18). They read 
the current state of economic integration positively, arguing that the Customs 
Union is decisive in stimulating exports and enabling Turkey to operate 
competitively in global markets. Turkish SMEs are content with the 
delocalisation of European production (Interview No. 50). However, there are 
no further economic benefits to becoming a member, with the exception of 
participating in the decision making process and eliminating visa barriers 
(Interview No. 50). Although the AKP underpins the reform process, they 
argue that the EU has double standards and uses the accession negotiation 
process instrumentally to force concessions regarding Cyprus and the Kurdish 
problem (Interview No. 50). Moreover, the attractiveness of membership 
decreases as the economic crisis takes hold of the Euro-zone. Further doubts 
are expressed regarding the inability as of EU members to keep to the 
Maastricht criteria; Europe's aging population, which makes it difficult to 
provide welfare; and rising xenophobia in Europe against Muslims and 
migrants (Interview No. 50). Despite this, the AKP conceives of the EU as 
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instrumental in developing standards and retains membership as a goal 
(Interview No. 50).
7.3.2.2) Political Parties in Opposition
7.3.2.2.1) Centre-Left Political Parties: ‘Social Market Economy’  
Analogous to their social base that relies on workers, public sector employees, 
peasants, retired people and SMEs, centre-left political parties can be expected 
to oppose membership. Indeed, they conceive of globalisation negatively and 
raise concerns over cuts from social welfare state. They believe globalisation to 
be a fact and regionalism as a platform that can provide protectionism. They 
support membership on the condition that Turkey will benefit from structural 
funds and free movement of workers and they raise their opposition in relation 
to national sensitivities. Indeed, the interviewees summarise their position 
neatly with the motto ‘membership on equal terms and conditions’. Indeed, 
centre-left political parties should be analysed within neo-mercantilist rival 
class strategy.
Turkey's centre-left political parties – the CHP and the DSP – see globalisation 
as a fact. They fail to propose an alternative to the market economy and 
criticise globalisation only in relation to social policy and national interests 
(Interview No. 51, 58 and 75). This is in tandem with their supportive stances 
towards the market economy model (Interview No. 44). The CHP proposes a 
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model it calls 'social market economy', whilst the DSP refers to a form of 
'Societal Competitive Economy' (CHP, 2007: 24-25; Türker, 2005a: 3). Both of 
these models consider competitiveness in global markets, low inflation and 
growth to be primary objectives; but include a social dimension prioritising 
employment, equal distribution of income and a welfare state (CHP, 2010: 143-
144). The role of state is depicted as supporting and supervising the private 
sector and acting in a regulatory (interventionist) capacity for those sectors 
where private investment fails to materialise (Türker, 2005b: 3; Türker, 2005c: 
3). They do not question export-orientation and depict welfare state regimes as 
failed projects. Accordingly, they argue that the only viable option is to 
promote production and employment within a market economy (Interview No. 
44 and 51). Opposition to the AKP is conducted on the basis of the manner in 
which neoliberalism is implemented through an 'irregular market economy 
model', rather than neoliberalism per se (Interview No. 75).
  
Centre-left political parties make clear their position with the motto, 
'membership on equal terms and conditions' (Interview No. 44; CHP, 2002: 53-
54). They view the social and economic implications of membership positively 
and state that membership will boost production by stimulating exports and 
competitiveness, increasing the quality of goods and services; and providing 
technology transfers (Interview No. 44 and 58). They believe it will improve 
social standards, provide a more equal distribution of income and eliminate 
regional disparities (Interview No. 44 and 51; CHP, 2006: 513). They refer to 
the role of the EU's structural funds in compensating disadvantaged groups by 
globalisation (Interview No. 58). They also propound the populist argument 
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that membership of the EU would constitute a decisive step towards 
'contemporary civilisation', a goal set by Ataturk for modernisation (Interview 
No. 44 and 58; CHP, 2006: 512). Moreover, it is argued that membership will 
not only strengthen Turkey's role as a regional power in foreign policy but also 
eliminate threats such as fundamental Islam and/or the dismemberment of 
Turkey (Interview No. 44). The only criticism related to the socio-economic 
content of membership is levelled at the unwillingness of the EU to recognise 
the free movement of labour (Interview No. 44).
Criticism of the process is largely based on political issues and national 
sensitivities. The Cyprus problemxxii constitutes the key issue. CHP refuses to 
debate Turkish membership question in relation to the Cyprus problem (CHP, 
2006: 20 and 119). DSP identifies the Cyprus issue as an issue of national 
sensitivity affecting the security of both Turkish Cypriots and Turkish citizens, 
who should not be 'sacrificed' for membership (DSP, 2004: 7). Both the CHP 
and the DSP argue that the solution for the Cyprus problem can only be 
founded by acknowledging two separate, equal and independent states that 
have equal sovereignty (Interview No. 58; DSP, 2004: 12). Second, the EU is 
accused of pursuing imperialist policies seeking to divide and rule Turkey by 
demanding the recognition of the Kurdish and Alevi populations as minorities: 
additional concessions 'specific' to Turkish membership (Interview No. 44 and 
58). Third, Turkey's status in the EU's defence initiative within ESDP and the 
Berlin plus agreement is criticised as –  although Turkey was an associate 
member of the Western European Union (WEU), it will not be able to 
participate in the planning and control of military operations under the EU 
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Armament Agency (Interview No. 58). Fourth, the EU is criticised for asking 
Turkey to recognise the 'Armenian genocide' (Interview No. 58). Finally, 
permanent derogations for the free movement of labour and structural funds, 
and any form of 'special status' outside of the membership framework are 
considered unacceptable (Interview No. 44 and 58; CHP, 2006: 5-7 and 234). It 
is argued, then, that the negotiation process 'discriminates against Turkey', has 
'double standards', and that the EU strategy is designed to keep Turkey at arm's 
length by proposing a 'privileged partnership' (Interview No. 44; CHP, 2006: 
159). Neither the CHP nor the DSP are against membership per se, then, but 
demand the right for Turkey to become a full member of the EU on conditions 
of equality (CHP, 2006: 9-10). The CHP even published a book titled Yes to 
Full Membership, No to Special Status to refute the general impression in 
Turkish society that it was an anti-European party (CHP, 2006: 1).
7.3.2.2.2) Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and Membership 
The MHP takes globalisation as a structural imperative that cannot be resisted. 
As its social base consists of SMEs, it sets itself a 'strategical priority' to render 
Turkish SMEs competitive in international markets by means of 'an 
independent and a national' industrialisation programme (MHP, 2007: 7 and 
12). This strategy is portrayed as endorsing national champions to create 
Turkey as an actor in globalisation (Interview No. 59). In tandem with this 
stance, EU membership is supported under the motto of 'honourable 
membership on equal terms and conditions' (Interview No. 59). Membership is 
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interpreted as instrumental for increasing the competitiveness of Turkish 
industry and for realising higher institutional standards. The main focus of 
criticism is, again, national interests; the MHP is critical about permanent 
derogations and/or any form of privileged partnership (MHP, 2010: 23-25); EU 
policies regarding Cyprus and Armenia are interpreted as intervening in the 
domestic affairs of Turkey (MHP, 2007: 117); and the EU's policies concerning 
the Kurdish problem are believed to threaten the unitary structure of the 
Turkish state, contradicting the Lausanne Treaty (Interview No. 59). The EU is 
also accused of excluding Turkey from its security and defence initiatives 
(Interview No. 59), whilst the MHP remains critical about sovereignty transfer 
(Interview No. 59).
7.3.2.2.3) Emancipatory Left and Social Democratic Political Parties 
The social democratic parties and Kurdish political parties refer to themselves 
as the 'emancipatory left', seeking to distinguish themselves from the 'centre-
left'. The BDP, ÖDP and EDP – none of which has passed the 10% threshold in 
an election – fall in to this category. The emancipatory left aims to rethink and 
redefine leftist politics by unifying class politics with the struggles of citizens 
of Kurdish and Alevi origin (Interview No. 27).  With the weakening of class 
politics and unionisation, emancipatory left no longer conceives of struggle 
operating around class conflict as the fundamental struggle in society 
(Interview No. 27), aiming instead to be open to pluralism. Debates concerning 
class and identity politics caused a split within the ÖDP, however, with critics 
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claiming that it conducts 'sterile leftist politics' and turns a blind eye to 
struggles focussed on forms of oppression other than exploitation (Interview 
No. 27).
The emancipatory left reads the EU as a capitalist integration model and 
criticises the economic aspects of integration as well as its defence initiative. 
Yet it accepts globalisation as an inevitable process that can only be resisted at 
the international level, meaning that it supports EU membership under the 
motto 'another Europe is possible'. Moreover, the EU's political reforms are 
well received. They also believe that Turkey will participate in decision-
making through its membership (Interview No. 27). In this sense, its stance 
coincides with internationally oriented labour and can be analysed under the 
Ha-vet rival class strategy. The membership perspective is supported as 
globalisation necessitates a struggle at the international level. Moreover, as 
struggle at the economic level has already been lost by the completion of the 
Customs Union, membership is debated in relation to social policy and political 
issues.
Contrary to the expectation from the hypothesis, the BDP support membership 
due to political reasons. Its support is based on a different rationale than social 
forces within neoliberal pro-membership project. The interviewee from BDP 
reads globalisation as a process accelerating inequality and income disparities. 
However globalisation is equally interpreted as a positive process to stimulate 
information exchange and technological development, factors seen as 
potentially lessening the isolation of the Kurdish movement (Interview No. 60). 
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Moreover, internationalisation/supranationalism is defended for implementing 
decentralisation through the transfer of power from sites of central authority to 
supranational and local levels, a move which provides increased space for the 
enactment of ethnic and cultural rights (Interview No. 60). They also argue that 
as the industrial base in Eastern Anatolia is not developed, regional funds from 
the EU and laws requiring the free movement of workers will help solve the 
economic and social problems of the region (Interview No. 60). Moreover, the 
EU is read as enabling a democratisation process which may contribute to the 
defeat of authoritarian state mechanisms and nationalism (Interview No. 60). 
The interviewee referred to human rights violations and noted that there are 
currently some two thousand Kurdish people in prison in Turkey, many of 
whom have had their right to expression assembly violated –rights that would 
be guaranteed by EU membership. In this sense, EU membership is seen a 
process forcing Turkey to adjust to international human rights norms 
(Interview No. 60).
7.3.3) Struggles against the Discipline of Capital in Civil Society 
  
7.3.3.1) Women’s Rights/Feminist Groups and Membership Question
The women rights/feminist activists can also be examined under the Ha-vet 
project. Although they do not develop a position resulting from an economic 
analysis, membership is seen instrumental to consolidate democratisation; to 
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constrain mechanisms of ‘strong state’ and to further develop civil society. The 
interviewees also highlighted that EU reform process was instrumental to 
improve women rights in Turkey.
The women's rights/feminist movement is not homogenous but is made up of a 
number of strands. Thus, feminism cannot be said to have developed a unified 
stance regarding state-society relations and/or globalisation. On the one hand, 
globalisation is read as a capitalist process which renders female labour more 
vulnerable to flexible forms of work and exploitation (Interview No. 18 and 
77). In this reading, women constitute a disadvantaged group. For instance, the 
interviewee from Ka-der reads liberalisation as a process impoverishing 
women. She argues that liberalisation and ensuing economic crises increase 
poverty, which impacts disproportionately on women – who are often first to 
lose their jobs and are expected to perform social services in parallel with 
social cuts. Thus, globalisation serves to reduce female participation in 
employment and politics (Interview No. 26). The interviewee from the 
Socialist Feminist Collective criticised globalisation for the fact that women 
are often expected to make sacrifices for the family and that female labour is 
often the first category to be subjected to flexible working conditions 
(Interview No. 69). On the other hand, globalisation is interpreted by some 
aspects of the feminist movement as a process opening new space in the 
political sphere for female involvement. It does this by increasing international 
mobilisation and international links (Interview No. 18 and 77). Other women's 
groups have not debated globalisation, meanwhile. The interviewee from Ka-
mer highlighted that many of its members are illiterate, unemployed, powerless 
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and unable to develop a critical stance vis-a-vis globalisation (Interview No. 
79).
Women's rights/feminist groups' approaches to membership are largely shaped 
in relation to social, political and cultural aspects rather than economic 
implications (Interview No. 77 and 79). For instance, the interviewees from 
Ka-mer and the Socialist Feminist Collective highlighted that the women's 
movement has never debated the implications of the Customs Union for the 
Turkish economy (Interview No. 69 and 79). In this sense – and resonating 
with neoliberal common sense - the Customs Union is seen as a ‘technical’ 
issue. The economic effects of EU membership are reduced to financial support 
and projects: Ka-mer refers to the financial assistance given to the Eastern and 
South-Eastern Anatolian region by the EU, and to joint projects designed to 
raise consciousness about violence and honour killings (Interview No. 79).
From a women's rights/feminist point of view, there is a common 
understanding that the EU sets the minimum criteria for women's standards and 
that membership will be positive for women's rights (Interview No. 17 and 26). 
Indeed, the women's movement takes EU legislation as a progressive model for 
gender equality – noting, for example, that Western European countries were 
among the first to apply positive discrimination and quotas (Interview No. 18). 
Moreover, it is stated that EU standards are used strategically to institutionalize 
women's rights, especially following the 1999 Helsinki Council (Interview No. 
10). For instance, in amending the Turkish Civil Code and Criminal Code, the 
women's movement successfully lobbied for more than thirty enactments, 
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taking European countries as a model (Interview No. 25), and the enactment of 
the article which rules that the state is responsible for providing gender equality 
is named as a decisive moment (Interview No. 15). Moreover, it is argued that 
although the women's movement proposed this change in 1992, it was only 
passed in the Parliament in 2005 thanks to the EU reform process (Interview 
No. 17). It should also be noted that there are organic links between the 
women's movement and the EU: the Representative of the European 
Commission in Turkey consults women's rights/feminist and human rights 
groups before publishing their regular reports (Interview No. 25), a relationship 
seen as instrumental for changing legislation (Interview No. 29, 71 and 79). 
Additionally, many women's rights movements are already members of 
institutions at the European levelxxiii (Interview No. 19, 25, 26 and 29).
In this sense, the process of EU membership is read in relation to the 
consolidation of democracy. Women's rights groups criticise 'military tutelage' 
and the mechanisms of the 'strong state' for maintaining strict controls on 
society, and read the EU as an international anchor capable of filling the gap in 
the Turkish political sphere, which results from an underdeveloped civil 
society. This, it is argued, will open up space for civil society and 
democratisation (Interview No. 10, 16, 18 and 77). 
In parallel with their critical stance regarding Turkish nationalism, the process 
of joining the EU is conceived of as a peace project. For instance, it is argued 
that membership will help solve Turkey's problems with Greece and result in a 
peaceful Aegean Sea  (Interview No. 18). There is also reference to the concept 
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of a 'Social Europe' (Interview No. 16): the EU process is seen as instrumental 
for the adaption of international norms and values regarding human rights, 
women's rights and democracy (Interview No. 79). It also provides a stimulus 
for debates concerning democracy and the Kurdish problem (Interview No. 
79). The interviewee from the conservative Capital City Women's Platform 
reads the EU as instrumental in subjecting the 'authoritarian' policies of 'state 
secularism' to scrutiny and providing a 'free secular' structure within which 
conservatives have more freedom to practice their religion (Interview No. 29).
However, the EU acquis on flexible work and the tendency to direct EU funds 
to 'female entrepreneurship' are criticised (Interview No. 10).  The EU's 
references to efficiency and the market in relation to gender are acknowledged 
(Interview No. 25). In this sense, women's movements do not define their 
stance as one of unconditional support (Interview No. 10 and 25).  
It is only the Socialist Feminist Collective that develops a strong anti-European 
stance. The argument that the EU reform process is progressive for women's 
rights is seen by them to be a misinterpretation, and claims that the EU 
increases levels of democracy is read as a 'distortion' (Interview No. 69). The 
Socialist Feminist Collective defines emancipation in the context of a struggle 
against 'patriarchal capitalism' (Interview No. 69). On the one hand, they see 
the EU as an economic integration model, within which social policies sustain 
its capitalist economic essence (Interview No. 69). On the other hand, they 
criticise the EU for developing a reductionist reading of women's rights which 
limits them to the public sphere. They argue that women's labour in private life 
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cannot be ignored, and note that EU legislation is confined to female 
employment in the workplace, with issues such as equal payment taking 
centrality. This, it is argued, is a policy motivated by economic incentives and 
which seeks to protect the interests only of particular women, with employed 
white women the most likely to benefit. Hence, the EU's policies ignore the 
exploitation of low-income women, poor women, migrant women, single 
mothers and uneducated women. This approach is further criticised for 
dividing the feminist movement into a group of relatively powerful, 
masculinised women, who have abandoned 'rebellious' feminist discourse; and 
a group whose domestic labour is exploited by the former (Interview No. 69).   
7.3.3.2) Human Rights Groups and Membership
Human rights groups conceive of internationalism and the EU as instrumental 
for democratisation as it can curb the so-called 'authoritarian republican 
oligarchy' Turkey experiences under a 'military and bureaucratic tutelage'; a 
controlling society which continues 'despite and upon the will of public' 
(Interview No. 19, 20, 70 and 71). In this sense, interviewees support EU 
membership as they believe it will open up space for civil society, 
democratisation and improvements to human rights legislation (Interview No. 
19, 20, 70 and 71). According to the İHD, the fundamental problem is 'juridical 
pressure', which leads to charges against İHD members for being members of 
an illegal/terrorist organisation, or for insulting 'Turkishness' (Interview No. 
19). The İHD criticizes the 'security doctrine' of the military and the 'Ittihadist 
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official ideology' that 'invents' internal and external enemies and 'artificial 
conflicts' with Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Alevis and human rights groups in 
order to perpetuate its existence (Interview No. 19). It is argued that the EU 
process problematises the falsity of this official ideology by finding peaceful 
solutions and questioning operations of military tutelage within the political 
sphere (Interview No. 19). It is asserted that the Turkish state neglects 
differences in ethnicity, religions and sects. Thus, the role of EU in helping to 
construct a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem is supported, especially 
when compared to the US' military approach (Interview No. 19 and 20).
7.3.3.3) Why not a united front against neo-liberal restructuring?  
I will now turn to consider whether it is possible for disadvantaged social 
groups to form a united front which resists neoliberal restructuring and Turkish 
membership of the EU as a struggle against the discipline of capital around 
social reproduction. Remarkably, my empirical research reveals that women's 
rights/feminist groups read globalisation as a capitalist process, within which 
women are conceived of as a disadvantaged group who are expected to bear the 
brunt of unemployment, or who are subjected to flexible work and increased 
exploitation (Interviews No. 18 and 77); as well as being expected to make 
sacrifices for the family in parallel with social cuts in welfare state (Interviews 
No. 26 and 69). Similarly, the interviewee from the Helsinki Citizen Assembly 
highlights that liberalisation engenders human rights violations as health and 
education are within the sphere of human rights. The interviewee from 
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Greenpeace Mediterranean acknowledges that the economic system causes 
environment problems and criticises predominant narratives that present 
environmental standards as 'economically costly' (Interview No. 34). 
Moreover, interviewees interpreted the relationship between feminism and 
human rights within leftist politics as 'natural', as both struggle against 
exploitation and develop a critical perspective (Interview No. 77 and 79).
Yet, I argue that there are four main obstacles to combining relations of force to 
create an alternative historical bloc that contests neoliberalism and EU 
membership. First, the economy has secondary status in these groups’ analyses 
of globalisation and the membership question (Interview No. 71). Membership 
is debated in relation to social, political and cultural aspects (Interview No. 77), 
whilst there have not been debates on the repercussions of the Customs Union 
(Interviews No. 25, 73 and 79). The interviewee from Capital City's Platform 
argues that the Customs Union is a 'technical' issue relevant only to particular 
industrial sectors (Interview No. 29). In other words, neoliberal 'common 
sense', which reads the economy as operating in an apolitical field, is 
internalised. The repercussions of globalisation and neoliberalism are 
approached in relation to effects on women, human rights and the environment, 
meaning that they remain issue-specific rather than developing a structural 
approach. Furthermore, globalisation is not read as an entirely negative 
process. Although some interviewees acknowledge globalisation as capitalist 
expansion, it is equally articulated as a force which opens space in the political 
sphere by increasing internationalisation and constraining the power of the 
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'strong state'; a progressive process working to increase freedom and 
democracy (Interview No. 18 and 77). 
Second, pluralism and autonomy from class politics are understood to be 
opening space for struggles articulated around gender, human rights and the 
environment. In relation to the feminist movement, the key motto is 'woman is 
not only exploited but oppressed' (Interview No. 18). In this sense, 
interviewees highlight that the status of women and human rights should not be 
'secondary' within the working class movement. They argue that abolishing 
gender hierarchies and adapting the 'universal language of human rights and 
freedoms' constitute primary forms of struggle that should not be 'subordinated' 
within a working class struggle (Interview No. 18 and 19). On this 
understanding, feminism should not be reduced to merely 'politics for women' 
(Interview No. 69). Rather, feminism per se is defined as an ideology 
(Interviews No. 15 and 77), signifying not only a consciousness of the 
exploitation of women but also engendering collectivism and developing a 
political strategy (Interview No. 77). During the 1970sxxiv, female 
emancipation was conceived of in relation to the labour struggle and the 
overthrow of capitalism. Thus, although de-politicisation engendered by the 
neoliberal turn is criticised, feminist activists welcome neoliberalism for 
'opening up space' for democratisation and critical thinking regarding former 
conception of gender and human rights politics within working class movement 
(Interview No. 77).
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Accordingly, class politics is accused of operating hierarchically and failing to 
acknowledge the autonomy of feminism and human rights in the political 
sphere (Interview No. 77). However, the Socialist Feminist Collective, among 
other feminist groups, defends the socialist system and posits classless society 
as the emancipatory structure for women, in which feminist principles can best 
be practiced. For them, the emancipatory struggle is thus understood to operate 
against 'patriarchal capitalism' (Interview No. 69). Furthermore, they argue that 
the socialist system will ultimately erase the differentiation of labour into 
salaried and unsalaried labour; eliminate gender differences; provide equality 
in domestic work; and eliminate the nuclear family as the predominant social 
relation of society (Interview No. 69). Yet, the interviewee referred to obstacles 
to forming relations of force around an anti-capitalist agenda. She argued that 
class politics constrains the gender question to providing equality in the public 
sphere, against feminism's claim that the 'private sphere is political' (Interview 
No. 69). In other words, the gender question is not limited to the public sphere 
and salaried work – female labour in the domestic work also constitutes labour 
under the category 'emotional labour' (Interview No. 69). Furthermore, she 
highlighted that one of the major principles of the organisation is to remain 
independent from institutions of 'state, men and capital' (Interview No. 69). 
This relates to wider critiques surrounding the private sphere brought about by 
second wave feminism. For instance, domestic violence was not a political 
topic until the 1980s, and it was feminism's break from class politics that 
allowed it to be conceived of politically (Interview No. 15). For reasons like 
this, class politics is criticised for approaching gender question 'instrumentally' 
(Interview No. 77). For instance, before the 1980s, the collapse of the capitalist 
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system was articulated as the solution to patriarchy, and the Soviet Union was 
considered to bare the proof of this. However, it became increasingly clear that 
this was an 'illusory' argument (Interview No. 18).
Third, the idea of 'structural emancipation' is no longer considered. As a result 
of the 'explosion of particularisms' (Mouffe, 1993: 1) and/or 'emancipation(s)' 
(Laclau, 1996: vii), there is no longer a single definition of emancipation 
(Interview No. 18). Though emancipation is defined as struggle against 
patriarchal structures in general, it is conceived of as a pluralist struggle; a 
struggle against the absence of women in formal political mechanisms 
(Interview No. 15); against violence and honorary killings (Interview No. 79); 
against inequality in education and employment (Interview No. 17); and 
against the secondary status of women in society (Interview No. 29). More 
importantly, the relationship between the emancipation of women and a 
structural anti-capitalist struggle is abandoned and the possibility of revolution 
is called into question (Interview No. 18 and 26).   
Finally, alternative subjectivities have an alternative conception of political 
praxis that weakens the capacity for action around a common principle. 
Contrary to the rhetoric of a mass movement, the women's rights movement is 
organised as a social movement around small horizontally organised groups, 
mostly founded on an ad hoc basis in a flexible manner (Interview No. 18 and 
79). A system of rotation is used to prevent leadership from emerging in the 
movement (Interview No. 18). Some campaigns are run by volunteers and are 
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dissolved after the project ends (Interview No. 70). Alternative, postmodern 
forms of struggle such as the internet are utilised (Interview No. 15).
In relation to Gramsci's concept of a 'Modern Prince', women's groups develop 
a critical stance vis-a-vis political parties, believing them to be unsuitable 
vehicles for the articulation of their interests in the political sphere. Indeed, 
they stay independent from political parties – claiming that this prevents the 
movement from becoming an instrument of a particular political party 
(Interviews No. 16, 18, 69, 74 and 79). More importantly, women's 
right/feminist groups remain issue specific. Alongside their failure to develop 
politics at a structural level, their primary concern is not to establish relations 
of force in society so that they may enhance their strategic ends. For instance, 
the interviewee from Ka-der defined employers and trade unions as platforms 
that are founded and run by men (Interview No. 10). Similarly, another 
interviewee remarks that Ka-mer never takes an ideological position in the 
political spectrum (Interview No. 79). It is even stated that the women's 
movement never sought to claim political authority (Interview No. 18).
7.4) Conclusion 
This chapter aims to extend the debate on struggle over hegemony among 
social forces to political and civil society. I have aimed to question to what 
extent the ruling class can articulate its economic vested interests embedded 
within neoliberal pro-membership project in universal terms in political and 
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civil society. Additionally, this debate also sheds light whether alternative class 
strategies - introduced in the previous chapter - can form a united front with 
disadvantaged groups and struggles against the expansion of discipline of 
capital in the sphere of social reproduction and whether they can form an 
alternative historical bloc by presenting their project on a universal terrain.      
In tandem with the hypothesis, state institutions related to global economy 
supports pro-membership to stimulate competitiveness and to provide security 
in attracting FDI. It is equally defended to civilise politics and consolidate 
democracy. Membership is interpreted in relation to modernisation project and 
the EU is also considered to be a peaceful project. Interviewees from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security raise concerns regarding participating to the Internal Market. 
However, they conceive of globalisation as a fact and Europe as a regional bloc 
able to provide protection. Hence, contrary to the expectation from the 
hypothesis, state institutions that are related to disadvantaged groups from 
globalisation such as labour, agriculture sector and SMEs adapt to neoliberal 
conception of role of state in economy and welfare regime. Accordingly, they 
refer to structural funds and social policy in defending membership. Notably, it 
is highlighted by interviewees from state institutions that compliance with the 
EU acquis is carried independent from the membership perspective. This 
condition illuminates the hegemonic status of pro-membership perspective as 
reform process and its neoliberal socio-economic content is adopted as 
‘progressive’ despite uncertainty on prospects of membership. Indeed, echoing 
Cox's argument that European integration constitutes 'a microcosm of the larger 
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internationalizing process' (Cox, 1987: 259), interviewees from state 
institutions conceive of membership in relation to compliance with 
international rules of global economy and international standards of human 
rights and rule of law. Thenceforth, neoliberal content is carried without 
necessarily the goal of attaining membership.  
Subsequently, the AKP hegemony is read as instrumental in embedding 
nationally oriented capital within the neoliberal project. Although it identifies 
its social base as SMEs, farmers and artisans, its social purpose is the 
consolidation of the neoliberal transition. It is the AKP Government that 
promotes neoliberal pro-membership project for competitiveness and 
democratisation. Yet, it is the reform process rather than membership 
perspective that is conceived of as decisive to comply with rules and standards. 
The interviewee from AKP highlighted that the EU has double standards and 
its attractiveness decreases in tandem with economic crisis and xenophobia. 
The political parties in opposition are analysed in relation to two fractions: the 
centre-left and emancipatory left. The centre-left political parties – the CHP 
and DSP - cannot come up with an alternative to globalisation and market 
economy model. They aspire to develop social policy within market economy, 
neatly summarised by models proposed as ‘societal competitive economy’ 
and/or ‘social market economy’. They adapt to economic and social aspects 
envisaged by membership and emphasise structural funds and free movement 
of workers in defending membership. However, they raise concerns over 
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national issues such as Cyprus problem, Kurdish and Armenian issues, and 
oppose a form of privileged partnership in which Turkey will be exempt from 
structural funds and free movement of workers. That is why their position is 
neatly summarised as ‘membership on equal terms and conditions’ and they 
can be analysed within neo-mercantilist rival class strategy. 
It is the political parties affiliated to ‘emancipatory left’ that criticise European 
integration as a capitalist integration model and economic aspects of 
membership. Yet, contrary to the expectation from the hypothesis, these 
political parties endorse membership perspective for political reforms and 
democratisation. Additionally, internationalism and supranationalism is 
defended as instrumental to contain nationalism and mechanisms of so-called 
strong state. They refer to free movement of workers and regional funds in 
supporting membership that would contribute to solve regional inequality in 
the Eastern Anatolia. Although European integration is a capitalist process, 
however they support Social Europe. In that sense, the political parties within 
emancipatory left is examined in relation to Ha-vet strategy.  
  
The following sub-section on civil society examines struggles among women 
rights/feminism, human rights and environment that are conceived of as class 
struggle in the sphere of social reproduction against the discipline of capital. 
Contrary to expectation stemming from the hypothesis, these groups support 
membership perspective in relation to its political and social policy aspects. 
Interviewees are concerned about effects of globalisation on women rights, 
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human rights and environment. However, they fail to develop a stance on 
economic implications of membership. Women rights movement takes EU 
legislation on women as progressive – that sets the minimum criteria to 
improve women rights situation in Turkey. The membership perspective is 
equally interpreted as a process opening up space for civil society and 
democratisation. It is read as a peace project to curb the role of ‘strong state’ 
and military expenditures. Indeed, it is possible to unravel four reasons behind 
the failure of disadvantaged groups in society to form an alternative vis-a-vis
neoliberal membership perspective. First, economic implications of 
globalisation are debated in relation to effects on women and human rights. In 
this view, not only neoliberal 'common sense' on the separateness of economics 
and politics is internalised, but their criticism of globalisation remains issue-
specific – that echoes the criticisms that I conducted for theory of discourse in 
chapter three. Second, class politics is accused of operating hierarchically and 
failing to acknowledge the autonomy of feminism and human rights in the 
political sphere. Third, the idea of 'structural emancipation' is no longer 
considered that in turn renders it more difficult to form relations of force 
around a structural emancipatory project. Finally, contrary to mass movement 
rhetoric they develop an alternative conception of political praxis that in turn 
renders common action more difficult.  
On the basis of my empirical study on political and civil society, I argue that 
pro-membership project is hegemonic as ideas associated with membership are 
defended on universal terms in political and civil society. Rather than one 
project for and one project opposing membership, there are two rival class 
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strategies contesting pro-membership in the Turkish context: neo-mercantilism 
and Ha-vet ('No-yes'). However, I contend that neither of these constitutes a 
counter-hegemonic historical bloc. This is further elaborated in the overall 
conclusion. 
284
Chapter 8 - Conclusion
This research has analysed the current struggle over hegemony among social 
forces in Turkey relating to its bid for EU membership. It has debated the 
trajectory of Turkey’s integration into European structures within the structural 
dynamics of globalisation and neoliberal restructuring, with attention focussed 
on the role of European integration in liberalisation. Turkey’s liberalisation and 
its neoliberal restructuring are often interpreted autonomous from membership 
process reasoning that neoliberal restructuring of the 1980s was carried at a 
time when Turkey-EU relations were frozen following the military coup. 
However, I argued that it was through the Customs Union that Turkey 
eliminated its trade protectionism for European products and globally as it has 
to comply with the EU’s common external tariff. Additionally, Turkey adopted 
macroeconomic policies under the guidance and surveillance of the EU and the 
IMF. The EU therefore played a decisive role in Turkish complicity with 
structural adjustment policies. Accordingly, throughout this thesis, I have read 
the position of social forces vis-a-vis membership against the background of 
globalisation. 
Conclusion chapter is structured as follows. It summarizes main coordinates 
that guides the research design and reviews main conclusions from each 
chapter. It is followed with presenting the main empirical findings on the 
current struggle over membership as a pro-membership project whose status is 
interpreted as hegemonic and two rival class strategies that contest it: neo-
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mercantilism and Ha-vet. Following I argue that these two class strategies 
cannot come up with an overall alternative and unfold the reasons behind their 
failure. The discussion proceeds by speculating about probable future 
coordinates of class struggle and ends by a particular optimism referring to 
examples from current struggles in Turkey.     
The struggle around EU membership has been read as an open-ended struggle 
among social forces whose outcome can only be established by class struggle. I 
have queried whether there is a dominant pro-EU hegemonic project 
pioneering the pro-membership perspective and considered who the social 
forces behind any such project might be. I also explored groups disadvantaged 
by globalisation and neoliberal restructuring and considered whether they 
might form an alternative historical bloc that opposes and resists both 
membership and neoliberal restructuring in Turkey. I have asked whether they 
can form a united front and how we might be able to unravel the reasons for a 
lack of an alternative to neoliberal restructuring.  
The analysis took the social relations of production as its core. It began by 
establishing the main mechanism of integration of Turkey’s production into the 
transnational production structure (which is trade rather than FDI). Thus, it was 
shown that Turkey’s path of integration is an instance of internationalism 
rather than transnationalism. Accordingly, intra-class struggle was debated in 
relation to both the national and international forces of capital and labour. This 
research was guided by a hypothesis developed in relation to intra-class 
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struggle, namely that the transnationalisation of production and finance has 
generated a new division between internationally and nationally oriented social 
forces of capital and labour. The former could be expected to develop a 
supportive stance to membership seeing it as the means to stimulate exports 
and consolidate an open and a functioning market economy. It was expected 
that it would defend regional integration as a platform for struggle in a battle 
that has already been lost at the national level due to the transnationalisation of 
production. Contrarily, the latter was expected to oppose membership as they 
will increasingly be exposed to the pressures of competition; and lose state 
subsidies and gains from the welfare state. However, the aim of this thesis was 
not to verify or falsify this hypothesis. Rather, it was taken as a contour in the 
research design, enabling me to map the position of social forces. Indeed, 
empirical research reveals that various social forces adopted a position contrary 
to the expectation from the hypothesis – as in the case of nationally oriented 
capital or emancipatory left political parties.  
In debating intra-class struggle, particular industries were selected. The textile 
and automotive industries were examined as internationally oriented sectors. 
They were endorsed as pioneering sectors within the export-promotion strategy 
following neoliberal turn in 1980s and continue to hold a privileged position in 
Turkish exports. The stance of SMEs and agriculture sector was analysed in 
relation to nationally oriented forces of capital and labour. Agriculture is a 
sheltered sector that is not subjected to tariff reductions via completion of the 
Customs Union (with the exception of processed agricultural products). In 
addition to nationally oriented sectors, public employees were also expected to 
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develop a critical stance to neoliberal membership project due to social cuts 
and the consolidation of neoliberal form of state. Additionally, I drew on van 
der Pijl's claim that 'the issue is no longer that “capitalism” is showing signs of 
collapse...What is failing today is not capital but the capacity of society and 
nature to support its discipline` (van der Pijl, 1998: 48). In accordance with 
this, I approached struggles around patriarchy, the environment and human 
rights as instances of class struggle against the discipline of capital in the field 
of social reproduction. I expected social forces in these areas to contest Turkish 
membership of the EU, and neoliberal restructuring more generally. 
I have not read the Turkish state as a sui generis entity as does the ‘strong 
state’ tradition in political science literature on Turkey (Heper, 1985; Keyder, 
1987; Buğra, 1994). This, in my view, is a myth and is problematic for three 
reasons. First, it presents the main struggle in the society as one of elites versus 
people (in a populist sense) - a reading that masks class struggle. Second, it 
reads the state as having a rationality and 'substantive ends' of its own 
(Yalman, 2009: 160 and 200). Thus, the state is seen as ‘withering away’ from 
the economy in order to constrain its power. To counter this, I adopted the 
Gramscian notion of the integral state, which paves the way to understand state 
apparatuses (such as the military or bureaucracy) not as monolithic entities, but 
as platforms of class struggle among competing fractions. Finally, the strong 
state tradition is problematic as it takes state and civil society and politics and 
economics as operating separately and autonomously from one another, 
presenting the state as a ‘black box’ beyond human agency, and civil society as 
a progressive sphere for democratisation. In place of this view, I conceive of 
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particular mechanisms of civil society as ‘fortresses and earthworks’ (Gramsci, 
1971: 238) that contribute to the ruling class’ project of gaining consent from 
subordinate classes in society. From this critique, the ‘politics’ behind the 
strong state tradition is shown as the consolidation of neoliberal restructuring. I 
highlighted Buttigieg's concern over the effects of strategically misconstruing 
power relations in disabling leftist struggle (2005: 35-37), a point relevant for 
discussing the leftist fraction that supports the neoliberal AKP hegemony in 
Turkey. This fraction views the AKP as a progressive force that - through the 
discourse of political Islam – operates outside of and external to the 
mechanisms of the 'strong state', and so as a force with the potential to 
constrain state power (and the power of the military in particular). I argued that
this is a transhistorical reading of statolatry that is based on conceiving of the 
relationship between state and society as one of externality. It is short of class 
analysis and ultimately ends up reinforcing neoliberal restructuring. It is in 
relation to this point that I objected to discourse theory.
On the basis of this critique, I adopted a conception of the state-society 
relationship that understands it as a social relationship embarking on 
Gramscian historical materialism. This reading paves the way for criticising the 
mechanisms of the capitalist state, rather than presenting state as a black box. 
Drawing on Cox’s analysis on the internationalisation of the state, state 
institutions are considered in relation to their links with the global economy 
and the neoliberal form of state. Hence, state institutions that are closely linked 
with the global economy are expected to support membership, whilst those that 
289
are related to disadvantaged groups from globalisation such as planning offices 
and labour ministries will be sidelined in the struggle.
This reading also unravels the neoliberal ideas and institutions embedded 
within civil society. These are instrumental in enabling the ruling class to 
transcend its narrow vested economic interests and develop a universal project. 
Thus, I examined civil society in two distinct aspects, both of which lead to 
empirical findings. In chapter five, particular institutions that have organic 
links with the ruling class were examined. I noted that although they aspire to 
present ‘expert’ opinions as independent knowledge in a positivist sense, these 
institutions can be seen as ‘trench-systems’ in the war of position. I highlight 
their organic links with capital and read the knowledge they produce as 
‘common sense’, with the social function of presenting ideas associated with 
membership as universal. Against this, I approached women rights/feminist, 
environmental and human rights’ struggles in civil society as having the 
potential to develop a counter-hegemonic historical bloc in chapter seven. 
In chapter two, I reviewed European integration theories and existing analyses 
of the Turkish membership question. The classical integration theories –
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism – were shown to constrain the 
debate to the particular ‘form’ of enlargement. This was shown to be a non-
debate as Turkey continues to integrate with European structures independent 
of the question of whether it will become a member. Thus, such understandings 
fail to engage with the power relations underpinning the ongoing integration 
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process and its socio-economic content. The Europeanisation literature treats 
integration as autonomous from globalisation and subscribes to a liberal 
conception of state and society relations. It concurs with the ‘strong state’ 
tradition, meaning that it subscribes to neoliberal restructuring. Meanwhile, I 
showed that the constructivist approach neglects the material, and that its social 
purpose is to present the EU as a civilian power. This is a reading that abstracts 
imperialism and exploitation from capitalist accumulation and reduces it to 
military intervention. To correct these readings, I introduced Gramscian 
historical materialism, citing four particular strengths that make it appropriate 
for analysing Turkish integration. First, it situates the Turkish membership 
question within the structural dynamics of globalisation and neoliberal 
restructuring - opening the floor for debating the power relations behind 
ongoing integration. Second, the socio-economic content of the pro-
membership perspective and the power relations underpinning it can be 
questioned. Third, it operates to combat ‘common sense’ arguments that 
operate around the strong state-weak civil society dichotomy by analysing 
state-society relationship through the social relations of production. Finally, 
integration is not explained behind automaticity of an economic rationale. 
Rather, it is read as an open-ended struggle whose outcome will be determined 
by class struggle.  
In chapter three I summarised the debates between Gramscian historical 
materialism and Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory. I focused on five key 
areas of disagreement and adopted Gramsci’s conception of hegemony. First, I 
highlighted that in Gramscian historical materialism, agency is not limited to a 
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reductionist notion of class and the production of physical goods, but is based 
around the social relations of production, encompassing institutions and ideas. I 
then criticised Laclau and Mouffe for failing to adequately articulate what they 
mean by 'a non-economistic understanding of economy' (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2002: 136), and for operating within capitalism's structured separation of 
economics and politics: a condition that 'de-socialises the material'. Second, I 
noted that the Gramscian notion of integral state and ethical state not only 
captures the role of capitalist state per se in the struggle over hegemony, but 
uncovers the ‘fortresses and earthworks’ within civil society (Gramsci, 1971: 
238). In other words, it understands that civil society is a sphere where 
hegemony is both contested and consolidated. On the contrary, in the 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, the status of state is under-theorised and 
neoliberal civil society is not contested – and coupled with their separation of 
politics and economics – discourse theory operates within the neoliberal order's 
separation of the state and civil society. Third, whilst the international sphere 
remains under-theorised in discourse theory, Gramscian historical materialism 
paves the way to conceive of hegemonic struggle at the national level within 
the conditions of the international and unevenness of capitalist development. 
Fourth, I argued that in claiming a break with past forms of industrial society, 
Laclau and Mouffe close the possibility of analysing capitalist development 
historically. My final objection was related with the conception of structure in 
theory of discourse. I noted that they conceive structure negatively, seeing it as 
an obstacle to freedom and emancipation. This, in my view, operates on the 
terrain of individualism and fails to provide a stable standing from which to 
create a structural emancipatory struggle. 
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In concluding the debate, I observed that the critique of Laclau and Mouffe 
speaks with counter-hegemony but falls short of defining the hegemony of the 
ruling class and examining its contradictions. Hence, their concept of 
hegemony is either incomplete – lacking an account of the discipline of the 
dominant hegemonic system - or it operates within pre-eminent hegemonic 
order. On the basis of this theoretical critique, I argued that Gramscian 
historical materialism does not necessarily exclude struggles of political 
recognition and introduced van der Pijl’s argument that it is the ‘discipline of 
capital over the entire reproductive system’ and its ‘exploitation of the social 
and natural substratum’ that has to be resisted (van der Pijl, 1998: 36 and 47).  
In this sense, I observed the current struggle over Turkish membership of the 
EU as resistance to the forms of social reproduction imposed by capitalist 
discipline. Understanding the struggle as such paves the way to include 
struggles around feminism/women's rights, the environment and human rights 
as an instance of class struggle.
In chapter four I historically situated Turkey’s integration to European 
structures by reading its political economy under two periods. I showed that, in 
the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey followed an industrialization strategy based on 
import-substitution in tandem with Fordist accumulation and a 
developmentalist state. I argued that during this period, Turkey-EU relations 
took the form of a tug-of-war between structural adjustment working through a 
controversy between liberalisation of trade with the EEC and 
industrialization/development under ISI. In agreement with Yalman (2009: 30) 
I read Turkey’s transition to neoliberalism as a passive revolution. Although 
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Turkey adopted an export-oriented strategy with the Stabilisation Programme 
of 24th January 1980, it was unable to implement this in the context of rising 
social unrest. I argued that the coup was instrumental in containing labour and 
limiting its resistance to liberalisation. I showed that it was after the neoliberal 
restructuring that Turkey applied for full membership in 1987 and began tariff 
reductions. I observed that neoliberal hegemony was strong enough to endorse 
completion of the Customs Union as a prelude to membership. I then identified 
the 1990s with financial liberalisation, opening the Turkish economy to 
speculative short-term capital that engendered a vicious cycle of growth, crisis 
and adjustment and caused crises in 1994, 1999 and 2001. Following this I read 
the AKP’s hegemony within this background of economic crisis as an instance 
of trasformismo - the ‘formation of an ever more extensive ruling class' 
(Gramsci, 1971: 58) which worked ‘to co-opt potential leaders of subaltern 
social groups' (Cox, 1983: 166-167). Though the AKP presented itself as a 
‘rupture’ from previous right-wing political parties, it consolidated neoliberal 
hegemony. The AKP was key to including nationally oriented capital to 
neoliberal project and containing disadvantaged groups through a populist and 
hyper-liberal individualistic conception of social policy. 
The following three chapters presented my empirical findings. Though the 
chapters are structured on the basis of positions of capital and labour, this is 
followed with extension of the debate to include political and civil society, it is 
plausible here to frame the current struggle around three projects. There is not a 
single pro-membership project and a single alternative project (as presumed by 
the hypothesis). The contours of current struggle are much more complex: 
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whilst the pro-membership project is hegemonic, it is contested by two rival 
class strategies: neo-mercantilism and Ha-vet.
I observed that the neoliberal pro-membership project is underpinned by 
internationally oriented capital, right-wing political parties, nationally oriented 
capital and state institutions related to the economy. It is presented as a process 
to providing economic development, macroeconomic stability and increases in 
the competitiveness of the economy and quality of production. The EU is 
presented as an anchor for the consolidation of democracy and the civilising of 
politics, operating against the mechanisms of the 'strong state'. The 
membership perspective is identified as hegemonic. Indeed, the neoliberal 
hegemony is shown to be strong enough to sustain the reform process without 
necessarily attaining the membership status. 
In line with the hypothesis, I showed that internationally oriented capital is the 
pioneering force behind the pro-membership perspective. Membership is 
endorsed in order to stimulate exports and economic growth; provide 
competitiveness; technology transfer; and to safeguard a functioning market 
economy and macroeconomic stability – both of which are seen as decisive 
factors in stimulating FDI. Furthermore, the neoliberal turn in European 
integration that revisits social policy by prioritising workplace around social 
partnership and conditioning of employment to economic growth is well-
received. The membership process is also understood as a peace project that 
will help end the isolation of Turkey on the international stage. Finally, the 
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process is articulated through populist arguments that link it with
modernisation and Westernisation. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, I found that nationally oriented capital – that is 
debated in relation to SMEs and agricultural sector – is also in favour of the 
open market economy model. It reads globalization as an inevitability and 
argues that the only viable strategy for survival under globalisation is to 
increase competitiveness through an export-oriented strategy that will create 
‘national champions’ to operate on the international markets. I observed that 
nationally oriented capital is integrated with the transnational production 
structure via outsourcing and contract manufacturing, in parallel with 
delocalization of production. This resonates with the argument of Robinson, 
who notes that transnationalisation is a process of decentralisation and 
fragmentation of transnational production, and that it operates through 
‘multilayered networks of outsourcing, subcontracting, collaboration, and so 
on, that increasingly link local and national agents to global networks’ within 
which agents either ‘globalize or perish’ (Robinson, 2004: 14, 15, 19 and 20). I 
argued that nationally oriented capital have either adapted to globalization, 
setting themselves the goal to operate competitively in international markets; or
have been integrated into the transnational production structure through 
outsourcing and contract manufacturing. My interviews revealed that the 
effects of liberalisation engendered by the Customs Union have already been 
felt - either through bankruptcy, or by adapting to new conditions. Thus, they 
are no longer concerned with integration to the Internal Market. Accordingly, 
membership is seen as a process through which the consolidation of 
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international rules and standards can be adopted, enabling the discipline of 
industry so that it can operate competitively in international markets. I did find, 
however, that a fraction inside the agriculture sector has acted as I had 
expected and adopted a critical stance vis-a-vis membership on the grounds 
that Turkish farmers will not be able to compete with European enterprises. It 
is believed membership would force the closure of many small farms, creating 
impoverishment and unemployment. Moreover, I found many argue that 
agricultural support provided to CEECs reveals that EU mechanisms would not 
protect Turkish agriculture from globalisation. Such perspectives are 
marginalised, however, and even actors involved in processed agricultural 
products - such as food processing industry - are integrated within the 
international market and are supportive of membership. 
Thus, I have observed that the pro-membership project is pioneered by 
internationally oriented capital and adopted by nationally oriented capital. Yet, 
Gramsci conceives of hegemony as a moment when ruling class transcends its 
economic corporate interests and takes a role of ‘moral and intellectual 
leadership’ by posing the questions on a ‘universal plane’ (Gramsci, 1971: 181-
82). Given this, the hegemonic status of the pro-membership project can only 
be ascertained by discovering whether the social forces transcend their vested 
economic interests. I found that they have, and so argued that neoliberal pro-
European perspective is indeed hegemonic: the project is no longer debated in 
relation to narrow economic interests of the dominant class and/or class 
fraction. It successfully articulates a hegemonic world view by delivering 
persuasive ideas covering a wide range of issues including social policy; 
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foreign policy; democratization and modernization - to such an extent that the 
reform process is carried out without necessarily an explicit focus on attaining 
the membership status. I noted that its hegemonic status is further apparent in 
civil society, where particular institutions aspire to cultivate ‘objective and
scientific’ knowledge claiming their independence due to being financially 
independent from state. However, I read this process as providing the 
‘fortresses and earthworks’ (Gramsci, 1971: 238) for the hegemonic project. 
Thus, civil society plays a significant role in presenting ideas associated with 
membership as ‘universal’. It has the social function of opening particularly 
sensitive issues to public debate by asking ‘experts’ – ‘traditional intellectuals’ 
in a Gramscian sense - to write opinion papers. These institutions present 
membership perspective as progressive - a process that consolidates democracy 
and civilizes politics moving it away from the conception of the ‘strong state’. 
Moreover, analysis of political and civil society revealed that the pro-
membership project is adopted by state institutions in the neoliberal form of 
state. In line with Cox’s analysis on the ‘internationalisation of the state’ and 
function of state institutions related to global economy under the neoliberal 
form of state (which focuses on the way in which state institutions related to 
the global economy are adjusted to meet the requirements of international 
production), I found that institutions closely linked to the economy defend the 
membership process in order to stimulate competitiveness; provide 
macroeconomic stability and consolidate the market economy model. They see 
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the process as a decisive factor enabling compliance with international rules, 
and maintain security for Turkish markets - two key factors in attracting FDI. 
The pro-membership project is also defended by the right-wing AKP 
Government as it is seen as providing economic development, consolidating 
democracy and complying with international rules and standards. I read the 
socio-economic content of AKP rule as the consolidation of neoliberal 
hegemony. Though the social base of the AKP is made up of SMEs, farmers 
and artisans, its policies seek to integrate groups disadvantaged by 
globalisation whose interests could potentially be articulated around a counter-
hegemonic struggle. Indeed, its strategy in the 2002 election campaign 
articulated the need for a ‘rupture’ from previous right-wing governments, and 
this was instrumental in obtaining support from disadvantaged groups. 
However, contrary to its social base, it adopted the programme of ‘Transition 
to a Stronger Turkish Economy' and its macro-economic objectives. This is the 
key to the support AKP rule has obtained from internationally oriented capital 
which interprets it as capable of using its parliamentary majority to carry out 
neoliberal restructuring. Nationally oriented capital is supportive of the policies 
seeking to make SMEs competitive in international markets. Moreover, party 
policies are directed to co-opt disadvantaged groups through an individualistic 
conception of social policy which revolves around the charity model under the 
hyper-liberal form of state. For these reasons, I argued that AKP rule should be 
understood as an instance of trasformismo. 
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In line with this argument on trasformismo, I showed that fractions inside 
internationally oriented labour – Hak-İş among industrial workers and Memur-
Sen in public employment – become integrated to the neoliberal hegemony. 
Although internationally oriented labour supports membership with a different 
rationale (hence why it forms a different class strategy) these platforms adapt 
to the market economy model and are in favour of conducting trade unionism 
through the ‘social partnership’ model. Hak-İş interprets globalisation 
positively and articulates ‘unconditional’ support for all of the economic, social 
and political aspects of membership. In this sense, rather than defending 
struggle at the European level as a result of the structural constraints of 
globalisation, they support globalisation and membership in order to increase 
the competitiveness of economy. Indeed, competitiveness is endorsed as a way 
to save the workplace and generate employment - a stance that adopts the 
conditioning of employment to economic growth. Moreover, though most of 
the interviews are critical about mechanisms of social partnership positing that 
dialogue can only be developed among two ‘equal’ sides (Interview No. 30, 67 
and 68), it was only the interviewees from these confederations and affiliated 
unions who defined labour as a partner of capital (around a model that they 
articulate as ‘industrial democracy’). These platforms have increased their 
membership in the last decade. This resulted in the formation of new cadres of 
labour aristocracy under the AKP rule. Hence, I read their reference to 
internationalism as regressive and deficient. 
I argued that the pro-membership project is contested by two rival class 
strategies: neo-mercantilism and Ha-vet. Whilst they are both hostile to 
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particular aspects of EU membership, neither neo-mercantilism nor Ha-vet 
posits an overall alternative. Neo-mercantilism ends up supporting membership 
on equal terms and conditions whilst Ha-vet articulates a struggle at the 
European level – a position that can be neatly summarised with its motto that: 
'Another globalisation and Europe is possible'. 
The Ha-vet ('No-yes') strategy is underpinned by internationally oriented 
labour, the Kesk among public employees, social democratic political parties, 
certain feminist groups and human rights groups. These social forces criticise 
the capitalist nature of the European integration process, but promote the 
concept of 'Social Europe'. The current membership debate is criticised for 
being trapped between nationalist reflexes and an unconditional support for 
neoliberalism. In this sense, Ha-vet aspires to propose an alternative. The group 
can be linked with a fraction inside Left as the 'new left' or the 'emancipatory 
left'. 
In line with the hypothesis, I showed that internationally oriented labour (the
textile and automotive industries and Disk) have developed a supportive 
stance, albeit one which follows a different rationale to the social forces 
underpinning pro-membership project. Here, globalisation is criticised for 
creating de-unionisation and the rise of flexible work. However, internationally 
oriented labour is no longer concerned with the pressures of competitiveness 
due to participation in the Internal Market. They argue that globalisation is a 
‘fact’ that has undermined – ‘dynamited’ even – the struggle at the national 
level. Thus, the internationalisation of labour is defended as the only viable 
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strategy for struggling against globalisation and the organisation of production 
at the transnational level. It is argued that a ‘Social Europe’ has to be 
supported, and that globalisation has to be struggled in order to turn it to the 
benefit of workers' interests. It is posited that the impact of integration on the 
Internal Market has already been felt as a result of the Customs Union.
Interviewees articulated the view that the struggle over the economic aspects of 
integration has already been lost with the completion of the Customs Union. 
Thus, they relate membership primarily to issues around social policy and 
democratisation. They argue that the European Social Model is progressive and 
will contribute to the development of social rights in Turkey. Moreover, they 
hold that the strong Turkish state has resulted in an underdeveloped civil 
society. They therefore see international actors such as the EU as progressive 
anchors, capable of working for the consolidation of democracy by 
constraining the mechanisms of the 'strong state'. European integration is also 
interpreted as a ‘peace project’ that can contribute to solutions to Turkey's 
problems in Cyprus, its relationship with Greece, and the Kurdish and 
Armenian issues.
  
I noted that Ha-vet is also supported by social democratic parties and Kurdish 
political parties. The ‘emancipatory left’ differentiates itself from the centre-left 
through its critical stance on capitalism and its opposition to membership 
debates conducted in relation to national concerns. This fraction aspires to 
unite struggles around class and identity and advocates a united struggle among 
the segments in society that have been disadvantaged by processes of 
globalisation. These political parties criticise globalisation for generating 
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inequality and income disparity. However - in line with other social forces 
within Ha-vet - they accept globalisation as a fact and articulate a struggle at 
the international level. Contrary to the hypothesis, I found that Kurdish 
political parties support membership on political grounds. For instance, whilst 
they interpret globalisation as a process accelerating income disparity, they 
argue that globalisation has the potential to decrease the isolation of the 
Kurdish movement. Similarly, they have developed a stance supportive of 
membership. They argue that whilst Turkey’s eastern region is economically 
under-development, there is an expectation that free movement of workers and 
regional funds will help solve the economic problems of the region. 
Membership is also perceived as a democratisation process that scrutinises 
human rights violations in Turkey, and as a decentralising process that would 
constrain and shift the state power to supranational and local levels.
Most of the women’s rights/feminist groups and human rights support Ha-vet 
as well. These groups do not take a homogenous stance critical of globalisation 
though there is a general tendency to perceive of globalisation negatively. In 
the case of women’s rights/feminist groups it is argued that globalisation 
impoverishes women rendering their labour increasingly vulnerable to flexible 
forms of work. Human rights groups criticise globalisation for subjecting new 
spheres of public life (such as health and education) to commodification. As 
receiving healthcare and accessing education is a human right, they argue that 
globalisation violates human rights. I found that globalisation is also 
interpreted negatively by certain environment groups for causing environment 
problems. However, contrary to the expectation from the assumption, there is a 
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tendency among these social movements to support the political aspects of EU 
membership. Most of the women's rights/feminist groups and human rights 
groups agree that membership will improve social and human rights for 
minorities and women; and will engender a process of democratisation through 
the expansion of civil society and a reduction in the influence on the strong 
state and its 'military tutelage'. The EU pushes Turkey to comply with 
international norms and values regarding human rights, women's rights and 
democracy. The role of EU in helping to construct a democratic solution to the 
Kurdish problem is supported. Thus, the EU is read as a peace project that will 
contribute to solve Turkey's problems in foreign affairs. 
Thus, Ha-vet’s strategy cannot be seen as an overall alternative to pro-
membership project. In my view, there are three problems with the strategy of 
Ha-vet, which show why it is incapable of transcending its economic-corporate 
phase presenting a universally appealing bloc. First, the critiques I made of 
discourse theory in chapter three can be applied: Ha-vet criticizes state but fails 
to contest capitalist state per se; and neglects to unfold mechanisms of 
neoliberal civil society. In this, they implicitly re-iterate the neoliberal 
conception of state and civil society as two separate phenomena reproducing 
'common sense' understanding of the strong state. Their critique of Turkish 
statolatry is based on a dichotomy between the state and civil society, and an 
equally problematic dichotomy between politics and economics. This reading 
fetishes the ‘strong state’ and conceives of civil society as autonomous from 
the economy and fails to detect ‘fortresses and earthworks’ (Gramsci, 1971: 
238) within civil society. Thus, Ha-vet’s understanding further serves to 
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neoliberal hegemony at the ideational level. The political repercussions of this 
stance can be evidenced in the support given by particular social democratic 
forces within Ha-vet to the hegemonic alliance formed under the AKP to 
reform the mechanisms of the strong state as argued in chapter four. Another 
indicator of Ha-vet’s understanding of economics and politics as separate 
spheres is its reading of EU as a peaceful project. It is argued that the EU is a 
capitalist but not an imperialist bloc. This reading equates imperialism to 
military intervention, abstracting its content from the material conditions of 
capitalist accumulation and the exploitation of peripheral countries. This re-
produces a similar form of argument to social constructivism’s conception of 
Europe as a civilian power. Social forces supporting Ha-vet needs to re-
consider imperialism. As Cox reminds us, imperialism is ‘a rather loose 
concept which in practice has to be newly defined with reference to each 
historical period’ (Cox, 1981: 142).
Second, political parties whose social base relies on social forces within Ha-vet 
are yet to pass the 10% threshold in national elections. Their deputies are 
elected from independent lists and are incapable of forming a bloc in the 
Parliament. Moreover, particular social forces underpinning Ha-vet strategy –
for instance women’s rights/feminist groups, human rights and environment 
groups – are not inclined to resort to political parties as viable mechanisms to 
convey their interests in the political sphere. This largely stems from their 
alternative conception of political praxis, which is based on social movement 
rhetoric. A word of caution is necessary here, however: this criticism should 
not be taken as a claim that parliaments provide the only viable political 
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platforms. However, it should be noted that particular women’s rights/feminist 
activists even underlined that women have never aspired to take power in the 
political sphere. This again echoes with conception of power within theory of 
discourse and its criticism to classical forms of seizure of power in the 
vanguardist sense. As highlighted by Laclau and Mouffe, 'power is not 
something one can seize, because power is constitutive of the ensemble of 
social relations' (Laclau and Mouffe, 2002: 146-147). 
Third, the criticisms of globalisation made by these groups remain issue-
specific. Indeed, in line with my criticisms of discourse theory’s conception of 
structure as a hindrance to political action, these social forces remain incapable 
of developing a structural emancipatory project. In this sense, their criticism 
politicises the private sphere, but fails to critique the de-politicisation of the 
economy. 
The neo-mercantilist strategy is supported by nationally oriented labour, Türk-
İş (a confederation primarily organised in state economic enterprises), public 
employees, agricultural labour, and centre-left and nationalist political parties. 
It stands at the centre-left and on the far-right of the political spectrum. It is 
critical of globalisation for engendering de-industrialisation, de-unionisation 
and creating cuts to welfare. However, the socio-economic content of 
membership is received positively, with the exception of the EU's failure to 
recognise the free movement of workers (in contravention of the Ankara 
Agreement). Furthermore, membership is read as a process of modernisation 
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and westernisation. Thus, forces supporting this strategy have developed a 
policy of 'membership on equal terms and conditions', highlighting that their 
support is conditional on Turkey benefitting from structural funds and the free 
movement of workers. 
Nationally oriented labour – Türk-İş, agriculture sector, public employees - is 
concerned with the repercussions of integrating with the Internal Market. Here, 
globalisation is read as a process that generates both de-unionisation and de-
industrialisation for nationally oriented labour. However, nationally oriented 
labour is divided on the socio-economic content of membership. On the one 
hand, it is argued that the EU will provide protection from globalisation 
through the structural funds. For instance, it is posited that even agriculture has 
already been subjected to liberalisation in tandem with structural adjustment 
policies adopted in parallel with WTO and WB rules. In this view, the EU 
membership is to be supported as the EU - as a regional model - can provide 
protectionism from globalisation and contribute to develop social standards in 
Turkey. On the other hand, it is posited that the EU policies coincide with the 
policies of the WTO and the WB and will trigger further liberalisation. 
Furthermore, the European social model is accused of placing labour under the 
tutelage of capital and operating as a mechanism justifying imperialist 
exploitation. In this view, workers of developed and developing countries 
cannot cooperate as long as imperialism endures. Indeed, it is argued that 
conducting social policy around social partnership is testimony to the argument 
that European workers share surplus with European capital extracted through 
imperialist exploitation. Membership is not understood to be related to 
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democratisation, as it is believed that democracies can only be consolidated by 
domestic dynamics. However, nationally oriented labour adopts a unified 
stance in relation to national concerns, including the Cyprus problem, and the 
Kurdish and Armenian questions. Here, it is argued that the EU has a tendency 
to discriminate against Turkey and asks for unilateral concessions that would 
damage its national interests. Moreover, as the EU is seen as an imperialist 
bloc, its policies vis-a-vis Cyprus and Kurdish questions are understood as 
deliberate attempts to dismember Turkey. Thus, the nation state is articulated 
as a viable site for struggle against this ‘dismemberment strategy’ and to regain 
welfare achievements.  
The centre-left political parties fail to propose any alternative economic model 
other than a form of social market economy. Indeed, both the CHP’s 'social 
market economy' model and the DSP’s 'Societal Competitive Economy' (CHP, 
2007: 24-25; Türker, 2006: 3) consider increasing competitiveness in global 
markets as essential for economic growth, and articulate a social dimension 
prioritising employment, equal distribution of income and a welfare state. This 
is in tandem with their criticisms to globalisation centred on social policy and 
national interests analogous to their supportive stance towards the market 
economy model. Accordingly, centre-left political parties conceive of EU 
membership as having positive effects for both the economy and social policy. 
They support membership, believing it will stimulate competitiveness, increase 
the quality of goods and facilitate technology transfer. They also refer to the 
European social model and regional and structural funds in defending 
membership. Accordingly, their opposition is constrained to national 
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sensitivities and they offer conditional support to EU membership, provided it 
is carried out on the basis of 'equal terms and conditions'. 
In my view, neo-mercantilism does not stand as an alternative. First, neo-
mercantilism as a rival class strategy loses ground within globalisation. In 
terms of economic policy, EU membership is considered from the perspective 
of 'development'. Here, its ideas concerning economic and social policy echo a 
long defeated Keynesian welfare regime, in which the priorities are the 
protection of national industries, tripartism and moderate redistribution of 
income under the supervision of the state. It is argued that latecomer countries 
to the capitalist system are incapable of developing and industrialising through 
liberalisation and market mechanisms (Soral, 2009: 20). In this sense, 
structural adjustment policies and export-orientation resulting from the 
membership process constrain industrial development and compel Turkish 
industries to create a form of 'montage industry', which fails to trigger 
production within the national economy. Hence, the export orientation is seen 
to have triggered de-industrialisation rather than economic growth, and 
industry is left underdeveloped. Dependence upon international markets not 
only impedes economic development but also generates political dependence
(Soral, 2009: 57). Indeed, the consolidation of the market economy in Turkey 
is related to the imperialist project designed to dismember Turkey (Interview 
No. 30 and 78).
This argument echoes the debates within the left during the 1970s between 
Maoists, the developmentalist school and those supportive of the strategy of 
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de-linking. Mao makes a distinction between the contradiction between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which is to be resolved by socialist revolution; 
and the contradiction between colonies and imperial powers, which can only be 
solved by national revolutionary war:
In our country, the contradiction between the working class and the 
national bourgeoisie belongs to the category of contradictions among 
the people... The national bourgeoisie differs from the imperialists, the 
landlords and the bureaucrat-capitalists. The contradiction between the 
national bourgeoisie and the working class is one between the exploiter 
and the exploited, and is by nature antagonistic. But in the concrete 
conditions of China, this antagonistic class contradiction can, if 
properly handled, be transformed into a non-antagonistic one and be 
resolved by peaceful methods. However, it will change into a 
contradiction between ourselves and the enemy if we do not handle it 
properly and do not follow the policy of uniting with, criticizing and 
educating the national bourgeoisie, or if the national bourgeoisie does 
not accept this policy of ours (1967: 56-57; see also, 1967: 50).
Thus, the neo-mercantilist strategy relies on a particular reading of 
imperialism, against which the nation state is seen as the platform providing 
protection. Yet this strategy is regressive as it overlooks the capitalist nature of 
the developmental state. In my view, the second reason why it fails to offer an 
overall alternative is the fact that although the critique is anti-imperialist, it is 
not anti-capitalist. 
Third, analogous with Gramsci’s conception of struggle that is conditioned by 
the international, it needs to be stressed that social forces supporting neo-
mercantilism are structurally disadvantaged within the neoliberal world order. 
As they articulate corporatism and forming alliances with nationally oriented 
capital, they are further defeated by the inclusion of nationally oriented SMEs 
within the transnational production structure. Moreover, privatisation 
weakened the position of nationally oriented labour by generating de-
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unionisation and unemployment. Many mass production sites operating under 
state economic enterprises – once state owned – have now been privatised, 
whilst the bulk of nationally oriented labour operates on a sub-contractual 
basis, often in a position of precarity. Thus, their workers cannot be organised 
using the classical tools of unionisation under the Fordist period, a trajectory 
that regrettably weakens the legitimacy of trade unions in society. Equally, 
there is a fraction that is co-opted to neoliberal hegemony such as in the case of 
processed agricultural products.
Fourth, the economic and social arguments of neo-mercantilism– such as the 
claim that the European social model sustains the exploitation of European 
imperialism inside Türk-İş - have been defeated as nationalist. Indeed, neo-
mercantilism overlooks internationalism and sees labour in Europe solely as a 
partner in imperial exploitation. This overlooks ongoing class struggles over 
the European order. This defeat constrained the opposition to national interests 
– meaning it focuses on issues such as discrimination against Turkey regarding 
Cyprus, Greece, and the Kurdish and Armenian issues - and protests against 
privileged partnership. The opposition is centred on permanent derogations and 
the possibility of a privileged partnership, both of which would deny the 
benefits to disadvantaged groups that would be granted with full membership. 
In this sense, it fails to develop persuasive arguments regarding economic and 
social order and cannot go beyond its economic-corporatist phase in the 
struggle over hegemony.
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The future trajectory is uncertain considering that `hegemony is never constant 
but always contested` (Bieler, 2005a: 466). However, it is possible to observe 
particular coordinates that provide hints of future class struggle. Currently, it is 
the European orientation, consolidation of liberalisation and political reform 
process that is hegemonic. For instance, it is highlighted by interviewees from 
state institutions that the adoption of EU acquis endures independently of the 
process of membership. This is often debated in relation to neo-Ottomanism 
and the AKP’s commitment to reform process without necessarily attaining 
membership status as an alternative (e.g. Moore and Dannreuther, 2009: 138). 
Yet, this is far from constituting an alternative given that the socio-economic 
content of reform process is identical with membership. On the contrary, it
further illuminates the hegemonic status of pro-membership perspective, as the 
reform process and its neoliberal socio-economic content is seen as 
‘progressive’ without Turkey needing to seek full membership status.
  
However, I have argued that capital might prefer to maintain the current status 
quo through which open trade is guaranteed by the Customs Union, but the 
costs associated with implementing European social standards are avoided. 
Indeed, internationally oriented capital has already put reserves to Turkey’s 
compliance to European social model on the grounds of competitiveness of 
Turkish enterprises (Interview No. 32). This is why capital detains adaption of 
social acquis on the condition that membership would be materialised 
(Interview No. 34), a position that reveals that the current state of integration 
has fulfilled the material interests of internationally oriented capital. 
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Indeed, interviewees from internationally oriented capital highlighted that 
membership is instrumental for Turkey to be competitive in international 
markets and that membership perspective can be re-considered (Interview No. 
64 and 65). They highlight that there are no additional economic benefits to be 
obtained via membership, aside from tangential gains made through 
participating to the decision making (Interview No. 6, 32, 63 and 64). Notably, 
particular members within TÜSİAD have already begun to operate 
transnationally by investing in European markets. This decreases their 
dependence on membership for providing them with material gains from the 
European market. Interviewees from nationally oriented capital posited that EU 
production has already become dependent on Turkey, suggesting that they have 
stabilised the delocalisation of production. In this view, options other than 
membership can be considered (Interview No. 7 and 22). The interviewee from 
TİM acknowledged that the Customs Union should be debated if Turkey does 
not become a member. Here, compliance to the common external tariff is 
particularly criticised. It is argued that the EU’s free trade agreements causes 
asymmetrical relations and creates dependence on the European trade regime, 
preventing Turkey from diversifying its foreign trade with other regions 
(Interview No. 65). It is also believed to be unsustainable as Turkish 
enterprises are subjected to decisions taken at the European level without being 
able to participate in the decision making procedure (Interview No. 5 and 6).
The SMEs are critical of dependence of trade to Europe advocating a 
multilateral trade regime and the adoption of strategies to diversify trade with 
neighbours (MÜSİAD, 2003: 65-67; MÜSİAD, 2004b: 50). An interviewee 
from the internationally oriented textile sector acknowledged that there is a 
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proposal to downgrade the Customs Union to a free trade agreement (Interview 
No. 64). 
The economic crisis further complicates the picture. It is argued that demand 
for Turkish products is contracting in tandem with the economic crisis in Euro-
zone, a situation that drives Turkey to develop policies seeking to diversify its 
foreign economic relations to incorporate alternative markets in North Africa, 
the Far East and China; and so decrease its trade dependence on the European 
market (Interview No. 63, 64 and 65). For instance, trade with the Middle East 
and North Africa increased five folds from 2002, reaching 20% of overall 
foreign trade (Interview No. 65). The interviewee from the Central Bank 
believes that the EU’s economic crisis means that membership would be to 
Turkey’s economic disadvantage. It was noted that participation in the Euro-
zone is highly risky under the current situation as it means losing national 
sovereignty over monetary policy (Interview No. 23), and that Turkey complies 
with the Maastricht criteria in relation to price stability and inflation outside of 
the membership framework; thus the need for Turkey to become a member will 
decrease as Turkey approaches EU standards (Interview No. 23).
Similarly, the interviewee from the AKP argued that the attractiveness of 
membership decreases as the crisis in Euro-zone progresses (Interview No. 50). 
The political climate in Europe, with conservatives opposed to Turkish 
membership, and a rise in nationalism and xenophobia were criticised 
(Interview No. 36, 50 and 63). There is also the impression that the EU uses 
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and abuses the Cyprus problem to block Turkey’s bid for membership 
(Interview No. 63 and 64). 
An interviewee from the internationally oriented automotive trade union 
highlighted that welfare regimes in Europe are radically retreating as a result of 
the economic crisis, and that this places in doubt the potential for the European 
Social Model to contribute to Turkish working class (Interview No. 67). 
Moreover, the social forces underpinning neo-mercantilism that have given 
their consent to the process on the condition of benefitting from 
agricultural/structural funds and ensuring free movement of workers can 
develop a more openly critical stance in the case of a form of privileged 
membership. 
Although there is not an overall alternative to neoliberal pro-membership 
perspective, resistance to globalisation and neoliberal restructuring is alive in 
various platforms. A few examples in the last couple of years will suffice to 
conclude with some optimism. The Tekel protest was decisive in providing a 
renewed impetus to class struggle. This occurred following privatisation of 
Tekel - a former state enterprise in the tobacco and alcoholic beverage sector –
when workers resisted to be employed on a 4-C status (precarious employment 
in public sector). The protest lasted for 78 days and was supported by workers 
nationally and internationally. In March 2012, members of teachers` unions 
accused the recently adopted Education Bill of promoting child labour and 
Islamic schooling. The struggle of unemployed teachers – who numbered 
around 300.000 - who are waiting to be appointed provides another instance of 
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resistance against precarious employment and the commodification of services. 
Meanwhile, medical doctors and medical students are protesting against 
neoliberal transitions in the health sector. The struggle continues in the sphere 
of social reproduction as well. In May 2011, a group of protesters gathered to 
demonstrate against AKP policies and the plan to construct a hydroelectric 
plant in Hopa during a visit of Prime Minister Erdoğan. The police intervened 
using force, and Metin Lokumcu, a retired teacher, suffered a fatal heart attack 
as a result of a gas bomb. In the last year environmental protests have 
continued, over continuing environmental destruction in the construction of 
hydroelectric plants, commodification of water, the death of Metin Lokumcu, 
and the government’s authoritarian stance more broadly. Very recently,
protests have been organised to demonstrate against the AKP policy of 
privatising municipal and state theatres. The authoritarian policies of AKP rule 
and the capitalist state are accelerating creating social unrest. More than 100 
journalists still remain in prison. The government continues to arrest Kurdish 
intellectuals – on terror charges including the activist and publisher Ragıp 
Zarakulu and Prof. Büşra Ersanlı, who was arrested for teaching on Kurdish 
politics in the BDP`s political assembly. There was also protest against the 
murder of the Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, with the court finally 
reaching a verdict - five years after his murder - which sentenced his murderer 
to life prison but failed to investigate the existence of an organised illegal 
organisation. This resulted in a large march with banners stating `We are all 
Armenians, We are all Hrant`, and protesters accusing the Government of 
backing down nationalist police and military forces. However, re-thinking the 
ways and means to overcome disagreements among different fractions is 
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i The Empty Chair Crisis is engendered by De Gaulle when he protested participating to the 
Council meetings and blocked the decision-making process due to the proposal of Commission 
President Hallstein to finance the Common Agricultural Policy via European Community’s 
own budgetary sources. The Crisis was overcome by the Luxembourg Compromise that 
stimulated unanimity in decision-making by safeguarding unilateral veto right over any 
negotiated matter if one of the member states declares that its interests are at stake (Dinan, 
1994: 39-69).  
ii The communists decided to protest the parliamentary elections and formed the abstentionist 
communist fraction. For Gramsci, working class should not collaborate with other classes in 
constitutional and parliamentary mechanisms of bourgeois democracy to reform parliamentary
system. It is only a different institutional platform that can provide the working class with its 
autonomous development as a class and accomplish its historical function under a new state. 
The relations of production can only be transformed under a new state, rather than the 
parliamentary means (Gramsci, 1978: 32-33, 39-40).
iii In the debate to find an adequate response to the rise of fascism, the PCI accused social 
democrats for their pacifism for being to the advantage of fascists. Gramsci refers to the speech 
of Giacomo Matteotti, who stated in the Parliament that ‘We must not let ourselves be 
provoked, for even cowardice is a duty, an act of heroism’ (Footnote 15, Gramsci, 1978: 465). 
Yet, according to Gramsci, fascism was not limited to a particular force. The working class 
was confronted with ‘the  whole  State  apparatus,  with  its  police,  its  courts,  its newspapers 
which manipulate public opinion as the government and the capitalists  please’ (Gramsci, 
1978: 57-61). 
iv The term ‘desocialize the material’ is owned to Ellen Meiksins Wood (Wood, 1981: 70).  
v Though those Marxist studies conduct class analyses, they end up arguing for the strong state. 
For instance, Keyder compares pre-capitalist periods of the Ottoman Empire and European 
feudalism and underlines that feudal social context that engendered capitalist production in 
Europe was non-existent in Ottoman Empire (Keyder, 1987: 7). Keyder compares Ottoman 
Empire with core capitalist countries and refers to two specificities in Ottoman social 
formation, absence of large-scale land ownership in the agrarian structure that in return 
rendered position of bureaucracy unchallenged by a landed class, and the expulsion of a 
majority of the Christian bourgeoisie during and after World War I that dislocated class 
struggle and capitalist transformation. Accordingly, as the argument goes, agrarian structure 
and ethnically differentiated bourgeoisie are enumerated as reasons behind the lack of 
constitution of a capitalist state under bourgeois domination, that in return reads Kemalist 
regime with ‘bureaucratic reformism’  (Keyder, 1987: 2). This reading based on differences 
between pre-capitalist social formations in European feudalism and Ottoman Empire ends up 
with argument on “peculiar status of bureaucracy” in Turkey as a ruling class (Keyder, 1987: 
77-79). 
Yet, it is Heper’s The State Tradition in Turkey (1985) that pioneers scholarly work on strong 
state tradition. Heper reasons existence of strong state tradition with the so-called inability of 
local notables to rise to a status of nobility and/or aristocracy and absence of a middle class in 
Turkish social setting (Heper, 1985: 101). This has rendered Turkish social setting as a strong 
state and weak civil society, inherited from the Ottoman Empire, and based on patriarchy, a 
setting that ‘subdues’ periphery (Heper, 1985: 14 and 16). Class as a category, it is argued, 
loses its explanatory power as strong state prevents development of bourgeoisie and 
consolidation of democracy accordingly (Heper, 1985: 98-100). Then, Heper explains absence 
of civil society in relation to absence of a developed `private sector` and leading industrialists 
and businessmen due to the mechanisms of `transcendental state` and bureaucracy (Heper, 
1985: 102-103).
318
                                                                                                                                                                
viTurkey signed five Structural Adjustment Loans Agreements with the WB between 1980 and 
1984, getting 1,6 billion dollars in total. Moreover, in 1980, Turkey signed three-year IMF 
stand-by agreement through which Turkey was given one of the highest amount of credit. For a 
more detailed analysis of the financial support given by the IMF and the WB, please see  Önis, 
Z. and Kirkpatrick, C. (1991) ‘Turkey’ in P. Mosley et. al. (eds.) Aid and Power the World 
Bank and Policy Based Lending, London: Routledge: 2: 9-37.  
viiAccording to Uzgel, the 28th February process was a turning point for the transformation 
within the National View. After 28th February process and the failure of Erbakan to stay in 
power, the `Green capital` started to look for a new political party, that will not only align with 
globalisation but also be more cautious with the secular/statist establishments (Uzgel, 2009: 
18). Yet, it is important to trace historical development of the AKP within the Milli Görüş
(National View) that formed the basis of the Party. The Milli Görüş was founded by Necmettin 
Erbakan in 1969 and its ideas were embodied in a number of subsequently founded political 
parties. The Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP - National Order Party) was founded in 1970 and closed 
in 1971 with allegations of aiming to find a state based on Islam. Subsequently, the Milli 
Selamet Partisi (MSP – National Salvation Party) was founded in 1972 that was closed by 1980 
military coup. As a successor, on 19 July 1983, supporters of Erbakan formed the Refah Partisi 
(RP - Welfare Party) without initially his formal participation. The RP got the 4,4% of votes in 
1984 election; %7,1 in 1987; %9,8 in 1989 and %17 in 1991. In 1995 elections, the RP got 
21,4% of votes, that rendered the RP the largest political party in the parliament with 158 seats 
out of 450. Erbakan formed a coalition government with the centre-right party, the Doğru Yol 
Partisi (DYP - True Path Party) led by Çiller in June 28, 1996 and stayed in power until July 2, 
1997. Yet, February 28, 1997 silent coup forced Erbakan to resign. Analogous with that the RP 
was closed in 1998 and substituted by Fazilet Partisi (FP - Virtue Party). The FP was closed by 
a decision of the Constitutional Court in June 2001. Hitherto, the National View is represented 
by two political parties, the traditionalists mostly under the Saadet Partisi (SP - Felicity Party), 
founded on July 20, 2001 and the so-called reformists under the AKP (founded on August 14,
2001).
viii Ahmet Davutoğlu is the Minister for Foreign Affairs since May 1, 2009. He has acted as 
chief advisor to Prime Minister Erdoğan and is well-known as the architect of the so-called 
‘new’ foreign policy orientation. Davutoğlu articulates five principles that lies at the core of 
this orientation. First, Turkey should try to find a balance between security and democracy, by 
providing security without undermining freedoms and human rights. Second, a policy of zero-
problems towards Turkey’s neighbours is envisaged that aims to strenghten relations without 
creating fears of imperial expansion. Third, Turkey undertakes to develop relations with 
neighbours and in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the US, the EU 
and the West. Davutoğlu reasons the PKK factor and mutual negative images for the limited 
influence of Turkey in the region and welcomes the AKP initiatives to forge economic 
interdependence, state cooperation and societal links, that in return forges Turkey’s influence 
in the Middle East. Fourth, Turkey pursues a multi-dimensional foreign policy, that conceives 
sustaining special relations with the US and membership objective to the EU, good 
neighbourghood with Russia and synchronization policy in the Euro-Asia as parts of a 
consistent strategy. Davutoğlu highlights that this strategy is not competitive but 
complementary with policies of global actors. Finally, Turkey aims to follow a `rhythmic`
diplomacy within which active involvement to international organisations and issues in 
international relations is pursued (Davutoğlu, 2010; Davutoğlu, 2008: 79-83). Please see 
Davutoğlu, A. (2001) Stratejik Derinlik, Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu [Strategic Depth, 
Turkey’s International Position], İstanbul: Küre Yayınları. Davutoğlu, A. (2008) ‘Turkey’s 
Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007’, Insight Turkey 10, 1: 77-96. Davutoğlu, A. 
(2010) `Turkey`s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy`, Foreign Policy. http://jft-
newspaper.aub.edu.lb/reserve/data/s11244/s11244.pdf
ix The automotive industry put forward three arguments. First, the decision to complete the 
Customs Union could be deferred in order to restore negative effects of 1994 economic crisis. 
Second, a transitional period was requested given that adoption of regulation regarding 
implementation of the Customs Union is very detailed. Third, the automotive industry resisted 
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free movement of second-hand motor vehicles that can be destructive and turn the domestic 
market into a second-hand market (Interview No. 63).
x Letter of Rıdvan Budak, President of Tekstil-Is to President of the European Commission 
Rose Manuel Barrosa. http://www.disktekstil.org/tr/?i=pages&id=334
xiFor instance, Jak Kamhi was a member of ERT between 1991 and 2003, and served in the 
Executive Committee of the TÜSİAD. Currently, Bülent Eczacıbaşı is a member of both the 
TÜSİAD and the ERT. Recently, Güler Sabancı has become a member to ERT.   
xii In the referenda, 60% of the Northern Cypriots accepted and 75% of Greek Cypriots rejected
the resolution achieved with the Annan Plan. After the referenda, the EU starts to take some 
measures such as providing free movement of goods, people and services in Northern Cyprus 
through the 'Green Line' regulation, giving financial assistance and taking initiatives for 
adjustment to EU legislation (TÜSİAD, 2009: 91-96). TÜSİAD well-receives these 
developments and highlights that potential deadlock can suspend the process, that will in return 
culminate in further isolation of Northern Cyprus and deterioration of economic problems 
(TÜSİAD, 2009: 97). Moreover, Turkey can be accused for the deadlock that can cause 
international sanctions and suspension of Turkey's membership process (TÜSİAD, 2009: 98).
xiii Institutionally, international oriented automotive and textile industries are represented in 
almost all European platforms in which members from Turkey take administrative posts 
(Interview No. 63 and 64). For instance, TÜTSİS has four members in the Administrative 
Board of European Textile and Apparel Confederation (Euratex) and President of TÜTSİS, 
Halit Narin acts as Deputy President within Euratex (Interview No. 64).
xiv OSTİM develops cooperation mechanisms on the basis of needs of SMEs such as 
employment, vocational training, energy, exporting, advertisement, fairs and research and 
development. SMEs within OSTİM formed OSTİM Investment Joint Stock Company by 
establishing firms each directed to solve the problems of SMEs such as international fairs, 
research and development and/or advertisement. For instance, OSTİM Investment Joint Stock 
Company built an electric power plant on its own to decrease prices of energy (Interview No. 
22).
xvDisk was founded in 1967 among former trade unionists within Türk-İş upon a severe 
criticism to the latter for being collaborative with the state and keeping an apolitical stance 
with reference to above-party politics (yellow trade unionism). The 1980 military coup was 
more reactionary towards Disk due to its former revolutionary stance and Disk was banned 
from 1980 to 1992. Disk defines trade unionism as a democratic and class based mass 
unionism that should be independent from state, capital and political authority (Disk, 2008). 
The Disk is a left-oriented trade union that supports leftist political parties (Interview No. 33). 
Yet, before 1980s, Disk was defined as a socialist union in its founding statute and this article 
is removed after 1992 (Interview No. 33). The Disk became a member to the European Trade 
Union Confederation (ETUC) in 1985, as the first member confederation from Turkey.
xvi Türk-İş is the first confederation, founded in 1952 by the state under the state corporatist 
period of 1945 and 1961. Within the historical context of Cold War, the Türk-İş categorized 
trade unionism as 'evolutionary and revolutionary' and sided with the former as a model (Türk-
İş, 2002a: 5). For instance, the Türk-İş from its inception has adapted a principle of 'above-
party politics' underlining that party politics renders trade unions dependant to political parties 
(Türk-İş, 2002a: 127). Moreover, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Türk-İş supported mixed 
economy model within which the state planned economic development and industrialisation 
and set itself the goal to stimulate private sector (Türk-İş, 2002a: 123 and 203-205).
xvii The international mechanisms are defended in the struggle against globalisation. For 
instance, trade unions in Europe collaborated with Turkish trade unions to issuing 'social 
responsibility declarations' which protested working standards in an international enterprise's 
workplace set in Turkey (Interview No. 12). Another interviewee referred to framework 
agreements designed to control wage policies and the application of equivalent social standards 
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at the global level. For instance, Birleşik Metal İş cooperates with European Metalworkers' 
Federation (EMF) to sign framework agreements (Interview No. 67). Yet, this mechanism 
cannot go beyond having a status of moral declaration as it lacks recourse to legal sanctions in 
cases of misconduct (Interview No. 33). Moreover, international platforms are criticised for 
failing to develop a concrete strategy which goes beyond organising conferences and opposing 
IMF programmes (Interview No. 68).
xviiiThere are three major obstacles to unionisation in Labour Law. First, workers have to obtain 
a notary certificate to register to and resign from trade unions. This renders unionisation 
cumbersome and costly for workers. Second, a trade union has to represent at least 10% of the 
workers employed in the same sector to be able to participate to collective bargaining. Third, a 
trade union has to get support of '50% plus one' workers in the same workplace to set up a 
trade union. Further obstacles are raised by interviewees such as cases in courts on the grounds 
of fake notary certificates, legal issues surrounding whether a particular trade union is 
authorisesed to negotiate collective bargaining, and employers' insistence that they operate on 
another sector (Interview No. 12). One interviewee highlighted that these cases last around ten 
years, serving to intimidate workers and severing the organic link between workers and trade 
unions (Interview No. 12).    
xix Türk-İş' former stance was shaped around a nodal point of imperialism, which they viewed 
as a force impeding the internationalism of the working class movement (Interview No. 30). It 
is possible to come across organic links between this idea and the work of Yıldırım Koç, who 
acted as the Chief Advisor and responsible for International Relations of Türk-İş between 1993 
and 2003. He lectures in Middle East Technical University (METU), and has published 
intensively. Koç contends that it would be a mistake for trade unions in Turkey to support EU 
membership with reference to the European social model, arguing that social standards in 
European countries are achievements obtained through national legislation rather than through 
the contributions of the European social model (Koç, 2004: 40-43). Moreover, Koç asserts that 
the European Social Model can only be attained through imperialist exploitation (Koç, 2006: 
106). In this sense the workers of developed countries do not cooperate with workers of 
developing countries. Indeed, European trade unions are partnerships of imperialist 
exploitation that not only shares the surplus but sustaines the system. Koç asserts that this
partnership manifests itself through discourses of 'social partnership' or 'social dialogue' (Koç, 
2006: 71). Accordingly, the ETUC is criticised as a platform unable to struggle against 
European capital, as most of its activities are financed by the European Commission (European 
capital, in other words). This is manifested in the documents of ETUC, in which it is difficult 
to find critical approaches to privatisation and imperialism; and there are few references to 
class struggle. Moreover, Koç argues that policies of the IMF and WB are shaped by US and 
EU countries. The EU's strategy vis-a-vis Turkish membership resembles the divide-and-rule 
strategy of the imperialist powers (Koç, 2004: 10-11; Koç, 2006: 21). That is why, for Koç, the 
current pro-membership perspective resembles the Independence War of the Turkish Republic, 
and nation-state is the institution that can resist imperialism and consolidate welfare regimes 
(Koç, 1998: 254).
xx Türk-İş criticises the European Parliament and the political criteria at six points. First, the 
EU's claim that Turkey is an 'occupier' in the Republic of Cyprus is unacceptable and 
constitutes 'infringement of international law'. Second, the European Parliament expects 
Turkey to recognize the Armenian Genocide. Third, the EU policies towards minorities are 
criticised for triggering ethnic separatism. Fourth, the EU supports Greece regarding the 
problems in the Aegean Sea. Fifth, the EU reference to declare the Patriarchate as ecumenical 
and open the Clergy School in Heybeliada (which is seen as a War Academy central to Greek 
expansionism) is unacceptable. Finally, the EU supports IMF policies in Turkey (Türk-İş, 
2002c).
xxi The NATO and the EU agreed on 16 December 2002 on the Berlin plus arrangement that 
enables the EU to benefit from NATO’s military assets for its crisis management operations -
for those cases that the NATO declines to intervene. Turkey is the only non-EU NATO 
member and its position within decision making structures and missions of the European 
Security and Defence Policy stimulated controversy. Turkey expected equal participation in 
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planning, control and strategic direction of EU mission if the EU uses NATO assets. The EU 
objected to give a veto right to Turkey that is a non-EU member. However, Turkey blocked 
initiatives of the EU to provide access to NATO assets on various occasions. Turkey’s major 
concern stems from a probable EU mission regarding its conflict with the Republic of Cyprus 
and bilateral disputes with Greece. At the Brussels European Council of 2002, the EU endorsed 
Ankara Document to eliminate Turkey’s veto on ESDP-NATO cooperation. Turkey was given 
an assurance that ESDP missions would not be directed to an ally and cooperation with Turkey 
will be provided for ESDP missions. 
xxii For instance, the CHP did not support the Annan Plan, arguing that if Greek Cypriots 
became members in the name of the whole island, the Turkish armed forces would have the de 
facto status of an occupying force in EU territories (CHP, 2006: 16). There were four primary 
reasons for CHP's objection to the Annan Plan. First, although the UN made three amendments
following Greek Cypriot concerns, there were no amendments resulting from the claims of the 
Turkish side. Second, the script was not publicised fully before the referenda took place. Third, 
the accord was proposedfor referenda before Governments had reached an agreement. Finally, 
Kofi Annan used his initiative to fill the gaps about disagreements (Interview No. 58). 
Similarly, the CHP also opposes the AKP Government's initiative to extend the Customs Union 
to Cyprus and eliminate the isolation of Greek Cypriots (CHP, 2006: 448). It is highlighted that 
extending the Customs Union to Cyprus would mean recognising Greek Cypriots as 
representative of the island (CHP, 2006: 233 and 438).
The DSP published a booklet Ecevit, Cyprus and Reality About Helsinki in Turkey's EU 
Membership Process highlighting that – contrary to accusations which alleged that the Ecevit 
Government made concessions against the national interest during the Helsinki negotiations –
the Helsinki European Council envisages an unconditional candidacy process for Turkey on 
equal terms and conditions, and that DSP won a guarantee that issues concerning Cyprus would 
not be put forward as a precondition for membership (DSP, 2004: 19). There were two issues 
arising before the Helsinki Summit, and Ecevit received a guarantee letter from the then 
President of Council of Ministers, Prime Minister of Finland Lipponen. This stated that Turkey 
does not have to take its problems with Greece in the Aegean Sea to the International Court of 
Justice if both sides cannot reach a political solution by 2004 (DSP, 2004: 32); and that Turkey 
is accepted as a candidate country on equal terms and conditions without any additional 
preconditions including a political solution for the Cyprus problem. Moreover, Ecevit 
underlined continuities in Turkish policy, which recognises the existence of two separate, equal 
and independent states in Cyprus, and stated that the accession of Greek Cyprus in the name of 
the entire island is unacceptable for Turkey. Moreover, if Greek Cyprus became a member, 
Turkey has stated that it will further integrate with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(DSP, 2004: 33). It is underlined that the existence of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is 
decisive not only for the security of Turkish Cypriot society but also the security of Turkey and 
the Mediterranean (DSP, 2004: 135).
xxiii Ka-der is a member of the European Women's Lobby, and benefits from international 
mechanisms enabling groups to lobby Brussels to put pressure on national governments to 
enact reforms in favour of women (Interview No. 25). Ka-der's Ankara branch runs the 
secretariat of the Turkish Coordination of the European Women's Lobby (Interview No. 26), 
whilst the Capital City's Platform is a part of the Executive Board of the same group (Interview 
No. 29). In a similar way, the İHD has a regular exchange of ideas with European institutions 
within the European Parliament – especially the European Commission (Interview No. 19).
xxiv The Progressive Women Association (İKD) was founded by the initiative of Turkish 
Communist Party (TKP) and was active between 1975 and 1980. It had 15.000 members in 
thirty-three branches in İstanbul and Anatolia before it was banned by the military in 1979. 
Within the context of 1970s, emancipation of women was conceived within labour struggle and 
overthrow of the capitalist system (Interview No. 16). Yet, at the second phase of feminist 
struggle after 1980s, women activists questioned subordination of women problems within 
working class struggle. It is highlighted that women activists subscribe to the argument that 
women problems go beyond economy (Interview No. 18) and that Marxism had to saved from 
defining exploitation on class basis and economic order (Interview No. 77). An interviewee 
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highlights that 'she divorced from Marxism' as 'sexual hierarchy is as important as class 
hierarchy' (Interview No. 18). Classical interpretations of Marxism ignored exploitation of 
women in gender relations (Interview No. 77). In that sense, former relations within working 
class politics are criticised. First, it is accused to operate within hierarchical structures and to 
fail to acknowledge autonomy of feminism and human rights in the political sphere (Interview 
No. 77). In that sense, feminism represents a rupture to not only define women as a subject of 
and an agent in politics but also to define main contradiction for feminism as 'gender equality', 
based on exploitation and oppression of women (Interview No. 77). Second, it is argued that 
women struggle within working class struggle under the former İKD confined women question 
to problems of women workers and wives of workers, which in return turned a blind eye to 
problems of peasant, middle-class and/or bourgeois women. On the contrary, 'plural' 
conception of women problems, embracing all women that were previously externalised, such 
as middle classes, lower classes, Kurdish women, religious women, heterosexuals and Marxist 
feminists are welcomed (Interview No. 77).
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